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# West Europe Report

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19 May 1980

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No. 1578

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## UNITED STATES ACCUSED OF COMPLICITY IN AIR INCIDENT

Nicosia EIKONES in Greek 28 Mar-3 Apr 80 pp 16,17,19

[Text] From Cyprus to Norway, the air defense controllers who man 84 radar stations in the NADGE (NATO Ground Environment Air Defense) system have known since the end of February 1980 what was going to happen in the Aegean on 13 March. The only ones who had not been informed about the flight of 50 Turkish Air Force aircraft were the paramount authorities, Greek security authorities and the 28th Tactical Air Force Headquarters (Greek) which is located in Larissa and whose mission is to coordinate air defense throughout Greece. They had only limited information. In Cyprus, more specifically, at the British radar station located in Troodos, classified and detailed plans for the flight of the Turkish aircraft have existed since mid-February. The plans (airspeed, altitude, route, equipment, etc.) were classified on special tapes which were fed into radar computers after a special signal was transmitted from the coordinating center in Brussels. The NADGE system, which began functioning in 1970 with the exclusive purpose of protecting Western Europe from an air attack from the east, is, on the whole, automated on computers. There are stations for the system in Greece (Pilion) and Turkey (Balikesir-Samsun-Diyarbakir). There are actually two radar systems in Troodos. The basic mission of one, known as BMEWS, is early warning of ballistic missiles; the other contributes to and is combined with the NADGE system.

In reality, Greece was deceived by the Americans and the other NATO partners because the classified tapes never reached the radar stations manned by Greek specialists; as a result, these radars remained blank. Early detection of the Turkish aircraft was made, on the whole, by the Greek national air defense network which has no connection with NATO and whose controllers guided the Greek Air Force pilots.

That this concerned an effort to ensnare the Greek Air Force, the Greek air defense system and Greek authorities is also proved by the signal sent from the 28th Tactical Air Force Headquarters to the General Staff in Athens. The signal said: "Forty Turkish combat aircraft and maritime-patrol aircraft entered the Athens FIR (area supplying information about commercial air flights) without having previously filed flight plans as

is provided by the international regulations for air traffic." The signal was transmitted shortly before noon on 13 March while the Turks, apparently in order to keep up appearances, notified the headquarters early in the morning when the formations had already taken off from the departure bases.

A further purpose of the plan is direct blackmailing of Greece by NATO and the Americans to comply as soon as possible with their strategic plans which certainly serve no one else but themselves.

That they are trying to blackmail Greece is proved, moreover, by the fact that the plans for the Turkish Air Force operation had been prepared long before 11 February, more specifically, around the beginning of January. As is known, the famous Rogers proposals, in which the Aegean is trisected, were submitted on 11 February. The Greek authorities had been informed about what was going to happen at least one month before 13 March.

Not only did the Greek authorities know, but also certain information came across in Cyprus when, at a reception given recently at a western country's embassy, a military attache let it be understood that the Turks were not about to sit quietly and the best thing for the Greeks to do, he said characteristically, is to show understanding and accept a status quo of collective defense in the Aegean.

That all the NATO partners were informed of what was about to happen on 13 March is proved also by the fact that, since the end of February, the British in Cyprus, with a special NOTAM (notification to navigators), had proclaimed the area which begins at Akama and extends northwest of Cyprus a dangerous area up to an altitude of 36,000 feet. The explanation given is that this had to do with maneuvers. At the same time, British airplanes were observed flying from Akrotiri and nearly reaching the FIR borders of Cyprus with Greece.

The Turkish Air Force operation was not so much a routine operation, that is simply trespassing to a small depth and then turning for home, as the pilots say. Nor was it an operation of the "cat and mouse" type where the adversary waits eagerly at the borders, enters the borders for a little while, making the other pilot race after, and then disappears. To the contrary, this was an organized operation in which took part 50 or more airplanes which roamed the Aegean for six whole hours.

The entire operation was coordinated by the First Turkish Tactical Air Force Headquarters located in Eskisehir. The airplanes took off from the bases at Eskisehir, Bandirma (in the Bosphorus), Balikesir and Sigli (near Smyrna). At the same time, the bases at Mourter (near Ankara), where is based, among others, the 114th Interceptor Flight with 38 F-102A airplanes, and at Intsigii in Adana were activated.



The way in which the Turkish Air Force flights occurred leaves no doubt as to what they pursue. In air force terminology, they are called penetration missions, intrusion missions and air supremacy missions. F-104S and F-4E airplanes were mainly used and the pilots flew at an exceptionally low altitude while they were in their own area. This is the way to try to avoid detection by radar stations. Upon arrival at their targets they abruptly ascended to approximately 11,000 meters from where they executed a sharp dive and began practice of hitting targets from 3,000 meters.

Usually these flights are conducted at radii of 800 to 1600 kilometers from the base and the length of staying above the target does not exceed seven minutes. Penetration and intrusion missions are not only the most difficult, but also the most dangerous, because there is a possibility of the adversary being caught napping due to radar deception. On the other hand, in air supremacy missions, the pilots fly for a long period of time at altitudes up to 3,000 meters where, when they arrive at the area in which enemy aircraft are located, they eject auxiliary fuel tanks and then, at speeds of Mach 0.9 to 0.98, they begin striking maneuvers at an altitude of 3,000 to 20,000 meters.

On 13 March NATO not only knew the Turks' plans, but with the Turkish Air Force they tried to deceive the Greek services. During the entire operation, the Turkish pilots used radar jamming apparatus and avoided using IFF equipment which, according to NATO regulations, are to be used by all allies so that they can be followed by air defense radar. (These are electronic apparatus which broadcast a special coded signal which causes the position of the broadcasting airplane to light up on the air defense radar screen and the radar of the pilot who is speeding toward interception.) If this equipment is not used it means that radar detection occurs upside down and, because radars act like chains, if one station presents anomalies, then all the others are directly affected. This certainly did not happen on 13 March. The only ones affected were the Greek stations which at a certain moment localized the positions except as needed for take-off of Greek Air Force airplanes from the 110th Battle Wing in Larissa and the 115th and 116th in Souda for visual reconnaissance.

At the same time, the bases of the 114th Interception Wing in Tanagra with F.1CG Mirages and the 117th Wing in Andravida (Peloponnisos) with F-4E Phantoms were placed on alert. It is characteristic that in France, which also has a special relationship with NATO, in order for entry of West German F-104G airplanes and F-4E Phantoms to be allowed into French air space, the pilots must activate IFF apparatus or they are considered and confronted as enemies.

Something which did not escape the attention of specialists is the element which in some way gave the character of the entire operation. The entry of Turkish airplanes into the Aegean FIR occurred at four points: between Limnos and Lesbos, Lesbos and Khios, Samos and Kos and Kos and Rhodes.

There was less than 16 flying-minutes distance from the points where Turkish airplanes were located to the air bases at Larissa, Agkhialos and Tanagra. (It should be noted that in order for the possibility of penetrating the air defense network to be restricted, no more than 14 minutes must pass from the moment when the pilots receive the signal for take-off at the waiting station up to the moment when they are able to have the target on the airplane radar. At any rate, this is the standard set by NATO and it considers it necessary for the success of interception missions.)

Last February the Turks suddenly surprised everyone with the communication saying that they are abrogating Notification to Air Navigators (NOTAM) Number 714 which they had issued in August 1974. The Turkish NOTAM, as is known, abolished Greek responsibility in approximately half of the Aegean. The Turks' communication occurred at a surprising time and led to many thoughts. Why this gesture, so much generosity on the part of the Turks? Perhaps many still ask themselves why. But very few know the real truth. Indeed, on the Greek side we hurried to react with a courteous gesture. We retracted the corresponding Greek NOTAM which we issued in September 1974. The truth is that the Turks received an assurance from NATO that they would give them many of the jet-propelled F-104Gs known as "Starfighters" or flying coffins. The West German Air Force will not need them any longer (it has 430 today) after receiving the multiple-role jet-propelled "Panavia Tornados" with folding wings which are today the pride of European technology. (The Tornado is constructed through collaboration of England, Italy and West Germany.) Naturally, now the Starfighters are not considered flying coffins because of improvements made on them by the West Germans. It is estimated that the Turks will receive 200 of these airplanes.

The Turks not only know well what they are seeking but in the calculations which they make it seems clear that their purpose is not to protect the Atlantic Alliance from attack from the east but to pierce Greece's air defence network. Lockheed F-104Gs or Starfighters are considered ideal for such missions. They are so small, with a wing span of just 6.68 meters, hard to perceive, exceptionally quick on a straight line (1,320 miles per hour airspeed) and particularly maneuverable with an astonishing acceleration which reaches 254 meters per second. Moreover, they are capable of flying at a speed of 915 miles at an altitude of only 300 meters above the sea's surface. In other words, they can cover, within less than 24 minutes, the distance from the First Tactical Air Force Headquarters located in Eskisehir to Athens or Nicosia. Because of their construction, even if they are hit, their electrical equipment continues functioning, including the IFF reconnaissance apparatus which helps them return to their base. The German pilots say that if the Phantoms can be compared to Mercedes then Starfighters are like Porsches.

The Turkish Air Force presently has in its ranks 96 Starfighters which were procured from the United States and Italy. It is so anxious to acquire

others as soon as possible that, with the special credit voted by NATO, it "bought" from the Netherlands last February 40 new Starfighters from Netherlands Air Force stock. The "sale" was officially announced by the Netherlands' minister of defense, G. Solton, and, curiously, up to now, it has not been publicized, at least in Greek territory.

NATO not only agreed to Turkish demands to repudiate NOTAM 714 but, even more, it proceeded to assure the Turks that their old claims for supply of weapons systems of former technology will be satisfied. At the same time, NATO brains have turned towards Greece and they indirectly let it understand that many things have changed, but, more clearly and rashly, they put to it the dilemma: Either it will agree on the matter of the Aegean favorably to NATO or the Turks will enter the Aegean without our being able to control them.

That Greece is facing a snare is clearer than crystal. At any rate, this was verified just six days after the episode in the Aegean by American Deputy Secretary of State Vest speaking to the U.S. Senate. He said, "I believe that Greece wants to return to NATO with the former terms, but it has not stated this officially. In such a case, disagreement would be noted in the NATO Council and, at any rate, the structure of administration has changed since then. Negotiations are continuing, but it is a complex issue and acceptance of operational adjustments by members of the Alliance is needed."

The operation-provocation of the Turkish Air Force in the Aegean on 13 March was nothing other than the application in deed of new operational adjustments which the NATO brains drew up in dark underground centers (in order for the illuminated operations maps to be discernable) of the Alliance's operations.

And, yes, this time there was "visual reconnaissance" and "neighboring surveillance" but what will happen in the future is something which will have to worry the NATO brains because they know very well that there are always borders which, if they are ever penetrated, then the issue of existence is made more urgent. Then surely the danger will come far more from the west than they imagine.

9247  
CSO: 4908

## REPORTER ANALYZES OBSTACLES ON RESUMING TALKS

Nicosia EIKONES in Greek 28 Mar-30 Apr 80 pp 9, 41

[Article by Iakovos Tenedios: "Collusion or Intransigence?"]

[Text] Once more the Turkish intransigence is becoming an obstacle to the start of a substantive and constructive dialogue which could lead to the solution of the Cypriot problem. Apparently at least, this time the intransigence is exclusively due to the Turkish Cypriot leadership and specifically to the attitude of Denktash who advances irrational and supercilious demands with an aim at humiliating not only the Greek Cypriot side but the international Organisation [United Nations] as well.

In other words, Denktash wants the Greek Cypriot side to renounce the last resolution of the UN General Assembly in order for the talks to be resumed. No, he is not satisfied with the fact that the talks could start on the basis of the 19 May [President Kyprianou-Denktash] agreement. He wants us to renounce the resolution, to tell the more than 100 nations which voted for it: "Come, take back your resolution, we do not need your support, your effort was in vain." This is Denktash's demand. But, in advancing this demand he has other things in mind. He aims much too far ahead. If we renounce the resolution he will appear at the table of the negotiations not for the dialogue but in order to dictate his conditions. He is bragging and protesting that by appealing our case to the General Assembly we violated the sixth article of the 19 May agreement. He does not consider the fact that, 1 day following the signing of the agreement, he himself violated it with his talk to the Turkish Resistance Organization [TRF], just as he prefers to ignore the fact that our petition to the General Assembly was the result of his intransigence during the 15 June talks which were interrupted 1 week later precisely because of this intransigence. The manner in which he wanted to impose the bizonal solution is known as is also known the whole comedy he played in cooperation with Evkaf on the Varosha matter. In spite of all this, he now says that he warned us not to go to the United Nations. In other words, he wanted us to surrender ourselves to him bound hand and foot, to accept with servitude what he was saying, bowing our heads and saying, "evet, efendim" [yes, sir]. This is how Denktash feels about the talks



and the dialogue. Naturally, following the recent developments, the question arises: Is Denktash alone behind this whole Turkish intransigence or is he supported by Turkey?

The most recent statements of the Demirel party spokesman, Justice Party Secretary General Mendese, were published--by coincidence or intentionally--in HALKIN SESI on 17 March, exactly on the day this newspaper was publishing the text of the arrogant Denktash statement. Responding to the question, "Do you believe in the inter-communal talks?" Mendese said that Turkey considers the inter-communal talks the only way to find a solution to the Cypriot question and that it sincerely supports their continuation. He does not in any way mention any conditions. On the other hand, in response to a question about Varosha, he said that the matter is very important and that it should be given priority during the talks.

About 15 days after the Mendese statements, Turkish Foreign Minister Ermen said that his government supports the procedure of talks. He too did not mention any conditions.

Rightfully, then, one raises the question whether Denktash, taking advantage of the troubles of the Turkish government, is trying to follow his own line, disregarding Ankara's recommendations. There exist more indications which could be interpreted as "transigence" on the part of the Turkish government. But such an assessment could not be absolutely sound because, first of all, we have the known statements by Cagliyangil who is an important cadre of the Demirel party. Then, we must not forget that the Demirel government is presently negotiating with the western countries for economic assistance and is trying to get increased American assistance which is subject to congressional approval. It is therefore very natural for Demirel to appear as moderate.

I fear, therefore, lest there be a collusion in this matter. Ankara is moderate while Denktash appears intransigent.

"I do what I can"--Ankara is presumably telling those who possibly are pressing it--"but the Turkish Cypriot leadership insists."

No need to say how ridiculous such an alibi is if one considers the fact that Denktash is but a tool of Ankara and does not dare express an opposing view. We have a recent example. In a statement in Istanbul on his way to London, he dared criticize the lifting of NOTAM 714 with regard to the air space. The Ankara reaction was swift. Upon his arrival in London Denktash was forced to recall his statement and to explain that he did not criticize the Turkish action and that he simply said that the Greek Cypriots are exploiting the lifting of NOTAM 714. We believe implicitly that if it desires the resumption of the talks, Ankara is in a position to bring intransigent Denktash to reason any moment it wishes to do so.

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CSO:4906

## ARMENIANS RECALL PAST, PLEDGE SUPPORT TO GREEK CYPRIOTS

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 24 Apr 80 p 1

[Text] Nicosia (Turkish News Agency in Cyprus): In a communique published by the "Armenian Coordination Committee" in the Greek sector of Cyprus "on the occasion of the anniversary of the genocide visited upon the Armenians in Turkey," a call has been made for "the United Nations to take responsibility for restoring the rights of 6 million Armenians."

It is declared in the communique that the Armenians living in the Greek sector of Cyprus, in memory of the one and one-half million Armenians claimed to have been subjected to genocide and mass murder in 1915, will not work [today], and that all Armenian institutions and places of business will be closed. It is also stated that groups of Armenian volunteers will go to hospitals in Nicosia, Larnaca, and Limassol to donate blood "in memory of the slaughtered Armenians and in support of the just cause of the Cypriot people."

Meanwhile, it was also announced that a memorial service will be held in the amphitheater of the Armenian Primary School, and that a ceremony will also be held this afternoon in the salon of the Nicosia Municipal Theater. It is reported that Zareh Aznavoryan, the Armenian Patriarch on Cyprus, will speak during the ceremony.

9173

CSO: 4907

## NEW TFSC TRADE REGULATIONS EXPECTED

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 18 Mar 80 p 9

[Text] Nicosia, ANATOLIAN AGENCY -- The local CYPRUS NEWS AGENCY has reported that a new foreign trade regime is expected to go into effect in the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus [TFSC] following approval by the Council of Ministers.

The announced text states: "The new foreign trade regime is being applied in parallel with the foreign trade regime put into effect in Turkey recently, bearing in mind the TFSC's special conditions and the importance of foreign trade to the TFSC economy."

The goals of the new foreign trade regime are listed as follows in the text:

To eliminate the foreign exchange squeeze brought about by the stiff foreign trade regime now in effect.

To ensure a steady supply of goods on the market sufficient to answer demand and thereby prevent hoarding and black marketeering, to assuage inflationary pressures, to bring maximum stability to the basic consumer goods which weigh heavily on the cost of living index.

To use economic measures to reduce smuggling from the south to a minimum.

To build a healthy economy. Within this concept, especially to supply industrial inputs with speed and economy and build a healthy industrial structure.

To increase Treasury revenues.

The regime emphasizes free market conditions. The goal is to give direction to commerce through economic measures and incentives such as the in-tariff, in addition to police measures, and, by ensuring the necessary flexibility, to reduce bureaucracy to a minimum.

There are no prohibitions, quotas or restrictions on exports and imports in the regime other than those prohibitions and restrictions posed by other laws. The mechanism envisaged for managing the economy includes tariffs, measures, customs controls and price registration and premium practices.

All imports to the TFSC and all exports from the TFSC are attached to licenses, prior permits and certifications issued by the Trade Ministry.

Some goods are subject to prior approval by the Agriculture and Livestock Ministry, some by the Health Ministry, some by the Interior Ministry and some by the Defense Ministry.

Prior permits are issued bearing in mind the social situation, production status, producer and consumer interests, health and other matters. Prior permits in agriculture and livestock require consultation with the Trade Ministry. Permits having to do with health are evaluated at the technical level from the standpoint of the health of society.

It is pointed out also that the present basic and layered exchange rate system will remain in effect in the new foreign trade regime.

In the new regime, importers who import goods for tourist purposes or luxury consumer goods are required to deposit in the authorized bank the cost of the goods plus 40 percent in the applicable foreign exchange. The cost of the goods is transferred to the exporter by the bank, the 40 percent is transferred to the state's layered exchange rate account and the equivalent in Turkish liras is paid to the importer by the bank.

This condition does not apply in the import of tourism and industrial investments and inputs or of goods subject to control with maximum prices set by the ministry. The applicable foreign exchange to be deposited in excess of the cost of the goods by importers of goods other than these is 20 percent over the cost of the goods.

The text indicates that imports from Turkey will be encouraged by means of minimum customs duties.

The new foreign trade regime to go into effect in the TFSC prohibits removal from the country of certain items by travellers. A limit is placed on the goods which may be taken out by travellers.

8349

CSO: 4907



## 'SUITCASE' TOURISM TARGET OF NEW TFSC REGULATIONS

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 13 Apr 80 pp 1, 13

[Text] Nicosia (HURRIYET) -- The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus [TFSC] is limiting significantly the goods which tourists may take with them when they leave the island.

The TFSC Trade Ministry published a list, to go into effect immediately, of the items which may not be removed from the island during tourist trips. The ministry also published a list of the items tourists may take from the island. The list divides goods into categories, assigning each a point value, and a tourist will be allowed to take abroad goods totalling only 10,000 points.

The TFSC Trade Ministry is forbidding importation to Cyprus of 15 types of goods, and the Turkish Republic Trade Ministry as well has announced a ban on these goods, which are sold by means of "customs sales abroad" as "deliver to port" or "deliver to airport."

The Trade Ministry and the Customs and Monopolies Ministry, in order to back up the TFSC government's decision, have sent instructions to the customs gates that the required controls be carried out meticulously.

Following is the list of forbidden items which, in accordance with the TFSC directive, tourists will not be allowed to take off the island and which both Turkey and the TFSC have announced will be subject to tight customs inspections:

Televisions, music boxes, video sets, crystal chandeliers, rugs, furs and fake furs, vacuum cleaners, dishwashers, washing machines, refrigerators, speedboats and motorboats for purposes other than fishing, bicycles, motor bikes and motorcycles, solid and liquid vegetable oils, raw coffee, agricultural seeds and pesticides, baby foods, toilet paper, professional tools and hardware, electric appliances and light bulbs, spare parts.

The items to which the 10,000-point tourist limit applies and the point value assigned each are:

Umbrella (200), album (300), thermos (300), iron (2,000), pocket lighter (300), table lighter (1,000), playing cards (600), straw and wicker bags and baskets (300), small toys (100), large toys (500), watch (2,000), glasses (large set) (7,000), porcelain dishes (156-piece set) (15,000), crystal (10,000), nonstick skillet (500), saucepan (1,500), flatware set (600), small synthetic rug less than 2 sq meters (2,000), blanket (3,000), flatware set of silver, chrome or similar metal (3,000), candlestick (1,500 (1,500), serving trays (1,500), whistling kettle (4,000), hair dryer (3,000), electric mixer (3,000), electric appliance (2,500), plastic and lace tablecloths (2,000), radio cassettes and pocket radios (1,500), normal radio (4,000), radio cassettes (including those for automobiles) (10,000), phonograph (8,000), bathroom and kitchen scales (1,000), electric shavers (2,000), cameras (10,000), sun glasses (2,000), picnic coolers (4,000), portable pocket calculator (2,000), each meter of cloth originating in third country (1,500), ground specialty coffee (200), drugs of which no more than 3 containers may be taken out (500), tea (100), chocolate (600), perfume (500), face creams (400), shaving lotion (500), women's clothing (2,000), men's clothing (4,000), men's and women's raincoats (6,000).

8349

CS01 4907

## ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIVERSITY PROTESTED

Nicosia TA NZA in Greek 3 Apr 80 p 7

[Text] Political, economic and social reasons dictated the establishment of a university in Cyprus, according to the 1 December 1979 decision of the general meeting of the Patrai [University] Cypriot Students Association [SKSP]. The Ministerial Council in Cyprus has decided a university in Cyprus will be in operation in 4 years at the latest. Greek will be the official language and the university will offer courses in medicine, engineering, technology, agriculture, fine arts, foreign languages, and social and humanistic sciences. Students from Greece and other countries will be accepted, as well as Turkish Cypriot students following special arrangements.

This decision was urgent and necessary. The lack of a supreme educational institution in Cyprus has been felt for years and it has become more acute following the traitorous coup and the Turkish invasion. Relevant studies and reports were submitted long ago, but the decision was delayed unjustifiably, because there were strong reactions by government and private circles who were continually advancing various obstacles. Among their arguments were "the danger to the Hellenization of Cyprus" and "the creation of a Cypriot conscience." Finally, the super-nationalists failed and the important decision for the island's progress was taken. We believe that the decision will be implemented soon and that efforts will be undertaken for the best organization and operation of the university.

The university should be autonomous and independent and should not be under the control of any other university or any organization. UNFSCO's role will be consultative. It will be assisting it financially and it will be sending experts when the need arises. In no case should Greek or foreign [curriculum] models be introduced rampantly. Our country has its own needs, its own political, cultural and social conditions. It has its own characteristics. Any imitation without previous study and careful review is against progress and will lead to unproductive conservatism and to retrogradation. Textbooks should be written in a progressive and critical spirit in plain, understandable language, on a scientific basis and with absolutely competent knowledge in each science. These books

and the university as a whole should aim at promoting research and critical thought and not servility, oppression, dogmatism, blind submissiveness, conservatism and atavism.

The university must be a self-governed institution and it should itself be making important decisions without outside interventions. It should itself manage its finances and the assistance given by the state and international organisations. Its operation should be independent of change in the government and political conditions.

The participation of students in the decision-making process should be indispensable and the professional personnel, the professors and the students should be represented at its supreme governing bodies. The free exchange of information will be achieved only if those teaching at the university are in a position to perform research and make conscious the social importance and the impact of activities when the political and social developments are discussed freely and when the teaching is not influenced by personal interests or pressures from political parties.

Our university can be staffed by outstanding Cypriot professionals in Cyprus or in various foreign universities and research institutes. It should accept students without discrimination as to sex, religion, nationality, should consider each student as a separate personality and should respect his cultural tradition, his rights and his freedoms. The alien students should be equal to the Cypriot students. An indispensable precondition for the sound operation of our university is the existence of equal education opportunities for all. Scholarships should be granted on the basis of financial need and performance, student homes should be established and free medical-medicinal care should be provided. Also, accommodations should be provided for student attendance of recreation, cultural, athletic and professional events. The curriculum should be worked out with professional and progressive criteria and opportunity should be provided for dialogue, debate and critical research.

We believe that the establishment of the university will give new life to our country. The presence of a democratic student youth, the return of important men of letters from abroad and the utilization to best advantage of those now in Cyprus will open immense prospects for the social, political and cultural development of our island.

The enrollment of foreign students will help in the development of our relations with their countries. New avenues will be opened for the Cypriot youth which with its massive, competitive presence will influence the whole population.

But to achieve this, the Cypriot students must live with and circulate among the people, with the people, because they are part of the people. It is impossible to establish a university of a different status by following the American and West European models which are presumably



"modern." Our students must not be isolated in the university environment else how can they feel the daily problems of the country? How can they influence and be influenced? How can they move to assert their rights if need be? How and where can they protest when the conditions dictate it?

The location of the university is of great importance. In no case should it be established in a remote area; but in a city, near the people so that workers, employees, pupils, students, professionals, young and old, men and women all together should contribute to the solution of our problems, to the development and progress of our Cyprus.

In the procedure for establishing our university the question of rational compensation of the professional staff should be given serious consideration. The university should be the means for helping through research programs the gainful employment of the already existing professional potential.

7520  
CSO:4908

## BAD FERTILIZER RUINS POTATO CROP

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 1 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Erten Kasimoglu]

[Text] Approximately 300 domams [1 domam = 940 sq meters] of seed potatoes planted this season in Yesilkoy [Agios Andronikos] and vicinity reportedly have rotted in the ground, with producers suffering losses of around 4 million Turkish liras.

According to information obtained, this damage is thought to have been caused by new fertilizer imported this year which is still being used experimentally by our producers.

Authorities pointed out that with the ground rot of the approximately 1,500 bags of potatoes planted, the 1,200 tons of produce expected this season are lost and this will have a serious negative effect even on the home market.

The Potatoes and Carrots Producers Union has conducted studies in the affected area and applied to the Agriculture Ministry asking that a commission be set up to ascertain the true causes of the disaster in the area.

Union President M. Altinay said in a statement on the matter that they wanted the producers' losses to be clarified and itemized immediately and that legal recourse would be taken in the event of any loss found not to be the producers' responsibility.

## Guzelyurt

Meanwhile, it was learned that many potato producers in the Guzelyurt area had suffered a similar experience and a team from the Agriculture Office had begun work to conduct studies in the Yesilkoy and other areas. The Agriculture Office team was expected in Yesilkoy yesterday afternoon.

## No Tobacco Crop

It is also reported that tobacco producers in the Karpas region are unable to plant their crops this year because they have not yet been paid last year's tobacco payments. The failure to set new tobacco prices after the devaluation has reportedly caused considerable consternation among tobacco producers.

## FDP BUNDESTAG DEPUTY REPRIMANDED BY PARTY SECRETARY GENERAL

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Apr 80 p 4

[Text] Bonn, 24 April--The FDP leadership reacted with considerable annoyance last Thursday to statements by the FDP deputy Moellemann about the future of the coalition in Bonn. In an interview with the magazine QUICK Moellemann had made the continuation of governmental cooperation with the SPD dependent on the continued chancellorship of Helmut Schmidt. For the "post-Schmidt period," according to Moellemann, "new perspectives for the FDP" might open up "in view of a change in the CDU/CSU and possibly of an SPD that was moving to the left." The secretary general of the FDP Verheugen said that Moellemann did not have the authority to make statements of this kind. No party committee had as yet discussed any statement about the coalition for the parliamentary elections and there was no need to involve the FDP in a debate about coalitions.

The principal intention of Verheugen's blunt statement is to counter the impression that Party Chairman Genscher himself might be behind Moellemann's statements. Otherwise there might be speculation along these lines; Moellemann is known (and feared) for his tendency to jump the gun, but it is also common knowledge that Genscher has a high regard for this deputy from the young guard of the FDP and occasionally allows him to make statements of which he (Genscher) approves, but which he does not wish to have attributed to himself.

In Verheugen's opinion Moellemann's very forthright statements could bring the FDP out of a comfortable situation into an unpleasant one. Once Strauss had been nominated as the leading candidate of the CDU/CSU, the FDP did not have to explain at great length why it would in all probability declare itself once again in favor of a coalition with the SPD under Chancellor Schmidt at the party convention in Freiburg in June. According to Verheugen, Moellemann had "made a problem" of this issue again, by practically saying that a coalition with the SPD--but without Schmidt--was essentially unthinkable; in addition, he was just fuelling speculation about the conditions under which there could foreseeably be some cooperation with the CDU.

The policy-making committees of the FDP will not consider the form of any statement concerning a renewal of the Federal coalition until after the elections in North Rhine-Westphalia. Probably it will be much like 1976, when Genscher announced in his keynote speech at the party election convention--also in Freiburg--the party's intention to continue governing with the SPD under Chancellor Schmidt and the delegates approved this without discussion.

Moellemann's statements would be a serious embarrassment for the FDP if they were associated with the "offers of a coalition" made by Strauss. In the interview Moellemann had mentioned, among other things, deepseated differences of opinion between the FDP and a "substantial number" of SPD members who were in favor of a different foreign policy.

Moellemann does not think that the FDP will form a coalition with Strauss, but he also mentions "unshakeable factual conditions" in negotiations with the SPD about the coalition: "That also applies to the foreign policy part of the government's program. If no agreement is reached, we will not form a coalition. The second condition is that the Chancellor's name is again Helmut Schmidt." Moellemann went on to say that in his view Schmidt could successfully pursue the course he considers correct "only with the help of the FDP." Anyone wanting to see this policy continued would have to vote for the FDP. An SPD that was too strong would weaken Helmut Schmidt "because more and more people from the left wing would be in his party."

Genscher too recently made a statement that the situation of the SPD would have to be considered in any continuation of the coalition. But it is Genscher himself who, as far as possible, wants to avoid public debate about the coalition; he would like to create a situation in which the voters choose the FDP "for its own sake" and not as the partner of one of the major parties.

9581

CSO: 3103

## REPUBLICAN PARTY EYES 1982 CANTONAL, 1983 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

Paris LE MONDE in French 18 Mar 80 p 10

[Editorial: "The Republican Party Prepares for the 'After 1981' Local Elections"; passages in slantlines published in italics]

[Text] In Jouy-en-Josas (Yvelines), on Sunday 16 March, Mr Jacques Blanc, secretary general of the Republican Party [PR], took part in a training session meant for the "Republican" militants of the Ile-de-France region. At that time, Mr Blanc analysed the results of the last partial cantonal elections as showing a "slow and inexorable decline of the opposition." He asked his militants to start preparing right away local consultations, the 1982 cantonal ones and the 1983 municipal ones, which will follow the 1981 presidential elections.

According to Mr Jacques Blanc, the cantonal election of March 1979 marked /"the end of a series"/ of local victories for the opposition. This is confirmed by the setbacks for the communists and the socialists in the partial cantonal elections, particularly noticeable since early 1980. The switch of socialist votes to communist candidates on the second ballot is not good. The candidates of the PR are in the best position to drain towards the majority the votes of disappointed socialists. It happened with Kabul.

At the time of a "regional training forum" organized by the Yvelines federation of the PR in Jouy-en-Josas on Sunday 16 March, the secretary general of the Republican Party repeated the analysis he had made on Thursday 13 March, at the conclusion of the last meeting of the political branch of his training session (LE MONDE 15 March). Without including the partial elections of Sunday 16 March, he noted that since the beginning of the year the Socialist Party had advanced in four cantons but it had lost ground in 10 cantons and improved its standing in only four cantons. In view of the transfer of socialist votes to communist candidates, he affirms that /"from a political point of view, the fishing season is open to all."/



This /"slow and relentless decline of the opposition"/ strengthens his wish to prepare, without delay, for local voting which will take place during the next 7-year term, so as to give the Republican Party a means for establishing itself, something it does not have at present. /"We must look beyond the presidential elections of 1981. (. . .) From your ranks,"/ he said to the militants, /"will come the municipal councilors, the mayors, the county councilors, the congressmen, and, why not? the ministers, in short, those who will be in charge of the country."/

Thus the training periods organized by the Republican Party last December were not only there to show local officials the ways and means for keeping the loyalty of the approximately 60,000 members claimed by the PR, but also to insure the "promotion" of certain ones among them. The mission of these future candidates will be to take advantage of the weak points of the opposition and the RPR [Rally for the Republic] (which are thought of as their adversaries by certain leaders, the same as the communists and the socialists).

Seven regional training periods were organized between now and the month of June. Within 2 days the trainees learn or perfect their billposting techniques (to use brushes with long bristles for pasting on the boarding, to put on gloves in order to tear down the posters of the opposition which has slyly added crushed glass to the paste), to write pamphlets, to express themselves orally, and the /"dynamics"/ of private meetings (to show a /"sense of humor"/ when answering questions, and /"the ability to draw strong political conclusions."/)

Though the 1981 election is not /"the direct concern of the Republican Party"/ whose /"role is not that of moving into the foregroundd"/ in the presidential campaign, Mr Jacques Blanc is evidently very much involved in it. /"At the right moment, we will send the guard and the rearguard of our militants and sympathizers,"/ said he. The time has already come, a long time ago it seems. It is not in order to prepare for the 1982 cantonal elections that the leaders of the PR offer their trainees, under the heading of "doctrinal modules," training sessions dedicated to learning /French Democracy/, to explaining France's foreign policy, and to detailed criticism of the socialist plan.

9465

CSO: 3100

## GISCARDIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Noel-Jean Bergeroux: "The Presidential Election"]

[Excerpt] The French Democratic Union [UDF] itself did not hesitate, during its weekend congress, to take the plunge. Undoubtedly anxious not to let the Elysee administrative staff completely freeze out (as it is alleged to be going to do) that of the UDF in preparing for the 1981 deadline, Mr Lecanuet took it upon himself, on Sunday, to decree mobilization--"in the field." The former senior minister did not bother about circumlocutions in order to encourage his troops to action, and he even called for the setting up of local "support committees" that would constitute the basic cells of the electoral machinery.

The RPR [Rally for the Republic] on the campaign trail, the UDF mobilized: and the President? He, it seems, is not campaigning. His entourage says, he himself says, that he will make his decision known within the legal time limit, that is, late, and that while waiting, his only concern is the conduct of the affairs of France. But in the reaffirmation of the choice of a "just environment," in the "sorrow" expressed in the name of France in the face of opposition, in brief, in this will to pose as defender of dialogue and civil peace, is it putting intent on trial to see the concern of a President who wishes to remain President? And why would this be blameworthy if care were taken not to reproach others for doing the same?

Likewise, is it not taking an interest in the future of the country only at the highest level to participate in the inauguration of a fair that will attract millions of visitors, and to talk with a meeting of elected representatives and economic leaders whose influence is certainly not inconsiderable at the time of a national consultation? Is it not taking a step which consists of appealing in turn to the different categories of society (and of the electorate) to go on 29 March to Youth Week to hold a dialogue there with representatives of that age sector--for whose benefit, moreover, the threshold of electoral majority was rightly lowered in 1974?

Is it refusing to become involved in electoral preparations to stigmatize those who affirm that "France is giving up," when the target, obviously, is Mr Chirac, according to whom "France is sinking" (TF 1, 4 March)?

Indeed, we will concede to Mr Giscard d'Estaing that his present diplomacy cannot be accused of electoral ulterior motives. The reactions provoked in some Jewish circles--and expressed in the magazine L'ARCHE or by the JEWISH TELEGRAPH AGENCY--could fill even the chief of state with some anxiety with regard to that part of the electorate. In the Near East, as in France, the choice of the median way lays one open to some unpleasantness. It was observed at the UDF congress that this foreign policy creates uneasiness even in the ranks of the Giscardians themselves. There, pro-Israeli sentiments are widely shared, and support for the Atlantic alliance is still steadfast. There, the president of the Republic is reproached, sometimes severely, for not having affirmed Israel's right to exist "with the same force" as he had used to proclaim the Palestinians' right to self-determination. The UDF has thus energetically made known that it would not permit Mr Yasser Arafat to come to Paris as long as the PLO did not renounce the destruction of the Hebrew state. If we take into account the close relations which the UDF leaders have with the Elysee, we can consider that this warning was not formulated without previous consultation, since Mr Lecanuet repeated it in his final speech.

With regard to the Giscardians, nevertheless, the danger of disaffection does not seem very serious. On Sunday, the UDF began to fulfill its role of driving belt for the will of the chief of state, by embarking on the path of justifying and explaining his foreign policy. In addition to Mr Lecanuet, who prepared for the occasion the theory of "Parallel friendships," we saw the Giscardian old guard mount the battlement and defend the presidential arguments. If there is anxiety in some hearts, it is unlikely that distrust will long prevail in public attitudes: the Giscardians, even the newcomers, seem little disposed to let go the prey for the shadow and to reverse the order of priorities. They know they are obliged to remain united, for the main point for them is victory in 1981.

Lastly, and this is not the least electoral of the positions he has taken, Mr Giscard d'Estaing once again advocated a rallying, a general understanding, a going beyond political divisions. In the same period his supporters were stressing at Orleans the need for the UDF to be at the center of the starting point of the enlargement of what Mr Jean-Pierre Soisson has called "the popular base on which the leadership of France should be secured:" the hard core, in a way, around which there would gravitate, not only the political parties, but also the levels of the electorate that bring about presidential victories.

To govern at the center without governing against the left. To be in the middle without being neutral. To win over by moderation without disappointing by an excess of timidity. To place oneself at the meeting point of national convergences and at the locus of pacification: such is the Giscardian strategy. It is valid both for administering and for campaigning style. Up to now it has not worked too badly for him.

It will be noted, however, that after six years of efforts for "relaxation" and for "a better understanding and cooperation on the part of the French," Mr Giscard d'Estaing gives proof of some optimism when he believes he notices "certain results" (whose "limits," it is true, he himself observes). In fact, what he has said at Lyon on the "excessive antagonisms of the political leaders" is a little the acknowledgment of his own failure in the matter.

9434

CSO: 3100



## ENVIRONMENTALIST CANDIDATE ANNOUNCES PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS

Paris LE MONDE in French 29 Mar 80 p 9

[Article: "The Presidential Election: Mr Delarue (SOS-Environment) Announces His Candidacy"]

[Text] Mr Jean-Claude Delarue, president of SOS-Environment, a member of the Economic and Social Council, announced on Thursday, 27 March, his candidacy for the presidential election. Mr Delarue, who had been excluded from the Political Ecology Movement (MEP) in January for having taken a position on the presidential election, by evoking his possible candidacy, in structures that look on themselves as representative of the ecologist current, considers that the MEP "is on the wrong track" in trying to come to an understanding with the Friends of the Earth.

For Mr Delarue, the ecologist candidate should be able to appeal to voters outside this current, which implies that he would be independent of any political group. The president of SOS-Environment considers that the Friends of the Earth do not offer guarantees of political independence.

Born in 1939, a teacher at the university, Paris-VII, Mr Delarue was a member of the PSU [United Socialist Party], then of the Socialist Party. In 1970, he set up the Federation of Means of Transport, of which he is the president, then in 1977, the SOS-Environment association, of which he is also president. He was, in 1979, one of the principal driving forces of Europe-Ecology.

After the announcement of this candidacy, two reactions were immediately noted, that of the Ecological Liaison Committee, one of whose components, Parisian Region Ecology, stressed that at the national meetings at Dijon in November 1979, it was decided that the possible designation of a candidate would not take place before the ecological States General, which are to be held at Lyon on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th of May next; and the reaction of Mr Philippe Lebreton, president of the Political Ecology Movement (MEP), who proclaimed that his organization "cannot accept this process of self-designation."

The support committee for Mr Jean-Marie Le Pen's candidacy in the 1981 presidential election broadcasts daily on a special telephone line, which it has baptized "Radio Le Pen" (No 522-40-38 in Paris), a series of messages, interviews or editorials setting out the political options of the president of the National Front and of his friends.

9634

C80: 3100

## PASOK INVOLVED IN ELECTION PREPARATIONS

Athens EKONOMISI in Greek 6 Apr 80 pp 1, 11

~~/Text/~~ Chairman A. Papandreou of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement ~~/PASOK/~~ and its Executive Office have sounded "an election rally." In an urgent circular to all PASOK organizations they asked for the immediate mobilization of all members, cadres and deputies and for constant readiness "because the historic developments have established PASOK as the political spokesman of the people's movement in the country. For this reason PASOK is shouldering a tremendous responsibility toward the people's movement: to open the avenue that will lead to a Greece which will belong to its people. For this reason PASOK has no right to fail."

Until 30 May

"Beyond doubt the coming elections, bringing together the experience of the political and social struggle of the previous years, will develop a new reality and new dynamics with different realignments among the political forces."

Following the urgent circular of the PASOK chairman and the Executive Council it was decided:

1. To start immediately the procedure for the selection of the PASOK candidates ~~/for deputies/~~ for the coming elections.
2. To establish four work groups for the election struggle.
3. To complete all procedures by 30 May when the names of candidates ~~/for the Chamber of Deputies/~~ will be announced.

Specifically, the circular sent already to the nome committees includes:

A. The procedure and the criteria for selecting the candidates. All PASOK members at all levels of the movement will be participating in this procedure, thus reaffirming once more the true democratic structure of the organization.

B. The establishment of the work groups for the election campaign. They are:

1. The committee for a campaign for funds needed for the election.
2. The public relations committee.
3. The committee for technical preparations.
4. The committee for legal coverage of the election struggle.

#### Historic Responsibility

The circular of A. Papandreou and the Executive Council points out, in part:

In view of the enormity of the national, political, economic, social and cultural crisis, the people demand that the main agent of Change, PASOK, respond immediately to the multishaded crisis and to lead the country out of the serious impasse, opening at the same time the way to the great Change. PASOK, fully conscious of its historic responsibility, has accepted the people's historic challenge.

It is an indisputable fact that the coming elections, bringing together the experience of the political and social struggle of the previous years, will bring about a new reality and new dynamics with different realignments among the political forces.

In view of the acknowledged inability of the Right ~~Right~~ <sup>New Democracy Party</sup> to gather votes with some "degree of certainty," the procedure of electing a president ~~of the Republic~~ <sup>of the Republic</sup> may inevitably start the procedure for elections ~~of a new Chamber of Deputies~~ <sup>of a new Chamber of Deputies</sup>. For this reason, the specific date for the election of a new president will determine the initiatives and the start of the necessary inter-party procedures for our movement. The time to be set for the elections should not take PASOK by surprise but on the contrary should find its organization in a state of readiness and sound order.

One of the basic prerequisites of the required readiness is the selection of PASOK's candidates for the Chamber of Deputies through the substantive and responsible participation of the organized grass-roots.

The responsibility of PASOK's members and cadres is tremendous. This historic development has established PASOK as the political spokesman of the people's movement in the country. For this reason PASOK is shouldering a tremendous responsibility toward the people's movement: to open the avenue that leads to a Greece which will belong to its people. For this reason PASOK has no right to fail.

## All Are Enrolled

This fact has also a startling message for all of us. Everyday we all must be more and more aware that we belong to a movement whose objective is the socialist transformation of our society. This must be reflected in the daily behavior and life of each one of us.

All must understand that for one to be a member of the Central Committee, a member of the Executive Office, a deputy, a member of the nome committee or a plain party member of the movement is a title which does not grant individual rights, but imposes only obligations. The struggle for achieving the PASOK targets will be different and for this reason each member and each cadre should consider himself enrolled in the service of the nation and the people. The circular's introduction concludes as follows:

The local organizations, the branch organizations, the initiative groups and the nome committees must select the best /candidates/ with a sense of responsibility, without any sentimentalities, with political criteria and with the interest of the movement as their guide.

We are certain that having been steeped for 5 years now in a collective conscience the electoral procedure will strengthen still more the unity of the local organizations, the Central Committee and Parliamentary Groups and will contribute to the development of the organization and the establishment of the preconditions for the success of PASOK which will open the avenue that leads to the great Change.

The circular letter describes the procedure for selecting the candidate deputies. In summary it is as follows:

1. The movement's members will participate in the selection procedure within the organization to which they belong (nome committees, local organisations, branch organizations, initiative groups).
2. The member recommendations will be sent to the nome committees through the coordinating committees of the local organizations. The member recommendations will be submitted in writing and will be debated and decided upon by their membership meetings.
3. The recommendation /for nominations/ by the local committees will be discussed at nome committee levels and will also constitute the basis for the formulation of the recommendations of the nome committees which in turn will send to the Executive Office their own recommendations as well as those of the local committee.
4. The members of the Central Committee will participate in the nomination procedure and they will have the right to nominate, express opinions, etc.



5. The final [candidate] list will be determined by the Executive Office and will be submitted to the Central Committee for final approval.

6. The present active deputies are candidates of the movement unless the procedure described in article 16 of the movement's constitution is involved. According to this article the Central Committee, after a recommendation by the majority of the members of the Executive Office or the Parliamentary Group, can exclude a present deputy from being nominated for specific reasons.

The procedure for nominations must be completed by the end of May when the names of the candidates will be announced.

#### New Membership Meetings

On the other hand, along with the procedure for selecting the candidates, those new membership meetings which have not taken place until now will be held very soon. Thus, the second phase of the new membership meetings which will elect the new new leaders of the movement will start immediately after Easter.

7520  
CSO:4908

## REPATRIATION OF COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS DEBATED IN PARLIAMENT

## Views of PASOK, KKE Parties

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 15 Apr 80 p 9

[Text] Following its Easter recess, the Chamber of Deputies [Vouli] resumed its session yesterday with a debate on the repatriation of the political refugees. The issue was brought up by KKE and Panhellenic Socialist Movement [PASOK] deputies who asked once again that the immediate repatriation of these refugees be permitted unconditionally, a request which the government again refused to satisfy. At the opening of his speech KKE Deputy K. Loules characterized the question of repatriation as "a highly national and political" issue and pointed out that 35 years since the end of the civil war and 5 years after the fall of the dictatorship 33,000 Greek nationals continue to be hosted by socialist countries as political refugees, and that not only they alone but also their children and grandchildren who were born in these countries live there as political refugees!

After referring to the impact of this division--perpetuated by the government--as well as to the continued inflammation of passions and to the separation of the Greeks into good and bad citizens on the basis of their beliefs, Loules added:

"By maintaining this status quo the government instead of healing the wound of this division contributes to its perpetuation. In addition, its continuation is not in agreement with the constitution or international law, not even with the spirit of detente and peace. As is known, the question of the political refugees is still subject to the special measures enacted during the civil war. Of course, these measures have been abolished but their impact is still in force--mainly because of law 233 of 1975."

Loules subsequently pointed out that both New Democracy Party governments since the fall of the dictatorship are responsible for the continuation of the political refugees' exile and for the non-recognition of the National Resistance. He also [reproved] the past and present governments for not implementing the explicit provision of article 3 of the constitution which

provides for the appointment of committees for studying the question of reinstating the citizenship of the political refugees. Loules said that he possesses a letter Premier Karamanlis sent to the Panhellenic Union of Political Refugees which states in part: "The issue is under legislative consideration." Yet, 4 years after this statement was made, no relevant legislation has been introduced [to Vouli]. The KKE deputy added that Greece constitutes "a unique exception" in the world as concerns the post-civil war issues and he stressed:

"Spain and Portugal also have had civil wars in modern times. Yet in both these countries the post-civil war issues and especially those concerning political refugees have been blotted out. All were given back their citizenship as well as permission to return home if they wished.

"In Spain, moreover, common monuments have been built for the victims of the civil war--that is, for the victims of both [political] fronts. In our case, on the other hand, the known organization of 'festivities of hate' is being continued and the National Resistance fighters are not permitted to lay wreaths! Those mayors who do dare give such permission are dismissed! This is the reason why our country constitutes a unique exception in the world."

While the KKE deputy was speaking, New Democracy Deputy Giannousis shouted anti-communist provocations.

"Do you also want the return of the criminals?" he asked comrade Loules.

"I, too, am a criminal," Loules responded.

"Your [political] front is criminal," said Giannousis.

#### National Necessity

The next speaker, comrade K. Vasalos, characterized the repatriation of the political refugees as a national necessity and pointed out that the front repatriation is directly linked with the will of the Greek people for an end to the national division. To this will [the government advances] the argument that such a repatriation is against the national interest.

The KKE deputy then referred to the need to transfer [to Greece] the pensions and social insurance rights of all political refugees who live in socialist countries and asked that a relevant draft law be submitted to the Chamber of Deputies. He said that the prolongation of this pending matter creates problems for those repatriated who, for example, do not have medical and medicinal relief and do not have the right to obtain housing loans.

## Two "Privileges"

Comrade N. Kepesis, on the other hand, interceded while the debate was on and said in part:

"We cannot speak about human rights inside and outside the Chamber of Deputies if no solution is given first to this most human of the human rights. Greece today has two deplorable privileges: the pending question of the repatriation and the non-recognition of the National Resistance."

## PASOK: They Nourish Gratitude

The main PASOK speaker was Khondrokoukis who pointed out that continuation of the present situation constitutes "an enormous irregularity." He said that the government invokes grounds for "reprisals" and dangers of "disorders." "But," he said, "this is illogical since such phenomena have not been observed in areas of Greece where repatriated refugees have settled. Responding to the question: "Since they live well in the socialist countries why do they want to return?" Khondrokoukis pointed out that "the love for the fatherland, for the village or city where they were born, to the land that gave birth to their ancestors is invincible. These most gallant socialist countries have, from the very first moment, treated the refugees with affection, have supported them materially and morally and all of them can work and be compensated on equal terms with the natives. These countries generously give them the means for the Greek education of their children. I myself have ascertained that the young men and women who were born there are fully conversant in the Greek language and also have a deep love for everything Greek. Therefore, this youth feels gratitude to the socialist countries which contributed to their Greek upbringing and professional training."

Also PASOK deputies N. Athanasopoulos, G. Serpanos and G. Moraitis spoke in a similar spirit.

## "Of Abated National Conscience"

Minister to the Premier Stefanopoulos who began speaking late last night characterized the political refugees "as men of abated national conscience." In an attempt to justify the government's negative stand on the issue of the free repatriation of the political refugees, he argued that this stand "is not dictated by the political interest of the New Democracy Party. On the contrary, the other side [opposition parties] is exploiting the situation politically." He even invoked "national dangers" as well as "maps which show Greek areas as belonging to another country!"...

On the other hand, Stefanopoulos attempted to create a political issue when--clearly alluding to Yugoslavia--he said that "a number of political refugees live in another country which is never mentioned but which in various ways creates serious national problems for Greece."



### Government Objection

Athens ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS in Greek 15 Apr 80 p 5

[Text] Both PASOK and KKE asked yesterday the immediate repatriation of 30,000 guerrillas who sought refuge to [iron] curtain countries after the crushing of the 1946-1949 communist rebellion which had foreign support.

The speakers of the two fellow-travelling parties asked also that properties be returned to guerrillas, that work be provided for them and that pensions be granted to those unable to work.

In response, Public Order Minister A. Balkos pointed out that since 1974 28,000 Greeks have returned to Greece out of 40,000 who had taken refuge in communist countries following the crushing of the rebellion.

The government will continue the repatriation after examining individually the cases of those who applied for repatriation. The minister pointed out that no repatriation will be permitted for those who cooperated in giving away Greek soil, those who deserted the Greek army and those who committed special crimes and are in danger of being killed by the relatives of their victims as soon as they return to Greece.

Minister to the Premier K. Stefanopoulos, on the other hand, speaking on the same issue of repatriation of former guerrillas, pointed out that no massive repatriation can be undertaken because there will be social turmoil and also because of the existence of national dangers.

"We cannot," he underlined, "repatriate all of them together from countries, moreover, which publish and distribute maps showing Greek Makedonia truncated."

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## ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW MINISTRY REPORTED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 15 Mar 80 p 1

[Text] Scarcely 24 hours after the other ministers launched another attack against him at the meeting of the National Regional-planning Council the day before yesterday, Mr Stefanos Manos, until now deputy minister of public Works, was sworn in yesterday as the first minister of regional planning, housing, and the environment.

The unexpected swearing in of Mr Manos--in fact, 2 weeks before the activation of the law which creates the new ministry--obviously constitutes Mr Karamanlis' reply to the opposition which has been provoked within the government by the ekistic policy of the new minister.

Nor did it escape notice that while Mr Manos was being sworn in before President of the Republic K. Tatsos, in the presence of Premier K. Karamanlis, at the same time Minister of Coordination Mitsotakis--who up to now had opposed very vigorously the plans and initiatives of the new minister--issued a statement in which he espoused and praised the ekistic policy of Mr Manos and announced that the program of summer housing had been approved, and not rejected, as he had written previously.

The main causes of the negative reactions by governmental officials--and above all by the ministers of coordination and agriculture, Mitsotakis and Boutos--to Mr Manos were not only the policy which he has pursued at the Subministry of Housing during the last 2 years, but also his new ministry and his consequent prominence and "promotion."

These reactions had also manifested themselves, and in fact in a "spirited way," at the last regional congress of the New Democracy Party in Athens, where at least a portion of the congress members strongly disapproved of Mr Manos' policies.

At the ministerial level, the conflict had revealed itself during the drawing up of the draft law for the establishment of the new ministry. In the course of lengthy deliberations, Mitsotakis and Boutos had waged a dogged battle to have its areas of jurisdiction confined and reduced.

The creation of the Ministry of Regional Planning, Housing, and Environment was expedited finally only through the personal intervention and "arbitration" of Premier Karamanlis.

But again, in the last two meetings of the National Regional-planning Council, almost all of the ministers who are members of this council strongly opposed the plans of the Subministry of Housing.

Finally, it is obvious that with the choosing of Mr Manos for the new ministry and the hastening of his swearing in, Karamanlis wanted to settle the situation and to make clear his support for the policy of the person who was deputy minister of housing until yesterday--however much this policy, as well as the prominence which has been given it, disturbs his colleagues.

But in private talks yesterday, the dissatisfaction of other ministers of the administration with the promotion of the new minister was equally evident. Specifically, Mr Manos occupies the 16th position in the hierarchy of the Council of Ministers--that is, he is ranked ahead of Minister of Communications Papadongonas, Minister of Public Order Balkos, Minister of Merchant Marine Kefalogiannis, and Minister of Northern Greece Martis.

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## PRIME MINISTER'S NEPHEW ANALYZES YOUTH POLITICIZATION

## Youth Involvement in Politics

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 1 Apr 80 pp 7, 8

[Article by Kostas Al. Karamanlis]

[Text] The handling of the politicization of the youth in our country on the proper bases presupposes an answer to the definitive question: Should or should not our young people occupy themselves with politics?

For me at least, the answer is clear. Not only is their involvement with politics essential, but it is also indispensable to the nation. Because how would it be possible otherwise for our democratic form of government to become consolidated and to mature if this vital part of the populace remains politically indifferent?

But also, how can we aspire to renew our political life and enrich it with new blood, and in what way will we create mature, responsible, and honest citizens vis-a-vis the State, if the young people are dissuaded from political and ideological concerns? And it is unacceptable to consider political engagement on the one hand and study or work on the other as diametrically opposite notions. But this is a dilemma which many parents hold as valid and put to their children. Of course, nobody disagrees with advice about increased diligence and studiousness, but this has no relation to involvement with political questions. On the contrary, I would venture to say that an independent and unprejudiced concern with politics constitutes an incentive for good work and productivity.

## The Explanation of the Term

In defining the meaning of politicization, I would designate it as involvement in public affairs in the broad sense of the term, where the individual, without being part of any answerable political decision-making body, is interested in the problems which concern first of all his country, and secondly the rest of the world. He stays informed about events, criticizes the positions of the responsible political



figures, and "weighs" the conflicting ideas and theories before he arrives at the formation of a personal opinion, which he publicly expresses and tries to make a reality. But at the same time with respect for the contrary viewpoints of others, with respect for the fundamental rules of democracy, in which the viewpoint of the majority prevails and where the criterion is always the common interest.

This is the meaning of the politicized person, as those see it who accept democratic operations and follow the liberal way of thinking and living. Because we also have the adherents of totalitarianism. They view the politicization of the youth as a social cancer, since their fascist ideology cannot endure an encounter with mature and responsible persons. They are the ones who encourage the young people to be politically indifferent, in the guise of the nonpartisan technocrat, or who try to impart to them their reactionary conceptions within paramilitary organizations having ostensibly national and social purposes. Or again, as the Marxists, who under the pretext of the class struggle and the high objectives of the communist party make sincere young people into fanatics and convert them into party organs, for whom the meaning of the good and the true is identified with the strengthening and domination of the party and with illegal procedures.

Thus it is clearly evident that the adherents of totalitarianism of all gradations understand the politicized youth to be the conscripted and inflexible individual who accepts indoctrination uncomplainingly--and above all without criticism--and who rejects criticism and the unrestricted flow of ideas.

In examining now the contemporary Greek state of affairs, we are obliged to observe that the politicization of the youth in our country is taking place in a way which is far from even-handed. The sector of the youth, whether that of the secondary school, university, or working youth, is being tyrannized over by the political parties, which are seeking to find new voters and fresh officers. This partisanship has gone on to such an extent that the average young person reasonably wonders whether he should remain politically indifferent or become a member of some party, since the called-for solution--for the young person himself--of self-respecting and independent political accountability does not seem to exist. For those who doubt these findings or consider them excessive, a visit to the building of the Law School, to the courtyard of the Polytechnic, or to the KATE [Higher Technical Education Centers] is sufficient to persuade him. The multicolored posters on the walls, the fanatical slogans which accompany the pressure selling of printed party materials, and the denigration of democratic procedures in the general assemblies and the administrative councils are indicative of this.

#### Those Responsible

Without a doubt, the responsibility for the course which events have taken in the sector of the student youth is borne by those who have

exercised control over this sector, beginning with the change in government and after. The KNE [Greek Communist Youth] and the youth group of PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] have seen to the suppression of every independent voice and have provided for the exerting of psychological violence on the students. And they have managed to transform the university areas into arenas for solving their internal differences with respect to Marxism. At a time when there are critical national issues and when serious international events are occurring, the revisionists are quarreling with the orthodox, the orthodox with the Maoists, and the officers of the PASOK youth are making sure that the already inflammatory slogans of their party become even more severe, extreme, and Marxist-oriented.

At this point, a clarification is in order. Despite the fact that they belong to the same ideological-political body, the party and the youth group of PASOK have significant differences between them. Differences which often go beyond the boundaries of tactics and touch on or possibly even affect fundamental questions of basic political choices. The result is that on the one hand, in the broader political sector of PASOK, this group wants to present itself as a party of the socialist center-left, but with a peculiar relationship to West European social democracy, and it merely performs the role of a strong parliamentary opposition. But on the other hand, in the student sector it tries to vie in militancy with the truly Marxist factions, even on questions which concern the status quo and the fundamental institutions of our country. And this is because those in charge in PASOK believe that extreme sloganeering and Marxist analysis are more stirring to young people. Thus we have reached the point that when we refer to politicization and political involvement, we mean enrollment in some Marxist or related faction, resistance to the junta--but subsequent to the return of democracy--and fierce scrambling for votes.

Notwithstanding all this, it does not make sense and perhaps it is even unjust to find fault with the above parties for the turn which the politicization of the youth in Greece has taken. Because in the last analysis they are in fact political parties, with specific objectives and aspirations toward which they remain faithful. What we ought to investigate are the causes which permit the exploitation of the youth sector by the various political groupings. And this is because only by entering on such an analysis will we be able to find ways to reform the student movement and to lay the foundations for a free, democratic, and unprejudiced political involvement.

First of all it is indisputable that both from its own nature and also because of its puerile behavior, the dictatorial regime hurt the young people to an unimaginable degree. Of course, on the one hand perhaps it also constituted an incentive for mass rallying and a target for militant mobilizing of the young people, the zenith of which was seen in the events at the Law School and Polytechnic. But the fact must not escape us that in the eyes of the youth the junta utterly degraded

very important institutions and traditions. And I will explain. The young secondary-school or university student of the 1967-1974 period identified the armed forces with those same people who betrayed these forces, and he identified the national morale and the rule of law with pro-juntaism. In fact, he was absolutely justified in this, since for the youth of that time, respect for officialdom and for the rule of law meant submission to and collaboration with the usurers of the popular sovereignty, or at the utmost obedience to the coerced and intimidated educator of their district.

But also, what sort of democratic education was received by the young people in this period, when secondary-school and university unionism was forbidden and the objective of the dictators was anything but the creation of responsible and aware citizens? But all these things are experiences which are not eradicated easily. On the contrary, they provide congenial soil to the repudiators of the same ideas which the dictators trampled underfoot, in their attempts to attract young people with deceptive slogans and unfounded theories. Once again it is revealed how harmoniously, even if unintentionally, the two extremes work together.

#### The Role of the Parents

But it is not only the April 1967 regime which is responsible for this situation. On the contrary, we have yet to examine a whole series of other responsibilities. And first of all those of the parents.

How many families have brought up their offspring in such a way that this education would foster political involvement and ideological fermentation, and how many have taught them that an interest in the great national problems is just as important as studying, character, and good social behavior?

Will Greek parents ever understand at last that their obligations toward their children are not exhausted with providing food, housing, and a certain financial security for the future?

What seems certain is that until that day comes when the parents realize these things, they will continue to experience the painful shock that not only are they no longer able to agree with their offspring, but also their advice and their ideals are rejected as old-fashioned and reactionary.

But the educators as well, and above all the teaching personnel in the advanced and higher educational institutions, are not without accountabilitys either. Beginning with the very first day of the democratic regime, their only concern was to avoid being characterized as pro-junta, and they were indifferent to their high social mission. How many university professors approached the students, interested themselves

in their problems and thoughts, and aroused their sense of responsibility or even their thirst for learning?

Unfortunately, the number of those teachers who are models to be imitated can be counted on the fingers of one's two hands.

But aside from the responsibilities of the family and the teachers, we ought also to touch on another equally important subject. And this is in reference to the way of thinking which permits and approves of unthinking and "superficial" criticism, facile accusations, and disparaging characterizations. The consequence of such a mentality is a lack of respect for our officialdom and institutions, a contempt for the rights and ideas of one's fellow citizens, and fanaticism. That fanaticism which dispenses with the functioning of logic and which does wrong to individuals and societies. That fanaticism which is the means used by the enemies of democracy to enrage the naive and to prop up their tyrannical regimes. Thus, how is it possible to create a climate and conditions which will foster the politicization and the maturing of the young people, as long as this brake on such a development continues to exist? And it is at the very least a shirking of our responsibility if we attribute this situation to the everlasting shortcomings of our people, to the allegedly fervent Mediterranean temperament, or even to the Turkish invasion. On the contrary, the guilt falls upon all of us, and in fact regardless of the political alignment of anyone.

#### The Role of the State

What follows pertains to the role of the State. Nobody who is at least basically sincere can dispute the fact that in recent years, and despite the presumable failings or even mistakes which have been made, a spirited effort has been made and significant work has been accomplished in Greek education. But the deficiencies are still enormous. And I do not refer so much to the technical resources (halls, laboratories, and so forth) as to the teaching personnel.

Each professor in Greece corresponds to 200 or even more students, at a time when in the Western democracies this correspondence is 1 to 20 or 1 to 30. The Greek professor does not even know his students by sight, whereas his European or American colleague refers to them by their first names.

And there is something else. Following their selection, the university professors in our country have tenure for life, whereas in those countries which can pride themselves on their educational system, such professors are assessed at fixed intervals of time. Thus they are obligated to continually improve their works of scholarship, to keep informed about the developments in their fields, to contribute to scientific research, and to show a genuine interest in the youth.



The situation is even more difficult for those young people who are inclined toward a technical education. Until a few years ago, these schools were unknown in our country, the result being that there was an overaccumulation of student applicants, a belief and an anxiety that only a university diploma assures any security, the numerical glutting of certain occupations, and the lack of skilled craftsmen in many other fields which were considered to be socially disreputable. And of course the efforts which have been made and are being made now in this direction are a proper beginning, but in any case the problem has not yet been solved.

But those officials who deal with issues and manage sectors which are either directly or indirectly connected with the youth are not without a share in the responsibilities for the wrong road which the politicization of the young people has taken. And I am not referring here to governmental policy and its educational programs, which I referred to above. But the officials should know that proper measures or good will are not enough if they want to succeed in their work. The young people need to be approached and understood. But even in the 6 years of democracy, we have not seen any of the people responsible for government policy approaching the young people, talking with them, and trying to find a point of contact and agreement. I am deeply convinced that if the appropriate minister or deputy minister were to undertake to visit the young people in their mass-meeting areas of the amphitheaters and assemblies and to enter into interpersonal contact with them--explaining and clarifying his positions, but also listening with attention to the views of the young people--the situation would be much different in the sector of our Greek youth. And it is a pity that this is not ventured in our country--since it is something which for other pluralistic democracies has been an established means of contact and communication for many years.

I have left the young people themselves to the last in this analysis, not because I consider them without blame, but because they themselves are the people directly concerned. There is no doubt that most of the demands which we have made are just demands. There is not even any doubt that despite the rise in the level of culture and standard of living in our country, we are facing great and overwhelming problems in a world which is moving and developing at a sensational speed. Problems such as settling in a vocation, the creation of a family, the facing of our own selves, and our position vis-a-vis the society as a whole. Nevertheless, we ought to admit that their solution depends to a large degree on us ourselves. We must realize at last that we do not gain anything by shouting for more examination periods, for an unrestricted transfer of courses, for a more lenient system of examinations and grading, and in general for more accommodations. Because the result of all this is that Greek education is degraded, and we just create a generation of half-educated people. And however cruel this may seem, it does not hurt either the "establishment" or the previous generations, but us ourselves, who will end up being the last in line



behind our foreign counterparts, both in the public and in the private sector. And this is a pity, because the qualitative level of our present youth is perhaps higher than ever. Because our political involvement and searching for new ways to improve and progress are strongly motivated. What is needed is a struggle. "Fight well" within the framework of democratic procedures, of mutual respect and of honorableness. Besides, the role of the silent majority which does nothing is not a fitting one for the youth. Indeed, especially since it is a common conviction that the majority, when it is active and responsible, constitutes the vanguard and the driving force of a people. But when it is silent and passive it becomes a puppet which can be manipulated by militant and unscrupulous extremists. And the special responsibility of the young people increases much more when one reflects that the hopes of an entire nation for a better tomorrow have been placed in our hands.

#### Comments on Author

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 2 Apr 80 p 12

[Text] His reputation as one of the few people with the courage of his opinions and with an often frank outspokenness led him to his discussions with Premier Kon. Karamanlis, whom in fact he had accompanied on his trip to China.

And the otherwise "beloved nephew" justified this reputation once again.

A practicing lawyer, a former officer in the ONNED (Youth Organization of the New Democracy), but with many friends in the sector of the Left, Mr Kostas Alekou Karamanlis (second-born son of the elder of the premier's brothers) published in I KATHIMERINI yesterday his views on the politicization of the youth in Greece.

Views which, as I learned, did not arouse a great deal of enthusiasm in certain governmental circles.

In his article, Kostas Karamanlis stresses, among other things, that the politicization of the youth is necessary, and this is "because it is unacceptable for political involvement on the one hand and studying or work on the other to be considered as diametrically opposed notions, as incompatible things."

With severe anti-junta criticisms (which were anything but "bridge-building"), and after referring to a number of accomplishments of the State (that is, of his uncle's administrations), the nephew who is the premier's namesake stresses the "tremendous shortcomings" in our technical resources and our teaching personnel, objects to life tenure for university professors, admits that there is an acute problem of settling in an occupation on the part of graduating students, and makes

many other indisputable statements. With the conviction that the present-day young people and students "are right in most of their demands," K. Karamanlis concludes with stating his conviction that the responsibility for the present "wrong" road which politicization has taken in the Advanced Educational Institutions is borne by the appropriate governmental figures, who have not succeeded in approaching the young people, having talks with them, and finding points of contact and agreement.

"Could this be from a Karamanlis, especially from Kostas," was the question certain embarrassed governmental officials were asking themselves yesterday, who were among those "in the line of fire" of the article by the "beloved and difficult nephew," but in any case these officials welcomed with some relief the news that soon K. Karamanlis is leaving for postgraduate studies in Boston.

12114

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## WAR INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT OFFERS ADVANTAGES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 25 Mar 80 pp 6, 7

[Article by Elisavet Kotzia]

[Text] With the change of government in 1974, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and the aggravation of Greek-Turkish relations, the first substantial efforts are now being noted on replacing a part of the military supplies imported to Greece by domestically produced weapons, spare parts, and general supplies. These efforts have been characterized as positive ones at various times. First of all, the relative degree of independence from the United States achieved by Greece with respect to equipping the Greek Armed Forces (ED) (and with Greece's turning to other suppliers) is desirable, because it gives the government more opportunities for maneuvering in ways dictated by national interests. Secondly, these efforts contribute to the saving of foreign exchange. Of course, it should not be overlooked that even if there were a political option of complete independence from NATO, there is no possibility of there being any total military production by domestic Greek industry. In order to contribute to the objective of a nationally dictated policy, the development of a domestic military industry must keep within certain bounds, which are determined each time by the economic capacity of the country. If non-productive military investments were to use up resources from the productive sectors of the economy such as manufacturing, they would cause a contraction of the economy and economic disturbances which would impede any policy of national independence. A thriving economy and national independence are two related and interdependent notions.

Following the war, the ED relied exclusively on NATO and the United States. The Americans incorporated the Greek forces in operations whose objective was to restrain the Warsaw Pact. Its provisioning with military supplies is determined on the basis of the role which Greece was supposed to play in the broader plans of NATO. Thus, the Greek ED were including in their weaponry destroyers which could withstand some degree of snowy weather and which were designed to take part in operations on the open sea (oceans), in conjunction with an airplane cover. Moreover, our divisions were suited for action on the plains

of Central Europe. That is, operations which have no relation to the type of defense which Greece needs to develop for its national security. In addition, a characteristic feature of the ED was an absolute absence of initiatives concerning the provisioning and replenishing of their military supplies. They merely reported to the American officials the number of the ammunition or spare parts, and shortly thereafter they received it in a package directly from the United States.

In 1974 it became all too clear that this dependence by the army meant also an inability to defend any national interests whatever. With the Greek-Turkish aggravation of relations, Greece encountered great difficulties in finding armaments from its allies. And having recourse to the placement of orders for these is not efficient in periods of crisis. A ship takes 5 years to be completed, and a helicopter takes 2.5 years. In 1974 the only Greek military industry was the Greek Gunpowder-Cartridge Factory Corporation of Bodosakis (AEEP-K), which was supplying only 20 percent of the ammunition used annually.

#### Initiatives of the ED

The critical nature of the situation compelled the ED to take initiatives both for provisioning Greece with military supplies and for the modification of the existing equipment. France was the country which was first to agree to supply us with the arms we required for that period, but only against appreciable foreign-exchange outlays.

The destroyers which were unsuitable for operations in sea straits were adapted to the nation's defense system through the installation of additional guns, and warships were ordered which were suited for the Greek seas. Tanks and other vehicles of an old type, which were useless for total warfare, were also modernized to meet the defense needs of the Aegean islands.

In 1975, the minister of national defense created the Military Industry Directorate in this ministry, and in 1977 the Military Industry Service was established, its purpose being to create a domestic war industry and more generally to support the ED through supplies from domestic sources.

Today, there are a number of military-supply plants in Greece.

At Aigion, a small-arms factory, which has permission to produce small arms of the German firm of H. and K. For the present, assembling of rifles of the type G 3A3 is being done, and the manufacturing of 13 different parts of this weapon is carried out here. The Greek value added comes to 65 percent. Of course, the "know-how" and the right of production were purchased from abroad, but this was covered to a large degree by German military aid.

At Lavrion a gunpowder factory is in operation, but it is producing less amounts than the planned daily quantity of 6.5 tons. A nitrocellulose factory has also been built, while an agreement which was signed in 1978 between the AKEP-K and the ED provides for a domestic production of ammunition sufficient to meet 30 percent of the total needs of the three armed-forces branches. Through incentives and special financing, it is calculated that in a few years 60 percent of our ammunition needs will be met from this.

Moreover, at Tanagra there is the Greek Aircraft Industry. For the present, it is only maintaining and repairing airplanes. The significance of its operating lies today in the fact that from the viewpoint of the national security, the removal of aircraft from the country for repairs is not desirable. There have been more than a few times when, because of the heavy pressure of their work, the foreign industries have delivered an airplane after a year's delay instead of the 2 months which the initial agreement provided for.

At the Velesinon plant, there exists today a capacity for general repairing of tanks and for manufacturing a number of spare parts such as caterpillar treads. Changes have also been made in the motors of the tanks so that they can be powered by diesel oil, which requires refueling about every 200 kilometers, rather than by gasoline, which needs refueling every 40-50 kilometers.

One critical sector is the production of replacement parts. The foreign companies often sell military supplies at low prices for reasons of competitiveness, and afterwards they charge very dearly for the replacement parts. Moreover, refusing to supply replacement parts can be an effective weapon when used by a foreign power to dictate its own policy. Notwithstanding these things, the productive activity of Greece in this sector is not great. This is due chiefly to three causes. Firstly, to the high technology involved in many replacement parts; secondly, to the small number of pieces required, which does not permit an economic operation; and thirdly, to the lack of ongoing contacts between the ED and domestic industry.

In the Greek shipyards, finally, the GEN [Naval General Staff] has commissioned the construction of six rocket ships, two of which have already been launched. The ships in question represent a substantial construction which emphasizes the potentialities which exist in Greece for even more ambitious shipbuilding activities. Finally, efforts are being made to construct a light tactical pontoon, which will be used by the land army.

But in addition to the specific military supplies, there are also general stores such as military uniforms, blankets, jeeps, and so forth. For a long period of time, their procurement was made from foreign countries. Because the private sector was not meeting the design



specifications of the ED. If, for example, a competition was proclaimed for a certain material which was supposed to meet specific requirements, those businessmen who were oriented to the domestic market were not responsive, out of a fear of rejection of their products, and also from a lack of entrepreneurial boldness with respect to modifying their production.

The result was that the ED approached foreign countries for purchasing these supplies, and they procured very expensive products which met needs different from the specific Greek needs. Thus, the army had jeeps with triple differential gearing, designed for traversing rivers, and its units were using these for transporting their provisions from the marketplace. It also ordered tires from the United States which could withstand temperatures from -30 to +50 degrees Celsius, inasmuch as the American military operations are designed to extend as far as the North Pole or to the Sahara. Of course, the Greek field of action is only from our northern borders to Crete.

Today, the major portion of general supplies is of Greek manufacture. For example, even the needs of the army for medicines are being satisfied by domestic industry. Moreover, in 1977 Stagier Ellas undertook the manufacturing of 3,500 5-ton military vehicles, at a rate of delivery of 700 vehicles per year. And whereas it started out by adding 10 percent to the manufactured value, today it generates 65 percent of this value.

As is maintained by the experts, there is still considerable margin for increasing the provisioning of the ED by the Greek market.

Among other things, one obstacle to this is the fact that a standardization of domestically produced products has not been carried out to a degree satisfactory enough for the design requirements of the ED to be met. Moreover, the products which the three branches of the army use have not even been standardized among themselves. Finally, there is mutual distrust between the ED and industrialists. The former do not have confidence in the quality of domestic production, while the latter often do not want to have very many dealings with the State.

In any case, a promoting of cooperation would be advantageous to Greece. Because Greek production of military supplies does not mean only a saving of foreign exchange, but also a reduction in expenditures for the budget, inasmuch as domestically produced products are cheaper than imported products.

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## NEED FOR AIR DEFENSE SHELTERS REPORTED

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek 10-16 Apr 80 pp 32-35, 86

[Article by Solon Grigoriadis: "How We Can Protect Ourselves...If War Comes"]

[Text] The events in Iran and Afghanistan have given us a twinge of anxiety. Once again the specter of danger has appeared [on the horizon]. World War? Improbable but the "improbable" does not mean "impossible." In Greece we have had 40 years to hear the chilling shrieks of the air-raid sirens as we did in the early dawn of 28 October [1940] with its nightmare and anger. But now, if they are heard again they will bring the message of a new danger, a thousand times more terrible. Because this time we are not going to face simply conventional bombs but the biblical fire and the radio-activity of nuclear weapons.

The problem is not uniquely Greek; it is a world-wide problem because most countries, deep in the complacency of 35 years of world peace, have forgotten the need to protect the population. Few countries have made any efforts in this sector and Greece is one of them. But what can and should we do so that we will not find ourselves exposed to the mercy of the explosive fires and—even worse—of radioactivity? This is the subject discussed by EPIKAIRA in conjunction with the international overview of the subject.

Out of 9 million Greeks only 230,000 (2.5 percent) can find shelter in case of war. The remaining 8,750,000 (97.5 percent) remain exposed and defenseless because Greece has an air defense structure only on paper. Not even on paper, to be exact, since the necessary studies have been blocked by the economic veto.

This assessment is being made today in most other countries. Nobody wants to deal seriously with the protection of the population in case of war which might include the use of nuclear weapons. But the Afghanistan and Iran events have rekindled a spark of anxiety. The old, fading and forgotten specter reappeared, even from afar, on the horizon. Suddenly governments and governed discovered that they are unprotected before the danger of a nuclear attack like the naked king with the invisible suit. They have started spasmodic and feverish discussions.

Here is a report published by the French magazine LE POINT on the situation in France.

"If France were to wake up tomorrow face to face with a nuclear catastrophe; if there was an explosion in a nuclear plant with a holocaust and hundreds of thousands of victims, what could it do? This terrible scenario has yet to happen. France is not threatened by nuclear cataclysm.

"Nonetheless the anxiety is growing. It is even voiced openly. On 27 January in the broadcast "Press Club" of the "Europe One" network, Michel Poniatofski, advisor to Giscard d'Estaing, underlined the need for air-raid shelters in every new apartment house build in France.

"Justified advice. All the experts who were asked to speak on this subject were categorical. In case of atomic war there has been no serious provision in France for the protection of the citizens, with the exception of the Taverny (France's Pentagon), the Albion hilltop (the location of France's strategic missiles), the underground telecommunications centers designed to serve as shelters for government officials, general staff officers, and the 'Jupiter,' the president's 'bunker.' In other words, except for these 'clubs' which protect against radioactivity there is no anti-nuclear shelter in France.

"A studied choice and Cartesian logic. Since France's defense is based mainly on its deterrent force, its assault force should have the ability to block a potential attack. The anti-nuclear shelters would harm the credibility of French strategy. 'Between the bomb and the shelter, the government chose the bomb 15 years ago,' said a defense inspector general.

"Nevertheless, this dogma seems to be developing. A debate began at higher levels. Defense Minister Ivon Bourges says: 'The shelters can become an important factor for the deterrent force.' In other words, the policy of the deterrent force should not essentially deprive the population of any protection in the event of a nuclear attack.

"We are so vulnerable in France that the members of the National Assembly are up in arms. In July 1979 at a hearing of the secretary general of the Ministry of Defense, Gen. Rogers Rante, before the parliamentary Finance Committee, several members took advantage of the opportunity to underline the efforts made by other countries. Sensitive to their worries, [Premier] Raymond Barre asked for a study of the cost of the necessary measures. Since then the experts have been engaged in a detailed listing of all spots that can be turned into shelters. But as it is noted in a report of the Finance Committee on the 1980 budget, 'we must be wondering if this census will be completed by the end of this century at the current pace.'"

#### Countries That Care

Some states--but very few--for years have engaged systematically in building shelters for the anti-nuclear protection of the population.

Norway, following the end of World War II, applied a very broad program for public as well as private anti-nuclear shelters. Sweden, too, passed in July 1979 a law which requires that every town with more than 5,000 inhabitants must have shelters capable of receiving the entire population within 4 minutes! Switzerland in the last few years has decided to acquire a colossal anti-nuclear protection structure. Is it a sign of the times? Anyway, Switzerland has constructed so far 193,000 shelters sufficient for the entire 7,000,000 population. Under the ice-skating rink in Verne, and in the autoban tunnel in Lucerne, they have constructed tremendous public shelters. Moreover, 70,000 hospital beds and 1,000 surgical units are located in underground locations.

The magazine LE POINT goes on:

"The USSR is supposed to have a significant number of shelters sufficient to protect 69.0 percent of the population. (We should add that the famous and gigantic Moscow subway is considered the largest and best anti-nuclear shelter in the world.) In China everything has been arranged so that the cities can be evacuated in case of radioactivity. 'I was told in Peking,' Michel Poniatofsky said, 'that the entire population can hide in shelters within eight minutes.'"

But in France, too, in spite of its lag in anti-nuclear shelters, the magazine notes:

"The officials of Population Safety have established a network of 2,500 stations for detecting the intensity of radioactivity throughout the country. Moreover, 4,000 sirens which will be soon capable of automatic activation from Taverny will allow the alarm signal to reach simultaneously 55.0 percent of the population. This alarm system will be complemented in the future by a telephone activated alarm system. In this way, every inhabitant will be personally informed by telephone. The first element to be studied: a special telephone call on 'radioactivity' and a pre-recorded message. This system will be progressively installed, starting from the countryside. Final step: The population will be called to remain where it is. The only deviation from this basic principle: the 'removal' of people from the danger zones. To achieve this, each department has plans for housing, transportation, and food."

Naked Like Beetles...

What about Greece? We said that we are naked. During the war the construction of shelters was required by law. After the war and for a few more years this requirement remained during the feverish reconstruction of Athens (in another column we give details of this legislation). But by 1960 these laws were either repealed or ignored. In 1961, a senior official responding to a journalist's question "why did the construction of shelters stop?" said angrily:



"Have you lost your senses, gentlemen? Why are you talking about shelters? Today, with the nuclear bombs, defense is a fable. We are all going to turn into nuclear ashes. But don't worry unnecessarily. There is not going to be any nuclear war."

"Yes, but what if there is a local war with conventional weapons?" insisted the journalist.

"Local war! But can there be local wars these days?"

Yet, so many local wars have taken place since. And for several years now the specter of a Greek-Turkish war has been darkening the horizon. What will happen if some early dawn the Turkish "Phantoms" drop their bombs over Athens? There will be chaos because the way things are now there is no way to protect the population. Of course, our strong air force will protect us. But if some planes get through and reach Athens...

And what will happen if a nuclear war breaks out? For 35 years such a war has not taken place and it is not likely that it will happen today or tomorrow. But we cannot rule out the possibility. How are we going to deal with it?

#### Compulsory Shelters?

This is the situation: Since 1974 under Legislative Decree 17, the construction of shelters has been required again for conventional as well as atomic weapons. The decree imposes penal sanctions, but it has not come into effect because it requires a decision of the Supreme Council of National Defense which has not been issued as yet.

In the meantime, a Joint Staff Committee has been established and some general studies have been made but no technical and detailed studies yet. There are corresponding services in the Ministries of National Defense, Public Order and Public Works. In this regard, the Emergency Planning Policy [PSEK] has done a great deal of work under the direction of its diligent and informed director, G. Rasis. But now everything has stopped. Why? Because the Ministry of Coordination refuses to give a single drachma. In 1978, Mitsotakis said clearly: "Don't waste your time. I am not going to approve a dime. Other pressing needs have priority."

A senior official with jurisdiction in this matter told us:

"Listen. We are dealing with this problem. But there are other more urgent problems. We need to construct the infrastructure of civil defense in Athens, I agree. But do you know that Athens needs another infrastructure? We have no sewage system, nothing. We must construct this infrastructure urgently because otherwise Athens will die. Therefore, we cannot devote our money and our resources to something that may happen much later or may never happen (a nuclear war) and give up something which is going to happen soon (the death of Athens if the infrastructure is not constructed speedily)."



This logic commands respect. Nevertheless, something must be done for the other infrastructure before we have a great calamity someday. The least we can do is make a detailed study of the anti-nuclear, anti-air-raid infrastructure and to begin construction in a way which will not require exorbitant expenditures. Let us take a look at the technical aspects. Today a shelter is not limited to protection against conventional weapons but primarily against nuclear weapons. For this reason its construction is more complicated and therefore more expensive.

#### Strategic or Tactical Weapons?

Officially the view held is that Greece is a marginal country and will be hit with heavy strategic nuclear weapons. There is no reason for the supposed adversaries to waste their large missiles on us. For this reason, we will face the possibility of attack with "reinforced conventional weapons," that is, with conventional plus tactical atomic weapons. This means that our shelters will be simple, not as strong as those in the United States and elsewhere. Thus, the "protection of structures" (this is the technical term for shelters) will require limited expenditures.

One may argue that any location with nuclear weapons installed or stored is a possible target for nuclear missiles either in a preventive or punitive strike. Of course, the government says that there are no nuclear missiles on Greek soil although the Institute for Strategic Studies in London and PASOK leader A. Papandreu disagree. Even if there are no missiles at this time, no one can rule out their appearance on the eve or during a major war, in which case the opposing strikes of the adversary may include strategic weapons.

#### Six Million People

Let us assume, however, that only tactical atomic weapons and not strategic will be used. What can be done for the protection of the population?

First of all, there is need for a zoning plan. It is not possible to protect the entire country, only key areas. Other regions, sparsely populated and mountainous, will be left out. In any event, with regard to the population we can make the following calculations:

- a. We should except from direct protection all those drafted in the armed forces who will reach, give or take, half a million.
- b. We should except those engaged in civil defense, another half million.
- c. Another part of the population will be able to find refuge in the countryside on their own, let us say another half million.
- d. From the remaining part, approximately 700,000 live in sparsely populated areas and need no protection.

- e. The few existing shelters can accommodate 230,000.
- f. Six million, more or less, will need protection.
- g. From these, 1,600,000 could have shelters.
- h. Some 4,300,000 could be protected in trenches.

These are the Greek projections today as estimated by technical studies. In other words, we need shelters for 1,600,000 in addition to the trenches. Is this a big feat?

First of all, we must keep in mind that Greece is favored by its climate and morphology in its anti-nuclear defense. The winds will quickly push away the A and B radiation following a nuclear explosion--regardless of where the wind will take the pollution--and only radiation C will remain. These rays represent a terrible danger but again the defense possibilities are greater than generally believed.

A wet blanket is the first filter against radiation. Even the mass of debris that will fall on the shelter provides added protection against radiation. The magazine LE POINT adds:

"Col. Patoureaux, a specialist on emergency measures for the protection of the population, is more precise: 'The radiation may be reduced. A stone wall 20 centimeters thick reduces the outside radiation 10 times. An additional wall of another 20 centimeters reduces the effect of the radiation an additional 10 times, which means that the radiation is only one hundredth of the radiation outside.'"

#### Private Shelters

This means that all underground areas existing today can be turned into shelters with appropriate modifications and reinforcements. They need, for example, strengthening of the roof to be able to withstand the weight of debris falling on it, filters, ventilation, fire protection for the exits, strong insulation, etc. It is enough to keep in mind that the shelter may be in a hell of flames and destruction while radiation will try continuously to take over the shelter and may suffer the effect of intense heat by the burning masses and the currents of heated wind which may reach 600 degrees Celsius for 12 hours. The walls of the shelter must protect the interior from the effects of this tremendous heat. The shelter must be capable of protecting the people for at least 14 days until the radiation outside is gone. If we take into account that under Greek conditions each shelter will house 50 to 100 persons, it is obvious that quantities of water, foodstuffs, etc., should be stored.

In any event, the cost of private shelters will not be great unless they are constructed from the beginning when the cost of the building may increase by 5 to 10 percent.

Much more expensive are the public shelters, especially in industries, hospitals, etc. This is where we come to grips with the general economic policy which must weigh the limits of the sacrifices the economy should make for "the protection of structures." But for the private there are not many limitations. A few appropriate incentives--tax deductions, etc.--will be enough to have a well-organized shelter in every large new apartment building--apartments with more than three floors.

Conclusion: Things are not as terrible as they appear. The government must go ahead. The first step is to open the way to the technical studies. The appropriate agencies such as PSKA are ready and eager to start.

The government must also take some specific measures in time: to make shelters a requirement for new buildings; to require future underground garages to have special reinforcements which will make them excellent shelters; to plan the Athens subway in a way that it will become an ideal shelter as happens in most metropolitan cities; and, above all, to be convinced of the necessity to prepare so that we will not find ourselves someday tragically surprised as so often happens in this land of the happy fools and orange blossoms.

It is not necessary to listen to the Cassandrae that appear all the time. Today one can bet odds of 1 to 1,000 that no nuclear war will break out in the next years, just as it has not taken place in the last 35 years. But should it break out, in spite of all predictions, then the destruction will not be one thousandth but one thousand thousandth. The irony of dialectics...

Let us make this destruction more specific: The nuclear weapons have created a new, macabre terminology, that of "the means of mass destruction": megaton; megadead: A megaton is the explosive force of a nuclear warhead equal to 1 million tons of TNT. Today, there are hydrogen bombs of up to 20 megatons and missiles up to 25 megatons, such as the Soviet SS-18. Megadead is 1,000,000 dead caused by a single nuclear warhead.

But let us not get "delirium tremens" in the face of these terrible figures. We hope that tomorrow's adversaries will not waste such titanic missiles on Greece. A 10-megaton missile exploding in Eleusis will cause total evaporation as far as Peristeri, tremendous destruction as far as the Thessaloniki, and great losses as far as Sparta. Our dead will not be counted even in megadead.

But if we were to assume that a small warhead of only 20,000 tons were to explode over the Ministry of Defense (in Kholargos), it would be enough to turn into a hell of fire a zone as far as Thessaloniki, a hell of radiation all the way to Kolonaki and cause heavy losses as far as Syntagma [Square]. Let us not forget that it was a 20,000-ton bomb that destroyed defenseless Hiroshima and caused 75,000 deaths! Defenseless Hiroshima! That is the problem.

## Legislation on Shelters

For the first time the state took steps to provide shelters on the eve of the Greek-Italian war. With Obligatory Laws 2372 and 2598 of 1940 it imposed the required "protection of structures" and regulated all related subjects.

Following the end of the war, the No. 1 and No. 6/1951 decisions of the War Council and decision 7/1960 of the Supreme National Defense Council [ASEA] retained the requirement for shelters in new, large buildings. In 1957 the Ministerial Council with its No. 43 action abolished the aforementioned decisions of the War Council. With regard to Decision 7/1960 of ASEA, without being abolished, it was bypassed by Decision 2059/1964 of the Ministry of Public Works. Thus, the shelters were shelved. The question was reopened in 1973 when following a recommendation by the National Defense General Staff [GEETHA] the No. 1 decision of ASEA was issued ordering a broad study of the problem. In August 1974, in the midst of the war climate of that time, Legislative Decree No. 17 was issued, providing again for the obligatory construction of shelters. But it set as a precondition the issuing of a decision by ASEA which has yet to come. Thus, the question remains open, but it may be reactivated very easily because it does not require new legislation.

## Is the Escape Feasible?

"If a nuclear war breaks out, the first measure to be taken is the evacuation of the big cities and the scattering of the people in the countryside." This is an old rule which is no longer taken into account. Because few will be able or willing to leave, while an obligatory evacuation is impossible.

Another rule expressed in the past was that at least the evacuation would be attempted at the last moment or when an adversary with tactical atomic weapons comes close. But this, too, is rejected because there will be little time for escape. There will be such confusion and chaos that the result will be a monumental jam, a catastrophe as bad as that provoked by an atomic warhead.

The magazine LE POINT notes: "We should not overlook the panic which will follow. At the Ministry of Defense they are skeptical.

"Let's be serious... In 6 minutes, the Soviets can inflict a nuclear bombardment," says a senior officer.

"You think that Paris will be evacuated at that time? I tell you everything will freeze!"

This is particularly true in the case of Athens which has only two exits--the Iera Odos (Sacred Road) and the highway to Salonica. But there we



will see a traffic jam with masses of cars piling up. They will be completely bottled up. And if there is a nuclear explosion further back, the radioactive wave will reach the people bottled up at the exits and find a rich harvest.

In other words, the solution of escape is not feasible except on a very small scale. So, the protection must be organized within the cities, in shelters.

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## LIGNITE POWER PLANTS EMIT RADIOACTIVITY

Athens TA NEA in Greek 27 Mar 80 p 9

[Text] Salonica--Radioactivity in large amounts is present in the atmosphere, as a result of emissions from the thermal electric-power plants in Greece which make use of lignites as their fuel.

The emitted radioactivity is of about the same magnitude as that which escapes from a nuclear power plant.

This significant finding was made by those in charge of the atomic and nuclear physics laboratory at the University of Salonica, following measurements made over more than 2 years at the Ptolemais-Kardia, Aleverion, and Megalopolis power plants.

The scientific findings were announced within the framework of the recent International Congress on Protection Against Radioactivity which took place in Jerusalem, and they caused a notable sensation and intensive speculation among the circles of preeminent nuclear scientists who had gathered there.

## Radioactive Cement

This fact is of particular significance, not only on account of the escape of quantities of radioactivity which are gradually accumulating in the atmosphere, but also because of the impending development of an industrial production of cement through using lignite ash as a raw material, which means that this product will be slightly radioactive, and hence that from now on particular care should be taken with regard to its subsequent use.

As for the dangers which result from the emission of radioactivity, Stefanos Kharalambous, professor of nuclear physics at the Salonica Aristoteleion University and head of the laboratory, is guarded about discussing these for the present, since on the one hand no immediate consequences for public health are looming, and on the other hand because the investigations and studies are still going on.

Mr Kharalambous stated to TA NEA that at the nuclear physics laboratory a systematic investigation is being conducted of the radioactivity of Greek lignites and their ash, among other things, with his co-researcher in this effort being K. Papastefanou. All Greek lignites contain radioactive substances of the uranium series. Many Greek lignites have a radioactivity amounting to concentrations on the order of 25 picocuries per gram of lignite. This concentration is fairly high. And the upshot of this is that the thermal electric-power plants which burn lignites are emitting to the atmosphere large quantities of radioactivity which amount to 40 curies per year from each one of these plants. This radioactivity is escaping not only as fly-ash, but also and above all (95 percent) in a finely divided form down to gaseous forms.

What are the dangers for the residents of the area which surrounds the thermal plants?

#### Double the Amount of Radium

The professor said that as a physicist who has concerned himself with the biological consequences of radiations, he has a full awareness of the dangers which arise from such radiations, and he completely embraces the thesis that any exposure to radioactive substances should be avoided.

"Our attention and our investigations have concentrated up to now on the overall burdening of the atmosphere with radioactive substances from the burning of lignite. In the last 50 years, our technological culture has doubled the amount of radium in the atmosphere. The calculations of Mr Papastefanou indicate that in the next 20 years--with the petroleum crisis and the continually increasing use of lignites--the radium in the atmosphere will increase by an order of magnitude.

"On the basis of the proposals which were made at the Jerusalem congress, the maximum permissible radium burden in the atmosphere will be lowered by an order of magnitude. The accepted maximum permissible concentration (old value) is  $10^{-11}$  microcuries per cubic centimeter.

"Our initial estimates are that the burden from the radioactivity emitted by the thermal plants is much less than the maximum permissible concentration even at the presumably hottest spots--that is, it is on the order of  $10^{-14}$  microcuries per cubic centimeter, and therefore no problem exists that this poses a danger.

"The continuously emitted activity from a thermal plant which burns contaminated lignite is of the same order of magnitude as that which escapes from a nuclear plant of the same power. With the difference that in the nuclear plant there is a potential danger of an explosion, which makes it potentially much more of a problem. Of course, recalling my principle--the principle of radiation protection, that every exposure to radioactive substances ought to be avoided--indicates that vigilance by the officials and further research are called for.

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"Our planning provides for a continuation of investigations on this subject and careful field measurements on the burdening of the atmosphere by radioactive substances near thermal power plants."

Is this the first time that your results have been announced?

"In this case as well, scientific ethics have been complied with--that is, the results were published in a distinguished international periodical, and two articles have also been sent and are in the process of being published in a Greek scientific periodical. At the Jerusalem congress on 14 March, we presented this topic. The conclusions can be summarized in the statement that: Both the matter of the gases and ash emitted from thermal plants and also the use of fly-ash as a substitute for cement in concrete should be examined with care.

"Many investigators have proposed that so-called fly-ash, which is produced in amounts exceeding 1,000 tons a day by each thermal plant, should be used as a substitute for cement in concrete, and there is already planning on building a plant for producing cement from fly-ash at Ptolemais.

"Such cement is certainly much cheaper, but on the other hand it will be slightly radioactive. It should be used only for the construction of large works in open areas--for example, jetties, dams, bridges, road projects, and so forth--and its use for the construction of dwellings should be avoided."

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## PSD SECRETARY GENERAL ON UPCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 20 Apr 80 pp 7, 8

[Interview with Antonio Capucho, secretary general of the Social Democratic Party, by M. Bettencourt Resendes; date and place not given]

[Text] In an interview granted to "DN", the secretary general of the Social Democratic Party [PSD], Antonio Capucho, declared: "Hinting in the news media that the CDS leads the AD [Democratic Alliance] is an extremely powerful psychological weapon that our adversaries have not refrained from using on a daily basis." He also made detailed comments on the current political situation. The forthcoming presidential elections comprise a substantial portion of the interview, and Antonio Capucho stated specifically that Gen Soares Carneiro is "far removed from being a conservative."

"DN": With the Democratic Alliance established and the coalition government in office, don't you think that this would be the right time for the PSD to reconsider its Social Democratic persuasion, and possibly assume the status of a liberal party, or one with the kind of centrism resembling that of the French Giscardians?

AC: I see no reason for this. The PSD is keeping the conclusions from its first national congress intact. The fact that it is in a coalition with a Christian Democratic Party in no way changes those principles. In Europe, Social Democratic Parties often form coalitions with parties to the right of them. In Portugal, parties claiming to be Socialist have already been in coalition with those of Christian Democratic inspiration.

In our party, there has been no sign of any desire on the part of either the rank and file, or the district or national leadership organs, to evolve in the direction of liberalism.

"DN": Then should I conclude that, in your opinion, the Democratic Alliance will not evolve in the direction of creating a great centrist party, such as occurred in Spain?

AC: I have already voiced my conviction that, if we should ever move in such a direction, this alliance would be immediately dissolved. AD is

viable only so long as the parties which comprise it retain their own identity.

"DN": There are some who claim that a gap between the bases of the PSD's program and its actual policy was the main reason for the major dissidence that the party has suffered since 1974. Do you agree with that interpretation?

AC: It does not seem to me that any issue related to the program was the underlying cause of either of the two cases of dissidence that occurred in our party.

"DN": Then were personal matters involved?

AC: Not only personal matters, but also matters of policy, underlying which there was no ideological issue.

"DN": How do you view the possibility of a return to the party by those dissidents, or at least some of them?

AC: Our party has already decided, through its own organs, that the return of the dissidents will pursue a normal course, through procedures; in other words, in the event that they want to return, they must submit their applications for admission to the respective municipal sections

It is obvious that, in every one of the sections, there will (I am sure) be a high degree of good will concerning the return of some of the dissidents. I am referring to those who, when they left, did not harass either the party or the party's president himself.

"DN": Is that your view, as well?

AC: It is my opinion that there can and should be a Social Democratic reunion within our party. I don't think that the individuals who, when they left the party, obviously did not attack the orientation of its leadership organs or the president of the PSD should be unwelcome.

"DN": It is often claimed that it is the CDS which "lends the features to the AD." Yet I think it would be more correct to say that, in coalitions of the AD type, there is always a tendency for one of the members to predominate, depending on the sector involved. In your opinion, which are the sectors wherein there is a centrist preeminence?

'The PSD Members Are Solicitous About Their Program'

AC: First of all, before actually answering the question, I must remind you of the following: Hinting in the news media that the CDS leads the AD is an extremely powerful psychological weapon that our adversaries have not refrained from using on a daily basis. They are quite well aware that what can most affect the capacity or desire for adherence to this AD plan among



the Social Democratic rank and file is, actually, an attempt to convince them that they will be outstripped by the minority force within the coalition, and also surpassed by a force to the right of them. The PSD is a machine type party, so to speak (and in this respect it is different from the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party]); and therefore our members are quite solicitous about their program and their party, and really would not allow the minority party an opportunity to lead the process.

I can assure you that the CDS does not lead the AD in any way. As implied in your question, the AD is represented in several areas: in the governmental area, where no one can claim that there is CDS leadership; and in the parliamentary area, where the AD per se does not even exist, but the majority does, because the reformers too belong to it. If a certain group is more or less active than another, this is quite debatable. If we were to analyze the speeches given in the Assembly, and the proposals themselves, we would also find that the CDS does not lead the majority.

On the electoral level, the AD is set up through a national coordinator. As you know, the leadership is carried out by a tripartite committee, led by an electoral coordinator, who happens to be me. There is also the AD's Permanent Council, which essentially carries out the Alliance's overall coordination. Its general coordinator (of the Permanent Council and not the AD, as certain news media quite often try to insinuate) is Dr Lucas Pires. We could, for example, continue on the level of the local governments, and conclude that the CDS does not actually lead the AD, nor does it have to lead.

#### The Party-Government Relationship

"DN": But is there not a predominance of the centrist component in certain specifically governmental sectors?

AC: No. Even in the preparation of the government's program, we observed that it was obviously a program wherein reconciliation existed between the PPM [Popular Monarchist Party] planks themselves (which influenced the government's program in certain respects) and the Social Democratic planks themselves. Inasmuch as we have long been the majority party within the coalition, one observes that, not only in the texts, but also in the governing itself, the PSD has the weight which, in fact, stems from this correlation of forces within the AD. It is completely untrue that it has been minimized.

"DN": As secretary general of the PSD, you certainly have an exhaustive view of the party's internal existence. The PSD is in power. Power becomes eroded, particularly in times of crisis. What truth is there in the references to the lack of relationship between the party and the government, and the dissatisfaction that this is claimed to be causing among PSD members?

AC: To the PSD, being in the government is a new experience; and, fortunately, when the president of the party assumed the functions of prime minister, he

was very definite about wanting to separate government affairs from party affairs, and he did, in fact, separate them. This was a good thing, because it seems important to me from the standpoint of political ethics that there not be excessive partisan interference in the government, particularly in an area wherein the PS [Socialist Party] was profligate, that is, in distributing power and assigning its members to key posts.

"DN": Hasn't that happened with the present government?

AC: No. Obviously, when the AD government calls upon trustworthy persons to fill positions in government office it would not exactly seek them among the Communists, nor likely among the Fascists. It would seek them among individuals who combine technical competence with political reliability; and who, therefore, offer guarantees for implementing the government's program and working in harmony with the government.

"DN": Those criteria for the selection of individuals are rather subjective...

AC: Obviously they are. When you mentioned the criticism of the party machine, you were, in fact, reflecting some outbursts of dissatisfaction over the government's failure to consult the party's machine more, specifically on the district and national levels, in filling these positions. And, in fact, it did not do so for that reason, that is, to procure people for the positions on the basis of their association with the party machine. In this respect, I admit that there has been a certain amount of attrition among party members, because the government opted for people who were completely unknown to the party itself.

"DN": In your opinion, once a party leader is in the government, should he become completely dissociated from party functions?

AC: I don't think that he has to dissociate himself, although I agree totally with the prime minister's decision. Under the current circumstances, I think that Dr Francisco Sa Carneiro's departure from party leadership was beneficial to the party and to the government itself, and its image. I don't believe that this should apply to the other party leaders. But, as you know, there are very few party leaders holding government office.

#### The Electoral Law

"DN": Let us move to another question. Does it seem proper to you that the electoral districts should be changed so as to favor those in which the AD has a large majority? Moreover, the electoral law is an issue that has caused some aloofness toward the AD on the part of the reformers....

AC: Whatever districts the AD changes, with the exception of Beja and Setubal, they would be districts in which the AD is in the majority. I must tell you that I myself, at the proper time, upheld the division of all districts

which had an excessive number of offices, for instance, more than 15 deputies. We would, at the outset, find Lisbon, Porto and Setubal, in one of which the AD is not in the majority and, in the other two, it does not have an overwhelming majority. It was not on the basis of whether or not we had a majority that the division of the districts was advocated.

"DN": But that was not the intent of the bill for changing the electoral law....

AC: The bill put forth by the MAI [Independent Movement for Local Government] includes only the division of the districts of the emigrants. On that occasion the discussion would be as follows: Should proportionality be introduced into the emigrants' districts too, or should there be a fixed number of deputies? The fact that we shall have an electoral census in May, which will probably extend into June, would preclude proportionality; and, therefore, it was decided to have a fixed number. This will most likely be submitted to the Assembly at the initiative of the government or the majority. The number that has been mentioned (nine deputies for the emigrants), if defective, is such out of paucity rather than excess.

"DN": Would it be your view, therefore, that the criticism made by the reformers of the bill on the electoral law is unfounded?

AC: Insofar as I know, the reformers, speaking through Dr Sousa Tavares, upheld the theory that the emigrants should not vote in emigration districts, but rather in the districts on the continent of which they were natives. This is a theory which I respect, but which is not practicable at present.

At the meeting which I attended as representative of the PSD, with the other majority parties, Dr Sousa Tavares did not deviate much from the number of nine deputies. I even think that he accepted it.

#### The Agreement With the Reformers

"DN": Do you think that the present differences between the reformers and the AD are, as certain newspapers have claimed, the "swan song" for the agreement which that group has with the PSD?

AC: I certainly hope not. There are actually some differences of opinion regarding the electoral law. I should explain that the reformers are at liberty to vote on many issues.

It seems to me important that the AD continue to foster the bilateral agreement between the PSD and the reformers. That agreement should be reviewed, and expanded....

"DN": As far as the realm of the presidential elections?

AC: Why not?

"DN": Do you consider that possible, in view of the public positions that certain reformers have already assumed, backing a possible second candidacy for General Eanes?

AC: They are not definitive positions. They are personal positions, preceding the establishment of our backing for General Soares Carneiro. I don't know whether the decision to back Gen Ramalho Eanes is still being maintained among the five reformist deputies. What seems essential to me is that the agreement between them and the PSD could be expanded, and stronger bonds could be created to link the two entities.

"DN": Dr Mota Amaral recently remarked that he backed the abstention vote of the Azores' representative on the National Policy Committee [PCN]; claiming that the PSD's authorized organ for deciding on the candidate to be backed by the party in the presidential elections was the National Council. Isn't the methodology adopted by the party improper?

AC: It does not appear improper to me. For the selection of the candidate for the presidency of the republic, the party's choice should actually be up to the National Council. In view of the difficulties in selecting the candidate, the Council decided to mandate the National Policy Committee to decide. In a second phase, that decision would be aired in the AD's Permanent Council; and, in a third and final phase, the National Council would sanction the decision.

As for the position of the Azores' representative on the CPN, in this case Joao Vasco Paiva, I agree with it completely; because in the Azores the party is governed by its own statutes; and it decided that the PSD's National Council in the Azores would subsequently give or deny its backing for the candidate chosen on the national level. This occurred for a very simple reason: Both in the Azores and Madeira, the party is in the majority by itself, the AD is non-existent, the regions have very specific problems, they are very solicitous about their autonomy, and they want a prior guarantee that the candidate to be backed by the PSD will really uphold and promote the regions' autonomy.

"DN": All right, but that was not the only abstention vote; and, furthermore, there was a negative vote which was reported to have come from Helena Roseta...

AC: The newspapers actually stated that Helena Roseta cast a negative vote. I cannot confirm nor deny it. It involves a leak of information concerning the CPN to the outside, which I regret. I can tell you that there was no unanimity, and that there were extremely varied justifications for the abstentions. There were some who abstained for the reasons given by Joao Vasco Paiva; and there were some who did so for other reasons.



"DN": Were they confidential?

AC: At the present time, owing to a question of party ethics, the reason for that abstention should only be disclosed by the individuals themselves. The basic thing is that any of the people who did not vote for the candidacy of General Soares Carneiro, either on the CPN or the CN, acted with a free conscience.

"DN": Was there a lack of unanimity on the National Council as well?

AC: No, but I must say that the number of negative votes was very small.

"DN": May we know the nature of your vote?

AC: On the CPN, I voted in favor of the candidacy of General Soares Carneiro. I am not entitled to vote on the CN. As a member of the CPN, I am not affiliated with that organ.

#### The Soares Carneiro Candidacy

"DN": The biographical data on General Soares Carneiro made public by newspapers which are unsuspected of hostility toward the AD appear to indicate a personage with a conservative bent. Do you think that such a candidacy could be well received by the AD's entire base of support, and specifically by the PSD electorate?

AC: I think so. But, for the present, it is not true that all the news media have lent General Soares Carneiro a conservative quality. It is our conviction, and mine specifically, that General Soares Carneiro is far removed from being a conservative, and that he comes rather close to our area.

"DN": The PSD area?

AC: I was thinking of a more extensive area. I don't think that we can consider General Soares Carneiro's candidacy using the standards that we normally employ for identifying individuals with parties. This is, in fact, a national candidate and, from the analysis resulting from the contact that I had the pleasure of making with him, he appears to be a person far removed from being conservative, in the reactionary sense of the term. He appears to me to be a person extremely concerned with the principles of social justice, equality of opportunity and the maintenance of liberties as they are established in the Constitution.

"DN": I don't have the exact remarks with me, but Dr Sa Carneiro is supposed to have said something very similar about General Ramalho Eanes in 1976. Could not Soares Carneiro turn out to be "another Ramalho Eanes" for the PSD?



AC: In politics, all decisions have a certain margin of risk. When we backed the candidacy of General Eanes, there was no commitment between one side and the other, although it is true that that risk was really serious. At the present time I recognize that, with the personage of General Soares Carneiro, the risk is minimal, or non-existent.

"DN": To what extent could candidacies such as that of General Galvao de Melo or Colonel Pires Veloso win votes based on the AD's support?

AC: All the candidacies, even the minority ones, draw votes. The PDC [Party of Christian Democracy] draws votes; and the MRPP [Movement for the Reorganization of the Proletariat Party] does also.

In either case, I am patriotically convinced that they will not run the candidacy to the end, without disrespect for the decision that they have made.

"DN": Pires Veloso has already announced his intention of continuing to the end...

AC: But unanticipated conditions could occur which would prompt him to change that decision.

#### The Pires Veloso Candidacy

"DN": Will the AD attempt to enter upon negotiations with those candidates, in order to convince them to drop out?

AC: No decision has yet been made regarding this matter. I don't think that contacts of this kind with other candidates who might emerge on the political scene have been precluded.

As for the original question, if they carry the candidacy to the end, they will, in fact, take votes from the AD. It remains to be seen whether those votes will be significant. Excluding other candidates of obviously lesser importance on the political scene, mention has been made of Colonel Pires Veloso as a major competitor against the AD. From the information that we have, Colonel Pires Veloso is actually an individual with a certain amount of popular appeal, particularly in the north, where it has even been rumored that the PSD entities are associated with his electoral campaign; something which is absolutely untrue.

I simply do not know whether that appeal will be reflected in a following in terms of votes. The appeal and respect could be maintained, without voting for him.

"DN": Therefore, in your opinion, the results of General Eanes' presidency are negative?

AC: In my opinion they are. General Eanes could have solved the problem of political instability in the government as early as 1976, if he had become closer related to the majority who elected him, and if he had tried, with that majority, to set up governments with a stable, firm foundation. He was never willing, or never had the political courage or determination to do so.

### The Polls

"DN": Polls which have been regularly published indicate high rates of political prestige for General Eanes. Don't you fear that General Eanes will be a possible adversary of the AD's presidential candidate?

AC: That question entails a very long answer, with several facets. The first one is the polls. I consider it a big mistake to try to compare the political prestige of presidents of the republic in office with the political prestige of governments.

In my opinion, this is as mistaken as comparing kilos with meters. It is obvious that the president of the republic has had a certain type of involvement in Portuguese society, but not a day-to-day involvement. Since he has not made any tragic, blatant mistakes, obviously his political prestige, for the simple reason that he occupies the organ of sovereignty, namely, the presidency of the republic, is not tending to decline; and, in particular, there is not yet on the political scene anyone backed by parties which could be dissociated from him on the basis of policy embarking on the presidential race.

Moreover, the EXPRESSO polls have disclosed a sudden rise in the government's prestige.

And now we shall see how those results evolve when the public begins to consider the various candidates in the presidential elections.

"DN": Don't you think that General Eanes has a very good chance of winning, in the event that he runs again?

AC: In the first place, I have strong doubts that he can run again with the backing of the PS. I don't believe that any candidate who obtained favors from the PC [Communist Party] in the run-off elections can win the elections in Portugal.

"DN": Then you don't think that General Eanes will win in the first balloting?

AC: By no means, because I presume that General Otelo will run, that the PC will run a military or civilian candidate, and hence all of that PS political group leaning to the left will also have more than one candidate. Even if it had only one, he would not win; because he would have to be introduced to the electorate with backing from the PC.

"DN": Won't General Eanes be able to seek votes based on AD support?

AC: No. The votes that he might seek from the AD electorate are insignificant. The candidate whom the AD decided to back is one who can and certainly will seek a sizable number of votes from the area of the candidate who appears under the wing of the "united left."

2909

CSO: 3101

## PRESIDENT'S, PRIME MINISTER'S APPROVAL RATE CLIMBS IN POLL

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 12 Apr 80 pp 4, 5

[Text] The Reason for EXPRESSO/NORMA's Six Questions

The questions selected by EXPRESSO for inclusion in the opinion poll published today have the following underlying reasons:

It is still considered important to ascertain the approval rate of Gen Ramalho Eanes and Dr Francisco Sa Carneiro for their respective performance in the positions of president of the republic and prime minister. As was announced at the appropriate time, EXPRESSO intends to gage these approval rates in subsequent weeks, so that it will be possible to find out how the Portuguese people react to the political activity of Eanes and Sa Carneiro between now and the pre-electoral period.

One issue which has concerned several Portuguese and foreign political observers is that relating to the degree of control exercised by the present government over the news media belonging to the state.

It was considered important to learn whether the Portuguese people think that this government exercises much, little or no control over the nationalized news media.

Another timely topic is that concerning the presidential elections of next December, for which several names of potential military candidates have been brought up.

Are the Portuguese people familiar with the various military personages who are being discussed so much?

This is a preliminary question, which should not be confused with the electorate's final selection, but which makes it possible to gage the amount of information that the Portuguese public has regarding several of the officers who are now candidates or possible candidates for the presidency of the republic.

Finally, there is a question which has been attracting the attention of national political circles both within and outside of the Assembly of the Republic: the question of the revision of the Electoral Law.

The government and the political forces backing it have overtly upheld that revision.

The opposition, in general, has expressed its profound reservations concerning such a proposal.

To what extent do the Portuguese people agree, totally or partially, or disagree, totally or partially, with the revision of the Electoral Law?

These were the five questions selected by EXPRESSO for the fourth exclusive EXPRESSO/NORMA opinion poll, which will be followed by six more, published in the same 2-week intervals, and ending in July of this year.

#### Technical Format

Universe: Portuguese, over 18 years of age, residing in the districts of Viseu, Beja, Porto and Lisbon.

Sample: 100 interviews in each district.

Criterion for selection of the study area: One district with a predominantly AD [Democratic Alliance] influence (Viseu: 64 percent AD); one district with a predominantly PS [Socialist Party] influence (Porto: 35 percent PS); one district with a predominantly APU [United People's Alliance] influence (Beja: 51 percent APU); and one district with a more equitable distribution of votes (Lisbon: 40 percent AD, 26 percent PS and 26 percent APU).

The four districts represent 46 percent of the total number of voters.

Questionnaire: Questions supplied by EXPRESSO.

Interviews: Direct, personal, using a structured questionnaire, in the residences of those interviewed.

Selection: Random, using the "random route method" for selecting the household, and the "Kish method" for selecting the individual interviewed.

Sample points: 26 localities, selected at random, after a prior stratification based on district and "habitat."

Field work: 1 and 2 April 1980.

Maximum margin of error for the total: + 5 percent in an interval of confidence of 95 percent and p/50 percent.



Maximum margin of error for the district: + 10 percent in an interval of confidence of 95 percent and p/50 percent.

Institution responsible for the research: NORMA, Portuguese member of Gallup International.

The analysis of the results has been made by EXPRESSO.

#### Eanes: Another Rise in Rating

The first question was: "Personally, do you approve or disapprove of the way in which Gen Ramalho Eanes is performing as president of the republic?" (See Table I.)

Of those queried in Lisbon, Porto, Beja and Viseu, 50 percent, 49 percent, 43 percent and 52 percent, respectively, approved of that performance.

His political performance was disapproved by 17 percent, 15 percent, 7 percent and 4 percent, respectively, in Lisbon, Porto, Beja and Viseu.

In this fourth poll, the districts selected are exactly the same ones used for the first poll; which affords a comparison with the percentages gathered exactly 2 months ago.

For example, Eanes' approval rate rose in Lisbon and Viseu (8 and 12 percent, respectively). He maintained the same percentage in Beja (43 percent); and it dropped in Porto (from 54 to 49 percent).

As for the percentages of disapproval, Eanes' rose slightly in Porto and Beja (in Porto, from 12 to 15 percent, and in Beja, from 6 to 7 percent). He maintained the same percentage in Lisbon (17 percent); and the percentage of disapproval dropped substantially in Viseu (from 20 to 4 percent).

The percentage of those who claimed not to know was slightly less in Lisbon, the same in Viseu, and slightly higher in Beja and Porto.

As for those who did not answer, the percentages dropped in all the districts, except Viseu.

Comparing the percentages in the Lisbon district during the last poll with those immediately preceding, one concludes that there was an increase in approvals larger than the increase in disapprovals, and a decline in the percentage of those polled who said that they could not answer.

In brief, Eanes' rating is still quite high, particularly in Lisbon, a major political barometer.

The very sharp rise in his rating in Viseu is noteworthy, Viseu certainly being a district with a strong AD electoral influence; as is its decline in Porto, a district in which the Socialist Party carries considerable electoral weight.

Generally speaking, Ramalho Eanes' prestige continues to be reinforced.

Table I

	Lisbon	Porto	Beja	Viseu
Approve	50	49	43	52
Disapprove	17	15	7	4
Don't know	28	32	49	39
No answer	5	4	1	5

#### Sa Carneiro: A Precipitous Rise

The second question in the poll was the following: "Personally, do you approve or disapprove of the way in which Dr Sa Carneiro is performing as prime minister and head of the government?" (See Table II.)

In this poll, Francisco Sa Carneiro showed a precipitous rise in comparison with the results of the last polls published, and also the results of the first poll, in which the districts included were the same ones.

For example, in Lisbon, Sa Carneiro now has 38 percent approval and 31 percent disapproval; as compared with 33 and 28 percent in the first poll, and 28 and 36 percent in the third poll.

In Porto, Sa Carneiro has 50 percent approval and 30 percent disapproval in this poll, in contrast to 35 and 38 percent, respectively, in the first poll.

In Viseu, during the first poll, the prime minister had 40 percent approval and 22 percent disapproval; and, this time, the pertinent percentages are 40 and 9 percent.

Only in Beja did Sa Carneiro's rating decline slightly (in the first poll, the percentage of approval and disapproval was the same: 21 percent; now the approval is 28 percent and the disapproval 30 percent).

Moreover, in Lisbon, Porto and Beja there was a very substantial decline in the percentage of those questioned who claimed not to be able to answer, and that same percentage increased in the district of Viseu.

With regard to those queried who said that they did not wish to answer the question which was asked, that percentage dropped 5 points in Lisbon, 5 points in Porto and 3 points in Beja, nevertheless rising 2 points in Viseu.

Although, in this poll, Francisco Sa Carneiro still shows less favorable percentages than Eanes in Lisbon and Beja (each for the respective position), one observes a reversal of positions in Porto and Viseu.

In Porto, the Sa Carneiro percentage is higher than that of Eanes, unlike what occurred in the first poll. In Viseu, Eanes' percentage is higher than that of Sa Carneiro, also the reverse of what occurred in the first poll.

But, generally speaking, the most significant feature is the appreciable rise in the prime minister's rating, particularly in Lisbon, where the last three polls showed a downward trend.

Not only is there a stoppage of that trend; there is even a marked improvement in the position of Francisco Sa Carneiro.

Table II

	Lisbon	Porto	Beja	Viseu
Approve	38	50	28	40
Disapprove	31	30	30	9
Don't know	28	18	41	46
No answer	3	2	1	5

#### Control of the Nationalized Press: The Majority Are Unaware

The third question was: "In your opinion, does the present government exercise much, little or no control over the news media belonging to the state?" (See Table III.)

The overwhelming majority of those questioned did not have the slightest awareness of the problem, and those claiming that they could not answer totaled 54 percent in Lisbon, 57 percent in Porto, 77 percent in Beja and 73 percent in Viseu.

It is possible that part of these percentages may end up favoring the government, whose intervention may be so subtle that it is not evident to the public.

No answers were given by 4 percent in Lisbon, 2 percent in Porto, 1 percent in Beja and 11 percent in Viseu.

Of the few queried who answered, the majority are of the opinion that the government exercises little control over the nationalized news media. This was the case in Lisbon (20 percent as compared with 15 percent who think that it exercises much control, and 7 percent who think that it exercises absolutely no control). The same thing holds true in Beja (10 percent: little, 7 percent: much and 5 percent: none). In Porto, the percentage of

those who think that the government exercises little control over the nationalized press and of those who think that it is not controlled at all was identical (14 percent).

Only in Viseu was there a higher percentage of those who consider the government's control over the nationalized media to be rather marked (9 percent, as opposed to 6 percent of those who regard it as controlled but little, and 1 percent of those who do not consider it controlled at all). In any event, this is a small overall percentage to assume any great significance.

Table III

	Lisbon	Porto	Beja	Viseu
Much	15	13	7	9
Little	20	14	10	6
None	7	14	5	1
Don't know	54	57	77	73
No answer	4	2	1	11

The Best Known Military: Ramalho Eanes and Antonio de Spínola

The fourth question was: "Would you like to tell me which of the following military personages you are familiar with?" (See Table IV.)

The comparison of the percentages obtained by the various military personages mentioned in the districts of Lisbon, Porto, Beja and Viseu reveals that Ramalho Eanes is by far the best known, followed by Antonio de Spínola and Pires Veloso.

Firmino Miguel ranks considerably lower. Lower still are Altino de Magalhaes and Lemos Ferreira.

Soares Carneiro, Pedro Cardoso and Rocha Vieira, in that order, are the least known military personages (it should be noted that the poll was taken before Soares Carneiro's candidacy was established in Belem).

In terms of regional distribution, the percentages for Ramalho Eanes and Antonio de Spínola were distributed homogeneously.

In general, for the other officers cited, Lisbon and Porto showed percentages of familiarity far higher than those in Beja and Viseu; and Beja's percentages were lower than those of Viseu.

The influence which the exercise of power at present or in the recent past has had and still has on the familiarity that the Portuguese public shows with the leading military personages mentioned as potential candidates in the elections for the presidency of the republic appears obvious.



Table IV

	Lisbon	Porto	Beja	Viseu
Soares Carneiro	19	22	4	3
Firmino Miguel	44	28	17	17
Pires Veloso	65	74	26	42
Pedro Cardoso	24	3	4	3
Ramalho Eanes	96	98	97	95
Altino de Magalhaes	26	18	10	11
Antonio de Spinola	85	86	60	85
Lemos Ferreira	26	19	13	13
Rocha Vieira	22	13	6	9

#### Revision of the Electoral Law: The Man in the Street Does Not Know What It Is

The final question in this fourth poll was as follows: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the Electoral Law?" (See Table V.)

The most prominent aspects of the results related to this fifth question is the slight notion that the man in the street has of what an Electoral Law is; and, consequently, of the advantages or disadvantages of its alteration.

Of those queried, those who claimed not to have any opinion on the matter totaled 47 percent in Lisbon, 48 percent in Porto, 76 percent in Beja and 66 percent in Viseu.

If we combine these percentages, which are enlightening in themselves, with those pertaining to the people who did not answer, we shall have to add 13 percent more in Lisbon, 13 percent more in Porto, 4 percent more in Beja and 19 percent more in Viseu.

In addition to this fundamental feature, another highlight is the fact that, in all the districts included, except Lisbon, those queried who answered the question and expressed an opinion on it, for the most part favored a change in the Electoral Law.

In Porto, the difference was appreciable: 17 percent were in total agreement with such a change, 11 percent were in partial agreement and only 5 and 6 percent were in partial or total disagreement with that change.

In Beja, the corresponding percentages were 8 percent in total agreement, 4 percent in partial agreement, 0 percent in partial disagreement, and 8 percent in total disagreement. In Viseu, the percentages were 5 percent in total agreement, 4 percent in partial agreement, 0 percent in partial disagreement and 6 percent in total disagreement.

Only in Lisbon were the combined percentages of those who disagreed (27 percent) higher than the percentages of those who claimed to agree (23 percent),

although it should be noted that those questioned who expressed partial disagreement did not, essentially, disbar a change in the Electoral Law.

Generally speaking, and as in the case of the third question, the results of this one are relatively positive for the positions upheld by the government and the political forces backing it.

Table V

	Lisbon	Porto	Beja	Viseu
Total agreement	11	17	8	5
Partial agreement	12	11	4	4
Partial disagreement	8	5	0	0
Total disagreement	19	6	8	6
No opinion	47	48	76	66
No answer	13	13	4	19

2909

CSO: 3101

## PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD POLITICAL LEADERSHIP MEASURED

Liabon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 24 Apr 80 pp 4, 5

[Text] The Reason for the Six Questions of EXPRESSO/NORMA

The underlying reasons for the questions selected by EXPRESSO for inclusion in the opinion poll published today are as follows:

It is still considered important to learn the approval rating of Gen Ramalho Eanes and Dr Francisco Sa Carneiro, in the performance of their respective functions as president of the republic and prime minister. As was announced on the appropriate occasion, EXPRESSO intends to gage these approval ratings in the weeks to come, so that it will be possible to find out how the Portuguese people react toward the political activity of Eanes and Sa Carneiro between now and the pre-electoral period.

Now that 6 years have elapsed since the "revolution of spikes," which is to be commemorated tomorrow, it is important to take the pulse of the Portuguese people regarding the way in which they view 25 April 1974 from this distance. This is because, in a period of marked political bipolarization, people have become more uninhibited; both those who defend 25 April and those who attack it.

Hence, it is considered important to learn whether, in the opinion of those queried, 25 April had a positive, negative or no effect on Portugal.

Inasmuch as, in the race to Belem, the shots fired to date have had a slight odor of dry powder, the AD's [Democratic Alliance] backing for the potential candidate, Soares Carneiro, sounds somewhat like ammunition...like another bullet which may not be due to the undeniable significance of the fact that that member of the military is supported by the government majority. The very enigma which that general represents to the public at large has caused his return to produce an air of expectation. Hence, we have asked whether the selection of Gen Soares Carneiro by the AD as a candidate for the next presidential elections was very good, good, fair, poor or very poor.

In view of the legislative and presidential elections at the end of the year, the question concerning the public image of the various political personages assumes particular acuteness. Therefore, we chose a group of top-ranking figures in the political party spectrum, and we inquired which ones were best known to the Portuguese people.

Following the foregoing question (which, we emphasize, was aimed only at determining to what degree the selected personages were known to the public), we found it logical to ascertain the amount of sympathy that they evoked among the populace: much, some, little or none.

These were the six questions selected by EXPRESSO, and asked in the districts of Lisbon, Guarda, Coimbra and Evora. This is the fifth exclusive poll of EXPRESSO/NORMA, which will be followed by five more, to be published in the same 2-week intervals, and ending in July of this year.

#### Technical Format

Universe: Portuguese over 18 years of age, residing in the districts of Guarda, Evora, Coimbra and Lisbon.

Sample: 100 interviews in each district.

Criterion for selecting the area of the study: One district with a predominantly AD influence (Guarda: 61 percent AD); one district with a predominantly PS [Socialist Party] influence (Coimbra: 35 percent PS); one district with a predominantly APU [United People's Alliance] influence (Evora: 49 percent APU); and one district with a more equitable distribution of votes (Lisbon: 40 percent AD, 26 percent PS and 26 percent APU). The four districts represent 29 percent of the total voters.

Questionnaire: Questions supplied by EXPRESSO.

Interviews: Direct, personal, through a structured questionnaire, in the residence of those interviewed.

Selection: Random, using the "random route method" for selecting the household, and the "Kish method" for selecting the individual interviewed.

Sample points: 20 localities selected at random, after a prior stratification by district and habitat.

Field work: 17-19 April 1980.

Maximum margin of error for the total:  $\pm 5$  percent in an interval of confidence of 95 percent and  $p = 50$  percent.

Maximum margin of error for the district:  $\pm 10$  percent in an interval of confidence of 95 percent and  $p = 50$  percent.



Institution responsible for the research: NORMA, Portuguese member of Gallup International.

The analysis of the results is made by EXPRESSO.

#### Ramalho Eanes: Slight Decline

The first question was: "Personally, do you approve or disapprove of the way in which General Eanes is performing as president of the republic?" (See Table I.)

That performance is approved by 43 percent (Lisbon), 39 percent (Guarda), 44 percent (Coimbra) and 39 percent (Evora).

His political performance is disapproved by 11 percent (Lisbon), 3 percent (Guarda), 10 percent (Coimbra) and 10 percent (Evora). In this fifth poll, the districts selected are exactly the same ones used for the second poll; which affords a comparison with the percentages found exactly 2 months ago.

For example, the approval of Eanes declined in three districts (Lisbon, Guarda and Coimbra) by a total of 14 percent; on the other hand, it rose 19 percent in Evora.

As for the percentages of disapproval, there was a substantial improvement in Eanes' position: In the four districts, the percentage of people dissatisfied with his political performance dropped drastically, by 54 percent. However, the decline in disapproval must be ascribed to those who did not know, and those who were perhaps undecided as a result of the launching of the Soares Carneiro candidacy. The number of the latter rose markedly in all districts.

The percentages of those with no answer dropped in Coimbra and Evora, but increased in Lisbon and Guarda.

When the percentages for the district of Lisbon from this poll are compared with those from the immediately previous one, it is found that there is a decline in approvals (7 percent) 1 percent in excess of the decline in disapprovals. Moreover, confirming the previous trend, the number of individuals who claimed not to know rose by 9 percent. The number of those polled who did not answer also increased (4 percent).

To summarize, although it cannot be regarded as disastrous, General Eanes' approval rating dropped slightly, mainly because, although the number of those disapproving of his policy dropped sharply, that advantage was not credited in the column of those who approved of it. In fact, a significant percentage of them were included in the category of those who "don't know" most likely as a result of the expectations created by the advent of Soares Carneiro in the race to Belem.

It is noteworthy that Gen Ramalho Eanes' rating dropped sharply in Lisbon, Guarda and Coimbra, but rose spectacularly in Evora, a district which prevented him from experiencing a more abrupt decline on the whole.

Generally speaking, and despite this decline, Eanes still maintains an enviable reputation from an electoral standpoint.

Table I

	Lisbon	Guarda	Coimbra	Evora
Approve	43	39	44	39
Disapprove	11	3	10	10
Don't know	37	50	45	46
No answer	9	8	1	5

#### Sa Carneiro: Spectacular Rise

The second question in the poll was the following: "Personally, do you approve or disapprove of the way in which Dr Sa Carneiro is performing as prime minister and head of the government?" (See Table II.)

In this poll, Francisco Sa Carneiro showed a spectacular rise in comparison with the one taken in the same districts 2 months ago.

For example, with respect to those who approve of his political performance, the prime minister's percentages rose in Lisbon (2 percent), Coimbra (6 percent) and Evora (9 percent); only in Guarda did the percentage decline, by 9 percent.

Insofar as disapproval is concerned, Sa Carneiro also enjoys a huge positive assessment: Those who were not in agreement with him declined in Lisbon, Guarda and Coimbra (by 12, 13 and 19 percent, respectively); and there was no change in this group in Evora (39 percent).

As for those who could not give an answer, Sa Carneiro, like Ramalho Eanes, was affected by what might be categorized as "lost percentages." In fact, only in Evora was there a drop in the number of undecided people (2 percent), who nevertheless increased considerably in Lisbon (5 percent), Guarda (14 percent) and Coimbra (26 percent).

The number of those not answering increased 3 percent in Lisbon and 7 percent in Guarda ; but declined by 12 percent in Coimbra and by 7 percent in Evora.

When the percentages for the district of Lisbon in this poll are compared with those obtained in the one we published 2 weeks ago, it is found that the approval of Sa Carneiro declined 4 percent, but the number of those disapproving of his policy also dropped by 5 percent.

Once again, those who did not know increased 6 percent, and those who did not answer rose 3 percent.

The rise in approval of the prime minister's policy was particularly significant in the district of Lisbon (generally regarded as an excellent barometer), Coimbra (a stronghold of the Socialist Party) and Evora (the PCP's [Portuguese Communist Party] traditional sphere of influence, where Ramalho Eanes also increased the legion of his admirers this time).

Overall, therefore, the increase in Sa Carneiro's prestige is undeniably spectacular, a trend which had already been reflected quite clearly in the last poll that we offered.

Table II

	Lisbon	Guarda	Coimbra	Evora
Approve	33	44	43	25
Disapprove	26	4	4	39
Don't know	34	45	52	31
No answer	7	7	1	5

#### 25 April: It Is Defended by the Vast Majority

The third question in the poll was the following: "In your opinion, did 25 April have a positive, negative or no effect on Portugal?" (See Table III.)

We can clearly infer that the response was positive in the four districts polled. In fact, Lisbon had 67 percent positive answers, as compared with 14 percent negative. The barometer-district, which is the capital, was followed in a very similar fashion by the other three: Guarda (32 percent-17 percent), Coimbra (53 percent-12 percent) and Evora (67 percent-7 percent).

The highly positive response to this question was also corroborated by the number of those who claimed no effect, which was extremely low: Lisbon (3 percent), Guarda (9 percent), Coimbra (13 percent) and Evora (7 percent). The percentage in Coimbra may perhaps cause some surprise, because it is a district in which the Socialist Party has accrued highly favorable electoral results.

The number of those queried who claimed not to know will not cause so much surprise, however, if we consider the low cultural level of many people in the interior, as well as the notorious lack of clarification still being felt to some extent throughout the entire country. For example, 9 percent in Lisbon, 38 percent in Guarda, 22 percent in Coimbra and 16 percent in Evora said that they did not know whether 25 April had been positive or negative. The high percentage attributed to the district of Guarda is seen as stemming from social and economic conditions, which do not prompt people in the interior to make great statements about what they think of the "revolution of spikes."

For reasons somewhat similar to those given previously, the percentage of those who did not answer was higher in Lisbon (7 percent), declining in Guarda (4 percent), and dropping further still in Evora (3 percent). In Coimbra, people wanted to express their views on 25 April in one way or another. In the final reckoning, this last column could perhaps be interpreted as corroborating the positive features which the revolution still has for a largely majority percentage of those queried in the four districts involved.

On the eve of another anniversary of the coup which overthrew the former regime (a psychologically propitious occasion on which those questioned could air more clearcut sentiments), the results of this poll may be interpreted as being particularly indicative of the widespread sentiments in the country.

Table III

	Lisbon	Guarda	Coimbra	Evora
Positive	67	32	53	67
Negative	14	17	12	7
None	3	9	13	7
Don't know	9	38	22	16
No answer	7	4		3

#### Soares Carneiro: The Majority Do Not Know Whether the Choice Was Good

The fourth question in the poll was as follows: "In your opinion, was the AD's choice of Gen Soares Carneiro as a candidate for the presidency of the republic in the next elections very good, good, fair, poor or very poor?" (See Table IV.)

The answers given to this question confirmed in an extremely clearcut manner what Gen Soares Carneiro still is to the vast majority of the Portuguese population: namely, an unknown quantity.

If we analyze Table IV, the line of percentages which immediately attracts our attention is that relating to those who said that they did not know: 73 percent in Lisbon, 71 percent in Guarda, 85 percent in Coimbra and 63 percent in Evora.

If we exclude this line, the most significant one becomes the one showing those who considered the choice of Soares Carneiro very poor; although any inference drawn is necessarily precarious, in view of the ridiculous data backing it. Nevertheless, they are the second highest figures, namely: 6 percent in Lisbon, 6 percent in Guarda, 1 percent in Coimbra and 22 percent in Evora.

And next, even more ridiculous are the percentages of those who considered the selection made by the AD of that general officer a very good one: 2 percent in Lisbon, 2 percent in Guarda, 6 percent in Coimbra and 0 percent in Evora.



The situation improves slightly for Soares Carneiro when the figures on those who consider him a good choice for Belem are analyzed: 5 percent in Lisbon, 5 percent in Guarda, 2 percent in Coimbra and 7 percent in Evora.

On the whole, although the figures do not indicate a sudden prestige for Soares Carneiro, they also clearly indicate that this is an incipient situation and, for obvious reasons, one destined to change. It remains to be seen to what extent.

Table IV

	Lisbon	Guarda	Coimbra	Evora
Very good	2	2	6	
Good	5	5	2	7
Fair	4	4	6	
Poor	4	5		3
Very poor	6	6	1	22
Don't know	73	71	85	63
No answer	6	7		5

#### Soares, Carneiro, Cunhal and Amaral: Everyone Knows Them

The fifth question asked by EXPRESSO was the following: "Which of these political personages are you familiar with, or have you heard of?"

A list was cited, containing the names of Sa Carneiro, Mario Soares, Freitas do Amaral, Alvaro Cunhal, Ribeiro Teles, Medeiros Ferreira, Jose Manuel Tengarrinha and Major Tome. (See Table V.)

It may be said that Mario Soares, Sa Carneiro, Alvaro Cunhal and Freitas do Amaral are known to nearly everyone.

The percentages for Mario Soares are 91 percent in Lisbon, 96 percent in Guarda, 100 percent in Coimbra and 100 percent in Evora.

The respective percentages for Sa Carneiro are 91, 94, 100 and 100 percent.

For Alvaro Cunhal, they are 91, 92, 100 and 100 percent.

The percentages obtained for Freitas do Amaral are 91, 92, 92 and 100 percent.

In an obviously distant position but still a rather favorable one are Ribeiro Teles and Medeiros Ferreira (79, 59, 40 and 66 percent for Ribeiro Teles; and 79, 55, 39 and 64 percent for Medeiros Ferreira).

On a lower level are Jose Manuel Tengarrinha and Major Tome, with over 50 percent in Lisbon and Evora (62, 45, 16 and 59 percent for Tengarrinha; and 68, 47, 20 and 57 percent for Major Tome).



In short, everyone is familiar with Mario Soares, Sa Carneiro, Cunhal and Freitas do Amaral.

Many people are familiar with Ribeiro Teles, followed by Medeiros Ferreira; some are familiar with Major Tome; and, at the bottom of the list, is Jose Manuel Tengarrinha.

Table V

	Lisbon	Guarda	Coimbra	Evora
Mario Soares	91	96	100	100
Alvaro Cunhal	91	92	100	100
Sa Carneiro	91	94	100	100
Freitas do Amaral	91	92	92	100
Ribeiro Teles	79	59	40	66
Medeiros Ferreira	79	55	39	64
Major Tome	68	47	20	37
J.M. Tengarrinha	62	45	16	59

#### Sa Carneiro, F. Amaral and M. Soares: The Best Liked Leaders

The final question asked by EXPRESSO related to the degree of sympathy deserved by the aforementioned leaders: much, some, little or none (the figures contained in eight tables are not published in their entirety, owing to lack of space).

Sa Carneiro holds first place, with the following percentages: Lisbon, 14 + 22 percent (much and some sympathy), compared with 11 + 35 percent (little and no sympathy); Guarda, 27 + 11 percent, compared with 3 + 3 percent; Coimbra, 32 + 29 percent, compared with 7 + 11 percent; Evora, 8 + 17 percent, compared with 6 + 47 percent.

Freitas do Amaral ranks second: Lisbon, 17 + 15 percent, compared with 17 + 31 percent; Guarda, 15 + 15 percent, compared with 2 + 7 percent; Coimbra, 34 + 19 percent, compared with 12 + 11 percent; Evora, 7 + 17 percent, compared with 6 + 47 percent.

Mario Soares appears in third place: Lisbon, 9 + 26 percent, compared with 9 + 34 percent; Guarda, 6 + 13 percent, compared with 12 + 16 percent; Coimbra, 13 + 29 percent, compared with 18 + 20 percent; Evora, 2 + 22 percent, compared with 16 + 41 percent.

Next is Medeiros Ferreira: Lisbon, 3 + 21 percent, compared with 5 + 31 percent; Guarda, 7 + 11 percent, compared with 1 + 8 percent; Coimbra, 15 + 38 percent, compared with 12 + 18 percent; Evora, 5 + 3 percent, compared with 30 + 38 percent.

He is followed by Ribeiro Teles: Lisbon, 5 + 16 percent, compared with 8 + 37 percent; Guarda, 6 + 10 percent, compared with 1 + 10 percent; Coimbra, 28 + 13 percent, compared with 21 + 6 percent; Evora, 5 + 10 percent, compared with 11 + 50 percent.

Third from last is Alvaro Cunhal: Lisbon, 7 + 13 percent, compared with 10 + 48 percent; Guarda, 0 + 4 percent, compared with 0 + 35 percent; Coimbra, 5 + 6 percent, compared with 11 + 55 percent; Evora, 19 + 21 percent, compared with 6 + 35 percent.

Tengarrinha appeared next: Lisbon, 10 + 16 percent, compared with 3 + 41 percent; Guarda, 0 + 0 percent, compared with 0 + 10 percent; Coimbra, 6 + 6 percent, compared with 15 + 69 percent; Evora, 20 + 14 percent, compared with 11 + 33 percent.

Last is Major Tome: Lisbon, 5 + 10 percent, compared with 7 + 45 percent; Guarda, 0 + 0 percent, compared with 0 + 22 percent; Coimbra, 4 + 5 percent, compared with 12 + 75 percent; Evora, 0 + 12 percent, compared with 15 + 39 percent.

The presumable effect of the exercise of power on these results must be taken into consideration.

2909

CSO: 3101

## LISNAVE REPORTS FIRST PROFITABLE YEAR

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 25 Mar 80 p 10

[Text] LISNAVE made a profit in fiscal year 1979. This is the first time this has happened. The profit amounted to 17.725 escudos, according to the report and statement published recently.

The increase in the company's corporate capital from 500 million escudos to 2 billion escudos, by using part of the revaluation reserves (2.5 billion escudos in 1978 and 127,554,000,000 escudos in 1979), also stands out in an examination of the report as another fundamental feature. These reserves also were used to cover losses accumulated up to 1978.

In the year being examined, LISNAVE performed services amounting to 6,924,000,000 escudos. This represents a 50-percent increase in comparison with 1978.

Amortizations and repayments also were at a higher level than in 1978.

Financial disbursements showed a new, substantial increase, amounting to 948 million escudos. This means a 50-percent increase in comparison with the 1978 amount.

This increase results from the growing need for resorting to bank credit and from the high interest rates both in 1979 and 1978.

## Consequences of the Development Plan

According to the company's report, these results are the consequence of the development plan prepared for 1979, which "was a year of great improvements in the situation of LISNAVE."

This plan includes total completion in the field of new construction, combined with an extensive personnel reorganization program made possible by the voluntary early retirement of 1,000 persons. This made it possible to reach the end of 1979 with 8,618 workers.

The LISNAVE report points out that this activity made it possible to increase the average per capita pay by 27 percent. The amount of overall remunerations increased only 15 percent.

The LISNAVE management points out as positive the fact that, during the year being examined, there were no labor disputes. This, together with an increase in productivity, "contributed substantially to the situation in which the company is at present."

#### Attractor of Foreign Exchange

LISNAVE is still one of the leading attractors of foreign exchange to Portugal's economy. Of its sales amounting to 6.9 billion escudos, 5.9 billion were billed abroad.

In addition, the company's activity has an appreciable multiplying effect on the economy, expressed by acquisitions from Portuguese suppliers amounting to 2 billion escudos.

The gross value added by the company amounted to 4,612,060,000 escudos in 1979, plus 68 percent of the 1978 amount and the gross cash flow (funds capable of being used in self-financing) was positive by 745,298,000 escudos.

#### Sources of Financing

The company was still obliged to resort primarily to short-term loans to finance its activity. These loans represented 51 percent (1 billion escudos) of the total sources, followed then by self-financing (26 percent). Medium-term loans amounted to 121 million escudos and represented only 6 percent of the sources of financing.

In 1979, the Margueira shipyards received 537 inquiries and responded to 442 that turned into orders. The Rocha shipyards repaired a total of 425 ships, of which 212 were docked in 1978.

LISNAVE expects to make some large investments this year, especially at fixed term, for cleaning and degasification of tankers. The Jidda (Saudi Arabia) shipyard is being built. A decision is being awaited from the Cape Verde Government for construction of a shipyard in that country and it has participated in the competitive bidding for construction of a shipyard at Mers el-Kebir (Algeria). Other projects are being studied in South America, Africa and the Far East.

Recently, also, LISNAVE signed a contract with a Japanese company for repairing 35 tankers, amounting to 1 billion escudos.

## URANIUM DEPOSITS, NUCLEAR ENERGY PROSPECTS DETAILED

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 28 Mar 80 p 1 [sec. supp.]

[Text] A detail in the report, of special importance to us, concerns estimates of installed nuclear power. According to those estimates, Portugal should have an installed nuclear power of 900 MWe in 1987. Installed power would increase to 1,800 MWe in 1989, to 3,600 MWe in 1995, reaching 5.4 MW [sic; probably should read 5,400 MWe] in 2000. Nevertheless, still according to the report, "more recent data indicate the following for Portugal: nothing before 1995, 1,800 MWe in 1995, 4,700 MWe in 2000."

Because it takes close to 10 years to construct a nuclear powerplant, conceivably, no decision is going to be made on one before 1985. It should be noted that, recently, the secretary of state for Energy and Mines stated that "the technological, economic, ecological aspects of nuclear energy are not sufficiently clarified so that a responsible decision can be made right now," and it is also impossible "to say whether this decision is to be made in 1984 or 1985. Besides, at present, that is not the basic issue."

It should be pointed out, however, that uranium prospecting in our country has undergone a great increase in the last few years. Budgetary provisions were made for 174 exploratory drillings in 1979, with a total extent of 15,950 meters, over double to sum of previous years, starting with 1975. For the first time, the financial responsibility of the National Uranium Enterprise in exploratory drillings exceeded (with an expenditure of 436,000 contos) the expenditures of the state (amounting to 340,000 contos).

Reasonably proved reserves, at a cost of less than \$80 a kilogram, are estimated at 6,700 metric tons, while exploitable reserves at prices between \$80 and \$130 a kilogram amount to 1,500 metric tons. With regard to supplementary reserves, workable reserves at a cost of less than \$80 a kilogram are estimated at 2,500 metric tons. With regard to cost between \$80 and \$130, there is no estimate. Possible reserves are said to amount to 7,000 metric tons, at a cost of less than \$130 a kilogram. With regard to the production of concentrate, it amounted to 1,729 metric tons up to 1975 and since then has amounted to a total of 2,220 metric tons.



It is to be noted that production decreased from 98 metric tons in 1978 to 85 (estimated) in 1979. This is owing to a decrease in the mineral content. A sharp recovery is anticipated, however. Production should be stabilized at 100 metric tons of uranium a year by the middle of this decade. In 1985, when the Alto Alentejo production center goes into operation, production should go up to 270 metric tons a year. Consumption, based on nuclear powerplants to go into operation starting in 1987, has been estimated at 950 metric tons up to 1990. At the end of 1979, the state had a stock of 593 metric tons and producers 132 metric tons.

In spite of the anticipated increase in production, Portugal is not going to become a "uranium power." On the contrary, the 270 metric tons of uranium a year are at the bottom of the list, and are followed only by Argentina and India with 200 metric tons, Italy with 120 metric tons and Japan with 30 metric tons. At any rate, it would be difficult to increase production. Even at the level of 270 metric tons a year, our reserves -- proved and supplementary -- at a cost of less than \$130 a kilogram will be depleted by around the year 2020.

10,042

CSO: 3101

## DEMIREL SAID TO SEEK OCTOBER ELECTIONS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 4 Apr 80 p 7

[Text] Ankara -- JP [Justice Party] General Chairman Demirel is expected to respond to Ecevit's call for a dialog on the presidential election by the first of next week at the latest.

Last week, Demirel met privately at his home with former First Army Commander General Kemal Atalay. The invitation came from Demirel. Atalay came to Ankara for the day and returned to Istanbul after the meeting. Circles close to the JP are saying that interparty dialog can begin only after Caglayangil begins his duties as acting president and if no agreement can be reached on a presidential candidate for the party, Demirel will propose the name of retired General Atalay and will ask the party to rally round this name. Thus Atalay will join the presidential candidates. It is understood that with Bilgic's emerging as a presidential candidate, Demirel has passed over Caglayangil to avoid disruption of party unity. With Atalay, whom he will bring into the Senate from the quota, the presidential problem will have been taken care of.

Meanwhile, the RPP has made an issue of the government problem in conjunction with the presidential election. Knowing that the JP will not form a government with the RPP, Ecevit is trying to get the NSP [National Salvation Party] interested. He is openly flirting with the NSP; the green light is on.

As a matter of fact, the formation of an RPP-NSP-independent government is not outside the realm of possibility. However, there is speculation that Korkut Ozal, who will have nothing to do with forming a government with the RPP, and his friends would leave their party should such an initiative take place within the NSP. For this reason, there is an attempt to get the JP involved also in order to satisfy this group.

As for the JP's accepting such a proposal, it is hard to say.

Despite the RPP's shouldering all the burden, a JP-RPP-NSP government is considered unlikely. What would happen in this case? In consequence of a negative response to all approaches by the JP, Erbakan would go to his

group and try to form an RPP-NSP-independent coalition, trying to get the Ozal supporters to accept it. It is not known whether he would succeed in this. What is known is this: in such an event, he would try to keep party defectors to a minimum. If he managed to do so, he would go ahead with the formation of a coalition including independents. There are rumors that certain members of the National Unity Group are participating in backstage activity along these lines.

A development such as this is expected to intensify further following the presidential election.

The JP wants elections in October. In an interview we had with him, Demirel plainly said, "October elections are required." In fact, he issued the invitation at his last group meeting: "Is it a government you are looking for? Then, come, let us go to the nation." The JP chairman also knows that the shortages which have subsided for the moment will be felt more after October. And this will affect the JP's election chances. This is why Demirel is acting on the hypothesis that the JP could win in an election held in October.

8349

CSO: 4907

## ERBAKAN COMMENTS ON 'WESTERN CLUB', PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 31 Mar 80 p 7

[Interview with NSP General Chairman Necmettin Erbakan by MILLIYET writer Orsan Oymen and cartoonist Bedri Koraman]

[Text] NSP [National Salvation Party] General Chairman Necmettin Erbakan, expressing to MILLIYET his views on the presidential elections, said that the "elections could not be resolved by party chauvinism" and that the Ecevit and Demirel groups would not prevail.

Adding that a prospective candidate could get the vote of the NSP only if he did not lean toward the Western Club, Erbakan said that it was significant that the constitutional amendment lobby had coincided with the presidential elections.

Erbakan's conversation with our writer Orsan Oymen and cartoonist Bedri Koraman is presented below:

Question: Now, since the presidential election requires 318 votes and since this vote cannot be obtained without representatives of what you call the "Western Club," will you, as the NSP, use your vote to express a preference among Western Club candidates?

Answer: With Turkey at such an important point, as you indicated, we would like to have someone for president who believes in the national solution. We have drawn a line, we have said it will not be the "Western Club." We want a man who believes in a solution with a national stripe. Looking at parliament, in a parliament of 638 members or thereabouts, there are 267 RPP members, 264 JP [Justice Party] members, then 29 NSP members and then the other groups. That is, a 638-member parliament will elect a president. When party chauvinism enters into this election, no solution is possible. It is therefore absolutely necessary that party chauvinism be kept out of it. Of course, the leaders of both darn parties are out of touch in what they say. They say, "Wait, sir, let's just take a look at what the Constitution says about the presidential election." It has been known for months. Where on earth have you been all this time? Instead of looking

now, shouldn't you have decided three months ago what your group's position would be? But no, the term is ready to begin, the egg is ready to drop, and then the simpletons try to settle on the will of their groups. In my opinion, they do not have an attitude satisfactorily consistent with the importance of the matter. On a matter of such magnitude, preparations must be made well in advance.

There are two lines from the standpoint of mentality: the Western Club and the national solution. Looking at it in the context of these two lines, there are some of our colleagues who have let themselves get caught up in the Western Club mentality. But at least 500 out of the 638 people in parliament want a "national solution."

Question: What do you mean by Western Club -- a bankruptcy club?

Answer: Bankruptcy club is a good term...because they favor internal exploitation and put the nation under tyranny both in order to be blindly bound to the West and to let exploitation take over. These terms complement each other. A lot of rumors are coming out now. They say they are thinking about bringing such a Western Club man to the presidency so that tyranny can then be brought about through constitutional amendments. There is nothing funny about this. It is part and parcel of the Western Club. In fact, when the present JP minority government took office, the first thing it did in the Assembly was to put priority on passage of restraint laws. Indeed, if it could find a chance there, it would cut off every voice, introduce foreign capital into Turkey in a completely uncontrolled way and further increase exploitation in Turkey. Foreign powers are naturally exploitative. They think only of their own welfare.

Question: Are there not members of parliament in your party who likewise advocate the Western Club? Mr Ozal is the present proponent of the Western Club's economic approach. Was he not your candidate for national deputy -- Mr Turgut Ozal?

Answer: If he had been elected and joined us, he would not have adapted to our party. Now he is playing on the Western Club team, with the misfortunes the thing has fallen into.

Question: Is his brother, Mr Kerkut Ozal, in your club?

Answer: Yes, his brother is in our club.

Question: You described the constitutional amendment as "tyranny"; this means that you are opposed to this constitutional amendment, does it not?

Answer: In this sense, yes; but constitutional amendment is a completely different subject. It is a matter which must be considered within its own conditions.



Question: How do you interpret the coincidence of the rumors and the presidential election?

Answer: The coincidence with the presidential election is interesting. And for what purpose is this constitutional amendment being made now in the hands of the Western Club? This, of course, is a very important matter. The issue today is not so much the question of this constitutional amendment as seeking a way out of helplessness only to let Western Club ideas take over.

Question: Are you saying there may be political motives behind Western aid, or promises of aid?

Answer: No doubt about it. We believe there are political reasons. We believe political compromises will be made.

Question: What kind of compromises?

Answer: Well, sir, last time we gave up our control of the Aegean. This is a very grave matter. Now it appears that aircraft approaching our Erzurum Airport have to get permission from the Greek government; of course, what is attempting to be done will soon come out.

Question: Are you, the NSP, engaged in dialog or direct contact with other parties?

Answer: We, as the NSP, are a medium-sized party; our group count is not sufficient to nominate a presidential candidate or get him elected. Our function is to ensure that the "Western Club" is not among the candidates nominated and that there is a man who believes in the national solution. This will be our entire function here. Now we see the matter at the point where contacts of party members would be more useful than interparty contacts. However, contacts among members of parliament must be intensified and the 500-person majority we spoke of must be got together.

Question: Then this will happen in the wings -- in the corridors of parliament?

Answer: Yes, of course. That is, contacts among members of parliament will go on until candidates emerge around whom everybody can rally. I hope. Let us rally around whichever of these candidates gets the most votes and bring to a successful conclusion a task in which success is mandatory.

Question: This view matches Mr Demirel's thesis; that is, he says the halls of parliament and everything are like a butter churn. He maintains that trends are churned together until, like butter, something takes shape.

Answer: But the difference between us, of course, is this: Demirel thinks he is laying groundwork when he says that. That is, he will bring parliament to a point -- well, he is using the churn simile for the purpose of getting everyone so sick of it that he can get everyone to accept the solution he wants.

Question: Are you saying that the churn does not refer to the churning of the milk, but just the churning itself?

Answer: He turns the handle in order to get himself from the churn. That is the difference between us. We want yogurt, cream, whatever. He wants to get something out of the churn which he has already put in. Everybody talks about churns, but the churns are different. Now his whole tactic is to get his own group so mixed up that they reach the point of saying, "My dear fellow, let come what may."

Question: Then he will get his way in the end.

Answer: People will stand for only so much. This is why men of good will in parliament must come forward with something different. For instance, the manner in which a positive solution is put together must be such that people can stomach it. The good must work much harder than the bad to get a positive solution out of those contacts.

Question: Is it risky, in your opinion, to extend the terms?

Answer: Basically. Of course, if parliament were aiming for a solution next week, everybody would get his people together and work shoulder to shoulder to bring that solution about. If something were in sight, then extending 6 April a few days would not matter much.

Question: There was a speech of Mr Ecevit's published in the newspapers. He is proposing a three-way coalition of the JP, RPP and NSP. What are your thoughts on that?

Answer: National solution -- that is our view. Take whatever formula you want. Is it the Western Club, or the national solution? If such a coalition were of the Western Club mentality, it would do no good. If it were the national solution, it would be very good. Then we would be there.

Question: You said that Demirel would get what he wants if the terms are extended.

Answer: But it is impossible, of course, to say what it is that Demirel wants. Today, Demirel does not have the power to do what he wants. What we said is that 500 members of parliament are smart enough not to be what Demirel wants. And there is a minimum of 150 people within his own party whom Demirel cannot influence today.

Question: Could he not influence them if it were extended this much?

Answer: Some, but we know them well. They cannot be deceived. They are definitely extremely smart in this regard. Of course, this make-up of the JP is of essential importance. It is not new; it has been there for a long time. It was lost for a moment in the hubbub. But now it has suddenly burst forth.

8349

CS0: 4907

## 'CUMHURİYET' COMMENTARY ON NEW POLITICAL APPOINTEES

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 2 Apr 80 pp 1, 9

[Article by Ugur Mumcu: "Favor Curried"]

[Text] An unchangeable rule of our populist democracy is that former members of parliament and retired generals close to the party in power are appointed to seats on the boards of directors of the public economic enterprises, banks and partially state-owned companies.

These board seats are the political administrations' feedbags. Parties change, but this attitude does not. The highly lucrative positions on boards of directors are at the disposal of parliamentarians who lost their elections and pro-administration retired generals.

In the selections made last week for seats on the board of directors of the largely state-owned Ereğli Iron and Steel Works, seats went to former commander of the Air Force, Gen Emin Alpkaya, and to the retired revolutionary and former RPP and Republican Reliance Party deputy, Orhan Kabibay.

Having joined the board-of-directors queue lined up before Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, retired General Alpkaya and former revolutionary Orhan Kabibay each captured posts by currying favor with the JP [Justice Party] general chairman. Another old revolutionary is still in line -- Orhan Erkanli! We have no doubt that a suitable seat will be found for Erkanli --on the Istanbul Petroleum Refinery Corporation Board of Directors, for instance.

We all know Alpkaya. Secretary general of the National Security Council during the 12 March period, General Alpkaya, while he was commander of the Air Force, fell out of favor with then Chief of Staff Semih Sancar and, accused of taking bribes from the Lockheed Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation, was forced to resign.

Alpkaya was tried on these charges in the General Staff Military Court and was acquitted. However, the former Air Force commander jumped from the void in which he found himself after this trial and, by coincidence, brought his parachute down on the roof of the JP general headquarters! As

a result of this "forced landing," Alpkaya has shared, along with the other generals who compose a "Retired Military Council" within the JP sphere, the great honor of "coming to the notice" of Demirel.

Alpkaya, however, quickly forgot his revolutionary zeal after the 1960 revolution; after he retired, he rented the home in Gaziosmanpasa in Ankara of President Celal Bayar, who was overthrown in the 27 May revolution.

If Bayar had known that Alpkaya, on 21 October 1961 along with 10 generals and 27 colonels at the War Academy in Istanbul, had signed the "revolutionary protocol" containing the decision that "the Turkish Armed Forces will actively intervene in the situation before the Turkish Grand National Assembly convenes following the elections which were held on 15 October 1961," he would not have signed the rental contract with the retired general. If he had known also that Alpkaya had signed a second "revolutionary protocol" along with 54 other officers on 9 February 1962, Bayar would not have rented his house to this former revolutionary.

Now this Alpkaya has captured the seat he deserves, with his will of steel, as one of the nine people directing the Ereğli Iron and Steel Mill. And now Alpkaya will sign the board of directors' decisions with the pen he used to sign the revolutionary protocols.

As for Orhan Kabibay...

Kabibay is one of the men who carried out the 27 May revolution. This former revolutionary was exiled on 13 November 1960 with 13 colleagues; as soon as he returned to the country, he established a close relationship with Col Talat Aydemir, who was sentenced to death following the 22 February and 21 May attempted revolutions. After Aydemir was sent to the gallows, Kabibay took on active tasks in the RPP and played highly important roles prior to 12 March.

The truth is, Kabibay was an organizer of a revolutionary attempt known as the "9 March Incident."

In his white Mercedes, Kabibay established frequent and close relations with young activists on the one hand and with the "radical officers" in the armed forces on the other. When things went wrong, he left the RPP and first joined the founders of the Republican Party with Kemal Satir, then at Feyzioglu's side, took great delight in the pleas for help rising from the torture chambers of the officers whom he had encouraged to carry out a military coup.

For some reason, no state authority ever touched Kabibay, who has been involved in every military revolution or attempted revolution since 27 May 1960. And Kabibay has carried out with great precision his tasks in affairs of this sort and, finally, by currying favor with Demirel, whom he tried to overthrow in a coup, has taken a seat on the Ereğli Iron and Steel Mills Board of Directors.



Now this "professional revolutionary," on the one hand, meets in hotel lobbies with the holding company consultants who are drawing up rough drafts for constitutional amendments while, on the other, he collects his share of the board of administration feedbag, having made a "pit stop" in front of Demirel.

To Kabibay, who has always successfully carried out the tasks assigned him, we wish success in his new job!

8349

CSO: 4907

## TOPUZ OPENLY CRITICIZES RPP LEADERSHIP

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 19 Mar 80 p 10

[Text] Ankara, Special -- In the RPP Turkish Grand National Assembly [TGNA] Joint Group yesterday, Istanbul National Deputy Ali Topuz made a speech criticizing top party leadership. "The top party leadership has a pushy, devious attitude which is jeopardizing internal party democracy, is unlawful and contrary to our bylaws, and is creating a crisis within the RPP on top of the crises of our state and our democracy," he said.

Topuz noted that the state and the democracy were experiencing the most critical period in their history; that along with the concrete facts which were the cause of the economic crises, the democratic parliamentary system was being abused; and that confidence in and the hopes pinned on the political parties and their leaders were fading. He said that the great responsibility for the nation's arriving at this point belonged to the Justice Party but that the RPP government had been unable during its 22 months in office to meet adequately the expectations of society. Topuz spoke as follows:

"We were severely defeated in the 14 October elections because we had failed for various reasons to alter the order in keeping with our democratic left program. The excellent potential of the RPP organization and TGNA groups is not being adequately drawn upon in policy making. Both in office and in the opposition, the RPP's assembly groups are pushed aside, and policy, decisions and positions are formulated in a tight circle of top administrators, then brought to the groups at the last minute for adoption by the group members without allowing the opportunity for adequate debate. Thus the TGNA groups are kept outside the RPP's decision-making process.

"The organization and the assembly groups have been offered no opportunity to evaluate the causes of our severe defeat in the elections. At the 8th Special Convention, which was called hastily ostensibly for this purpose, instead of delving into the election results, debates and discussions with the leadership were swiftly shifted to other grounds, superficial accusations prevented getting down to the facts, and the purpose of the convention was sidetracked. Internal party democracy was damaged by the

creation of an emotional atmosphere and by the uses to which the advantages accruing to being in the leadership were put. No need has been felt for input from either the organization or the assembly groups in the strategy to be followed in the new opposition period.

"The RPP cannot be restored to power simply on the basis of the failure of Demirel's minority government and the social reaction causing it. Even if it were, it would fail."

Topuz noted that in times of hardship, the tasks of top party leaders more than anyone else become more pressing, their responsibilities increase. "In fulfilling the requirements of duty and responsibility in times such as these, leaders are able to protect and solidify the unity of their parties insofar as they are realistic, tolerant, open, trustworthy, loyal and just. A strong unity cannot be obtained by applying martial law within the party," he said. Topuz asked that the voices raised in the parliamentary groups not be lowered and that no attempt be made to intimidate and silence group members who express their views by accusing them of opposing the general chairman, factionalism and weakening party discipline. He continued:

"RPP members of parliament must not be viewed as people who have to raise their hands meekly in favor of decisions which the top party executive has made in a narrow framework. Those who exhibit their thoughts must not look upon those who do not like them as traitors, and antidemocratic methods must not be employed for the purpose of expelling them from the RPP. At a time when we are talking loudly about how Demirel's minority government is shelving the law, the party executive should not shelve the party bylaws. The party executive should not abuse internal party democracy. At a time when we are proposing interparty dialog, the party executive should not avoid establishing dialog within the party because of groundless suspicions and prejudices.

"Everyone wants to see the RPP as a tower of strength, and those who provide leadership in the RPP should not use false interpretations to make disloyal and unjust accusations against party members who have worked hard for the RPP at a time when they can make no public rebuttal, even if this leader is the esteemed general chairman, using for his own ends opportunities to which only he has access, as he did at his last television press conference."

Ali Topuz said that the RPP's internal problems sprang from two basic causes, the first -- the concept of leadership -- having its source in the second, which is the defects in the party's organization model. "I have made some criticisms of the concept of leadership. I hope they will be taken to heart. In order to get rid of the second cause, I am calling for the convening of the bylaws convention, which it was decided at the 24th Convention would be called, as soon as possible and, in any case, before the delegate elections," he said.

Later in the RPP Joint Group, the general discussions on anarchy were concluded, having been introduced some time ago in a proposal by Sivas National Deputy Azimet Koyluoglu. According to the information obtained, it was decided at the conclusion of the general discussion that the group and the Executive Board would publish a bulletin on the subject of anarchy.

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## TKP RIFT MARS FIDEF MEETING

Istanbul AYDINLIK in Turkish 8 Apr 80 pp 1, 7

[Text] Frankfurt (Special) -- The Fourth FIDEF [Federation of West German Worker Associations] Congress held in Germany saw clashes between the British and German wings of the TKP [Turkish Communist Party]. On the first day of the congress, British wing adherents came from the Mannheim labor solidarity association and demanded to participate in the meeting. But I. Bilen supporters did not let R. Yurukoglu supporters into the congress, whereupon a fight broke out. The British wing supporters who were not allowed into the congress later conducted a hunger strike in front of the general assembly.

## MADEN-IS, BANK-SEN Leaders Attend

It was announced that MADEN-IS [Turkish Mine, Metal, Metal Works and Machine Industry Workers Union] and BANK-SEN [Bank Workers Union] leaders and a DUKD [Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Association or Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Organization] representative from Turkey were attending the Fourth FIDEF Congress.

Delivering the opening address at the congress, FIDEF Chairman Hasan Ozcan defended the occupation of Afghanistan and contended that the fascist upsurge in Turkey was rapidly increasing.

## British Wing

Following the split which, as is known, occurred in the TKP in June, 1979, clashes between the German and British wings rapidly increased. These clashes reverberated in our country also.

The German wing had decided to expel R. Yurukoglu from the party because "he wrote a book without obtaining permission from party headquarters." Yet when this book was published, the TKP defended its theses. But as a result of reactions which came later, the German wing was forced to retract the theses. As a result of this, the British wing split from the party and conflict between the two wings began.

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## KHOMEYNI'S FANATICISM CALLED HARMFUL TO IRAN, REGION

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 9 Apr 80 p 3

[Column by Oktay Eksi: "What Does It Benefit Iran"]

[Text] The region of the world called the "Middle East" has again become a hot spot:

President Carter severed U.S. diplomatic relations with Iran. He ordered Iranian diplomats out of the United States within 24 hours. The 209 military personnel in the United States for professional training were told that they "must leave the United States by Friday midnight." Moreover, he halted all U.S. sales to Iran -- including medicine and food. He announced that money owed American companies from Iran would be paid out of Iranian assets in American banks. In short, all the decisions which had been, for a long time, in a limbo of "Will he, won't he," he clarified in one sweep and put into effect.

The reason is known: the efforts to have the American embassy personnel who had been held hostage by fanatic students in the American embassy in Tehran since 4 November 1979 taken from the students and turned over to Iranian revolutionary government forces -- which latest effort had come personally from Iranian President Bani-Sadr -- were rejected by revolutionary leader Khomeyni, who has nothing whatever to do with Iranian statesmanship.

Khomeyni had announced that "the decision regarding the future of the American hostages will be made by the new Iranian parliament for which the elections will be completed in about a month." The Carter administration, figuring that a subject such as the new parliament would not be taken up before the end of May, said, "Enough of this humiliation," and announced the decisions summarized above.

Meanwhile, Iran's relations with Iraq had again deteriorated. The fat was thrown in the fire by the discovery that the students who had made an assassination attempt with a bomb against Iraqi Vice President [sic] Tariq 'Aziz last week were "Iranians." Next Iraq demanded that Iran vacate the three islands in the Straits of Hormuz which it had occupied since 1971 and then Iran launched a series of incursions across the Iraqi border.

Is it not to be expected that such a situation would create apprehensions, not just for those who live in Iran and those who are governing Iran, but in the nations which make up the Middle Eastern world also?

If we are not mistaken, the wave of apprehension has struck in many places, including the United States and Europe. It is being argued in many places now as to how far these events will go and whether the Soviet Union will try to fill the void left as a result of the U.S. decisions. But, as far as we can tell, it is only in Iran -- or only in the circle around Khomeyni which governs Iran -- that such doubt and apprehension do not exist.

Because: Khomeyni is without reflexes, as though isolated from the realities of this world, from its systems of logic and from the realm of feeling. For this reason, it is impossible to establish a dialog with Khomeyni.

Even so, it is impossible to go on like this, because even if men of good will from other states put up for a while with this primitiveness and insensitivity, there is no doubt either that it will eventually come to an end or that those whose intentions are not good will seize the opportunity. The result of this would be the parcelling up of an Iran weakened for the sake of an insensitive fanaticism.

Such an "end" would benefit neither Khomeyni, Iran nor the peace of the region.

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## 'HURRIYET' COLUMNIST SCORES CASTRO REGIME

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 12 Apr 80 p 3

[Column by Oktay Eksi: "Holiday in Havana"]

[Text] To confine the concept of fashion to the style of women's clothing alone is a great deception of which we are all guilty. We all let ourselves get caught up in some style without even noticing. It is only after a long passage of time that we realize this is so.

Remember the times when we liked everything American and felt compelled to denigrate anything connected with the Soviet Union?

And remember the years when Hitler's success was praised among the Turkish public and, after his defeat, how there was no calumny we did not heap upon him because of his madness?

Looking back 10 -- maybe 15 -- years ago, the "ugly American" fashion was widespread and anything remotely connected with America had to have something bad behind it. Of course, on the other hand, it was considered ingenious to accord first sympathy then admiration to everything related to the Soviet Union or the Marxist doctrine.

It even got to the point where to say "I am a communist" was the same thing in some foolish minds as "I am an enlightened person."

Turkey has not actually managed to rid itself of this period yet. That is why our pundits still have a one-track vision and continue to give one-track judgments.

For example, they no sooner saw human rights violations in Chile, Argentina or South Africa than they immediately took up the banner and raised a great uproar, even putting up posters and organizing protest meetings, but when human rights are trampled in the Soviet Union, in Cuba, or in Czechoslovakia, nobody turns a hair.

In the Cuban capital of Havana recently, the embassies of South American nations, Peru and Venezuela in particular, suffered a virtual occupation by 10,000 native Cubans who were fed up with Fidel Castro's police state pressures and economic hardships.

Explaining that he could not stop the Cubans who stormed the embassies' gardens seeking refuge in those countries, Castro tried to make the best of it by saying, "They are all bums and parasites. That is why we will make it easy for them to leave Cuba."

The true face of the paradise which Castro, who has been in power for the past 20 years, claimed to have created in Cuba has come out with this incident.

If you are looking for reasons, there is nothing surprising about it, because even 63 years after the revolution in the Soviet Union, which was the first state to implement the Marxist philosophy, the status of human rights is demonstrated by the arrest and exile to Gorky in January of Andrei Sakharov, the scientist who is considered the father of the hydrogen bomb, "for talking with Western journalists." At least Sakharov's great renown presents an obstacle to the Soviet leaders' meting out more severe punishment to him.

In Prague, the capital of Czechoslovakia, in October last year, the crime of six Czechoslovak intellectuals who were thrown into prison for two to five years was "forming a group to aid in the defense of human rights."

What we are trying to say is that whatever Hitler and Franco were, Castro and the Castro's are. The methods are the same, only the names have changed.

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## 'HURRIYET' LOOKS AT STRUCTURE, FUNCTION OF TNIO

Istanbul HURRIYET'S 8. GUN in Turkish 30 Mar 60 pp 3-5

[Article by Dogan Kologlu]

[Text] MIT... short for Milli Istihbarat Teskilati... [Turkish National Intelligence Organization - TNIO]... This is a state establishment which is frequently mentioned in our day-to-day conversations. It is an organization that prefers to work "silently".

The "Intelligence Organization" which worked under the name "Special Organization" during the First World War took on a new shape during the first years of the Republic, upon the orders of Ataturk himself. The new agency was called the "Military Police". But since this new organization was not considered adequate, it was desired that yet another organization be established, which would utilize the help of German officers with experience in matters of intelligence during wartime. In 1927, General Nikolai, a German officer, was brought to Turkey and charged with forming the new organization.

General Nikolai began to train Turkish officers in the Yildiz Palace. The officers who were to form the nucleus of the new organization were later trained in new technical developments by being sent to Germany. Finally, Turkey had an intelligence service that worked to keep in step with the latest developments in the field. Colonel Ali Sukru Ogel was made head of the organization and worked as its head for quite some time, and then in 1937, due to the efforts of Colonel Ogel himself, the organization was once again reorganized, this time being given the name "Directorate of National Security Services."

This organization was composed of four separate units:

A Bureau: Intelligence. (Only military officers were assigned to this division.)



B Bureau: Counterespionage. (Civilians, as well as military officers, were utilized in this bureau.)

C Bureau: Technical Division. (Again, only officers, or former enlisted men, were appointed.)

D Bureau: Propaganda. (Civilians working in foreign affairs and security were employed in this division. Later, it was closed down.)

The Directorate of National Security Services was later given Undersecretariate status by the TNIO law. The directors of TNIO have been as follows (in order): Fuat Dogu, Nurettin Erzin, Bahattin Ozulker, Bulent Turker, Hamza Carguc (as acting director), Adnan Ersoz, Bulent Turker.

#### **TNIO's Duties**

What is the TNIO's function at present? The answer to this question is as follows: It is to collect on a national level military, political, economic, commercial, financial, industrial, scientific, technological, biographic, psychological, and national security-related intelligence to be used as the basis for planning related to the State's national security policy; to transmit this intelligence to the Prime Minister; to publish it; to ensure coordination among all the various bodies and institutions involved in intelligence work; to carry out the requirements for defense against psychological warfare; and to engage in counterintelligence.

#### **Makeup of Organization**

The TNIO is an Undersecretariate directly under the office of the Prime Minister. It consists of eight divisions, which are subordinate to the TNIO Director:

- a) MAH (Directorate of National Security Services)
- b) IB (Intelligence Directorate)
- c) IIB (Directorate of Administrative Affairs)
- d) PSB (Directorate of Psychological Defense)
- e) Inspection Council Directorate
- f) Legal Counselor's Office
- g) Directorate for Documentation and Electronic Data Processing
- h) Directorate for Electronic and Technical Intelligence

#### **Also MIKK**

The National Intelligence Coordination Board (MIKK) was established in order to enunciate basic policies in dealing with the coordination and management of intelligence activities. It is presided over by the TNIO Director and in addition includes: the General Secretary of the National Security Council (or his assistant), the directors of MAH and the Intelligence Directorate, the Intelligence Chairman of the General Staff (or

his assistant), the heads of offices and similar bodies assigned intelligence duties by the various ministries, and other individuals to be appointed by the TNIO Director.

#### **Renewed TNIO**

We have observed that, particularly since 1961, the National Intelligence Organization has experienced a great deal of change and development. The TNIO's first reorganization was carried out in 1965 by way of organization law number 644. A number of relationships, which had until that time been carried out in a manner which could be considered as somewhat irresponsible, were revised to congrue to the "new method." But, within a short time, the problems inherent in law 644 began to be felt. So, strengthened by the first article of the law, the "electronic intelligence" and "documentation" units were made more active. With this step, TNIO's laboratories and television equipment made the utilization of "agents" a matter of history in many cases. A new step forward followed in 1974. By now, the TNIO could keep track of developments by means of the latest methods and expert personnel, and could produce a great deal of intelligence through documentation and sorting of the information on hand.

The developments didn't stop here, however. A number of operations were carried out within the TNIO. Actions were carried out in order to "distance ourselves from certain friendly intelligence services" with which we had had relations. Some of these matters even reached the press. Others were handled completely behind closed doors. Finally, the TNIO's present concept of intelligence was born. That is, "to deal only in intelligence as set forth in the organization law, and not to become involved in activities not included therein."

There were also changes in the quality of the personnel. Some TNIO officers say that, formerly, soldiers who failed the attache examination used to be assigned to the TNIO. Later, this system degenerated. Even the system of having the armed forces make the evaluation was abandoned. Others say that "TNIO is at last getting its personnel from universities and higher education institutes. There are even opportunities for officers to have schooling abroad. New dimensions, based on specialization and the recommendations of expert consultants, are being introduced." They even add that "In the economic section of the British clandestine service, 'naval operations' is a separate division of its own. Eight professors manage the CIA's public affairs department. Turkey, however, has not yet reached such 'levels of expertise.'"

In reorganizing the structure of the TNIO, there is one goal, as stated in the law dealing with its establishment: "to obtain intelligence bearing upon the security of the state." The intelligence organization engages in a number of different types of intelligence, all according to the geopolitical situation of the nation: "First priority targets"

are neighboring states, while "second priority targets" include other nations. TNIO engages in intelligence work in these various countries, and, in addition, also collects "domestic intelligence". Moreover, "counter-espionage and defense against psychological warfare" fall into its sphere of duties as well. But, in general, "cooperation with all foreign intelligence organizations" has been halted. The principle has been implemented that "liaison is only carried out with the Director's knowledge and upon his instructions."


#### 'Counter-Guerrilla Is Not Intelligence'

Among the changes and new developments within the TNIO has been the reaction against the "Counter-guerrilla" system. Those who see the TNIO as an "intelligence organization" are made uncomfortable by the word Counter-guerrilla; they cannot see this as part of their duties. The TNIO is simply no longer accepted to be an "action organization". As events have proven the proponents of this view to have been in the right, the division named the "special warfare section" but known to the public as "Counter-guerrilla" has lost its authority and begun to disband. No longer is anyone trained for the "special warfare section". Counter-guerrilla personnel, whose participation in martial law implementation has been much debated in the press, were active in political interrogations during the martial law period, but their guerrilla-type methods made the public uneasy. Yet, today, the TNIO rejects the Counter-guerrilla slogan of "war in order to save the nation from its attackers" and does not permit such actions.

#### Silent Satisfaction

TNIO officers opposed to the severe measures of Counter-guerrilla have formed an expert "operation group". In order for more effective investigations to be carried out, there are now investigative specialists. The terms "Counter-guerrilla" and "intelligence" are no longer associated with each other. A new expression has arisen: "silent satisfaction". TNIO officers are inclined toward silence, anyway... If information passed to the police is successfully acted upon by security forces, TNIO members no longer become jealous upon the pronouncements of police officials in the press. The new training has taught them "silent satisfaction". The idea has taken hold that difficulties and dangers arise whenever an incident is talked about and a great fuss is made. In today's TNIO, the slogan "No impulsive action" has taken hold. And the most important change is that there is now self-control, and self-criticism.

Functional Organization Chart of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization:



Key to Chart:

- (a) Prime Minister
- (b) TNIO Director
- (c) Directorate of National Security Services
- (d) Directorate of Psychological Defense
- (e) Directorate of Administrative Affairs
- (f) Legal Counselor's Office
- (g) Inspection Council Directorate
- (h) Intelligence Directorate
- (i) Directorate for Electronic and Technical Intelligence
- (j) Directorate for Documentation and Electronic Data Processing

[The following are two appendices to the main article]

No Power of Arrest for TNIO Officers

The duty of TNIO members is purely that of obtaining intelligence. Outside of the counterespionage branch, they have no powers of arrest. In compensation for this, however, they have the right to request assistance from all the many forces of the state whenever they may choose.

Yet the TNIO still has a number of complaints in this regard.

The following example is related:

During the period of military rule after 12 March 1971, the TNIO began to follow a man and woman of whom they were suspicious. They bugged their residence and noted all their contacts and conversations, eventually determining that the couple were involved in clandestine activities.



The couple decided to flee Turkey. They obtained false passports, bought airplane tickets, and left their house on their way out of the country. The TNIO immediately reported this to the police and requested that the pair be arrested.

Half an hour later, they asked the police about the matter.

"They weren't the couple you told us about. These were different people."

"How could you tell?"

"They showed us their passports. Their names were different from the ones you told us."

The police had seen the fake passports and released the couple.

The TNIO then sprang immediately into action, and at the last minute the couple were captured.

#### TNIO salaries to be readjusted

No longer can just anyone become a TNIO officer. There's a modern school... six and a half months of coursework, plus on-the-job training... a full year of probation and, if you are not "confirmed" after all this, you can't join the team. Those already on the roster are invited to "put their opinions into the ballot box." Great attention is paid to a combination of love of the job and love for one's country.

Planning for the new era is no different. That is, the same cycle of tasking, collection of intelligence, and analysis is to operate, yet more rapidly and more smoothly. Even America selects its policemen from among people with higher education and trains them for five years on the job... In addition, secrecy and cover for officers will be given special emphasis. To work with the TNIO is a job only for the truly dedicated... It isn't easy; in order to pursue an operation thoroughly, one must truly love the profession... So what is the salary one earns for all this? Here everyone is silent... Is the TNIO, which in the past three years has made great strides in the field of equipment and materiel, going to pay its personnel enough so that they will reject offers of employment as private detectives? To this question they give an answer which flatters the officer's pride: "A man who works for the TNIO doesn't go out and become a bodyguard... As far as salary is concerned... On that count, they're granting a three-month interim period, and then new supplemental payments will be made, in line with the Army regulations, and we'll be able to breathe a little easier..."

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## MILITARY REPORTEDLY BACKS CHANGES IN MARTIAL LAW BILL

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 4 Apr 80 pp 1, 9

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURİYET Bureau) -- The bill concerning amendment of certain articles of the Martial Law Act no 1402 was discussed and accepted in the National Assembly Planning Committee yesterday.

According to the bill, should martial law be lifted, martial law military courts will retain their duties and authorities until the cases in progress are concluded. The point system of service differential for the martial law duties contained in the bill was adopted. According to the text, those on martial law duty will receive "martial law service pay" within the framework of the points shown below according to rank and grade:

General - Admiral: 10  
Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major: 9  
Captain, First Lieutenant, Second Lieutenant: 8  
Lieutenant, Junior Officer, Expert Gendarmerie Sergeant: 7  
Security Chiefs and above: 9  
Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent of Police: 8  
Other security members: 8  
Business and residential district guards: 5  
Civil servants and laborers: 5  
Privates and NCO's (including gendarmerie): 3

A proposal to have "martial law service pay" begin as of 1 March 1980 was also passed by the committee. In accordance with the article concerning penalties and measures adopted by the committee, penalties meted out by the martial law courts may not be converted to fines or one of the measures.

The committee passed the provision contained in the text to the effect that "a suspect who escapes after having been sentenced in person to a term in prison for the crime for which he was tried is questioned in hearing and, should the court deem his presence at the hearing no longer necessary, the case may be heard and concluded in his absence."

Speaking in response to a question during the discussion, National Defense Minister Ahmet İhsan Birincioğlu said, "This law was proposed by the commanders."

## Reserve Officers Law

Yesterday also, the Assembly National Defense Committee discussed and sent to a subcommittee for study the bill amending the reserve officers law which reduces to 9 months the term of military service of those privates requesting it. The committee also adopted the bill giving imposition authority for future years for procurement of arms, ways and means for the reorganization of the Turkish Armed Forces. According to this, the Remo plan, which expires in 1980, will be extended to 1985 with a 5 billion-lira appropriation to be made for each additional year, and the Council of Ministers will have the authority to increase these appropriations up to 100 percent.

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## AUTHORITIES FACE JAILBREAK EPIDEMIC

Ankara YANKI in Turkish 7-13 Apr 80 pp 4-6

[Text] In the past 3 years, 3,236 prisoners have escaped from their prisons. One could say that the inmates or convicts just get up and walk away. Escapes have occurred everywhere, including the martial law prisons under military control. The prisoners usually escaped through tunnels, made agreements with prisoners who were to be released and got out in their place or escaped undetected on visiting days by mingling with the visitors. Early last week, the second large jailbreak in a month took place at the Van Prison. After 33 prisoners tunneled out in mid-March, 58 more escaped through a new 30-meter tunnel. Some of them were caught.

Justice Minister Omer Ucuzal has been as helpless as the RPP government's minister, Mehmet Can, before him. He thinks that the jailbreaks usually take place with the cooperation of prison employees. Funds obtained from the big bank robberies are probably used to bribe prison employees. Ucuzal said, "Large-scale changes will be made among administrators," and the prosecutor conducted a far-ranging investigation of prison directors and guards and began making arrests. HURRIYET published a report under big headlines saying, "The director general of prisons was fired," but there has been nothing to confirm any part of the report.

Ucuzal has accused the Mehmet Can period of facilitating matters. He claims that many guards were hired during the RPP period and sent to all parts of the country. They must have been the ones who failed to perform their jobs. They brought an atmosphere of "leftist guards ignore escapes by leftist prisoners." A GUNAYDIN writer usually sympathetic to the Justice Party, Husamettin Celebi, asked, "The minister knew about that, why did he not take action?" He began publishing comic strip cartoons suggesting that the prisoners who did not escape and remained in prison should be examined to find out if they were sick.

Certain authorities, aware of the Justice Ministry's responsibility, decided to hold discussions on the mechanisms of escape during the major crimes prosecutors' meeting in May, while the inadequacy of both prison buildings and employee training has once more come to light. Most of those

escaping from the prisons, however, are youths highly educated and well-trained in terrorist methods. If the security forces, primarily the police, are unsuccessful in the face of events, neither can an outmoded prison system be successful at holding prisoners.

Escape methods such as boring holes in concrete with acid and laying electric cables in tunnels are methods heretofore unknown by ignorant common criminals. Anything can be done when 150 to 200 terrorists are kept in cell rooms intended for 50 to 60 persons. The Van Prison, which has become a thoroughfare, has a capacity of 150, though 400 prisoners are housed there. The same is true of the prisons at Bursa, Adana, Samsatcilar and many others. Ail Demirel can say in this situation is: "The prison breaks are deplorable. If there is a guilty party, he will not go unpunished." The view of the experts is: "If we have come to a serious juncture today, it was irresolvable years ago."

The prisons will continue to be but hostalries.

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## STATISTICS ON NATIONAL EDUCATION SYSTEM

Istanbul HURRIYET'S 8. GUN in Turkish 6 Apr 80 pp 12, 13

[Article by Nail Gureli]

[Text] With all its squabbles and conflicts, shortages and problems, we are now finally approaching the end of another school year, with young people unable to enter university, and with primary and middle-school students who have just had their longest mid-term break ever. We are a nation where the very educational system is a problem in itself.

As a nation, we have a young population: According to the latest census, held in 1975, 24.061 million of our total population of 40.347 million are under 24 years of age. "In ten years, we have produced 15 million young people of all ages", but have we been able to solve these young people's educational problems? During the past forty years, what changes have there been in Turkey's educational level?

According to the latest available figures, 7.771 million out of our 40-million population are attending schools at various levels, from primary school to university. The distribution of the student population, both currently and as of forty years ago, is as follows:

SCHOOL	FORTY YEARS AGO	TODAY
primary school	956,000	5,502,000
middle school	95,000	1,064,000
high school	25,000	429,000
professional and technical schools	20,000	436,000
university and higher schools	13,000	340,000
TOTAL	1,109,000	7,771,000



Forty years ago, our population was 17 million, and 1.109 million of these were in school. Today, our population is 40 million, and we have nearly 8 million in school.

The number of primary schools rose from 10,596 in 1940 to 42,863 in 1977; that is, it increased fourfold in about 40 years. As for the rise in the number of students in such schools, it has increased sixfold, as is seen in the above table. Furthermore, the number of primary-school teachers, which stood at 20,564 in 1940, increased by a factor of 9, growing to 182,679 in 1977.

While the number of students in middle schools rose by a factor of 11 in 40 years, the number of schools grew by a factor of 13, rising to 3,055. The number of teachers rose by a factor of 10, from 3,867 to 30,322.

While the number of high schools stood at 82 in 1940, it rose to 929 in 1977. The number of high-school students rose by a factor of 18 in 40 years, while the number of teachers rose 20-fold, from 1,544 to 29,025.

In the case of higher education, the 20 university faculties and higher schools extant in 1940 rose to 227 in 1976. Today, the number of universities alone has risen to 19, the number of faculties to 90, and the total number of higher educational institutions has increased to 593. While the number of faculty members in higher schools and universities stood at 967 in 1940, it had increased to 15,274 by 1976.

#### Other Side of the Coin

These numerical increases do not indicate that the needs have been met, however, particularly in [primary?] and middle schools. The other side of the coin is rather bleak in this area.

When one looks at the bright side of the coin, for instance, one sees that the illiteracy rate, which stood at 80.8 percent in the year 1935, declined to 38.1 percent in 1975. As for the other side of the coin: while there were 10.388 million people above the age of 6 who were unable to read in 1935, this number had risen to 12.831 million by 1975. These figures make it clear that, in spite of the legal requirement, primary education has not yet become truly universal.

Of those unable to read in Turkey, 8.583 million were female and 4.248 million were male.

Over against the almost 13 million illiterates in Turkey, there are also 5.712 million people who do know how to read even though they have never completed elementary school. This group of "self-taught" readers consists of 3.370 million males and 2.342 million females; in other words, the males predominate.

The number of people holding primary-school diplomas was 8.346 million in the 1970 census; this figure rose to 11.762 million in the 1975 census.

The total of people having completed middle school as of 1970 was 1.015 million; this increased to 1.609 million by 1975. A precipitate decline is observed in the number of female students upon reaching middle school. Only 521,000 females possess middle-school diplomas, as opposed to some 1.088 million males.

While the number of high-school graduates was 423,000 in 1970, it rose to 733,000 in 1975. Of those, 494,000 were males and 239,000 females.

During the same period, the number of graduates from higher schools and universities increased from 276,000 to 333,000. Of the university graduates, 266,000 were men and only 67,000 were women.

As is observed, the graphic curve of the percentage of students composed of females drops sharply as they begin in primary school and go through middle school and high school toward higher education.

Despite the numerical increase, the negative state of affairs in absolute terms is observed in middle school as well. While in the 1935-36 school year, the number of students of middle-school age (that is, 11 - 13 years old) who did not attend middle school was 723,000, this figure had increased to 2.687 million by the 1972-73 school year.

The situation among high-school-aged students is similar. The number of high-school-aged students who did not attend school in the 1963-64 school year was 1.508 million; in the 1972-73 school year, this number stood at 2.668 million.

Those who were in the 19 - 22 age group, accepted as the age for higher education, who did not go to school during the 1973-74 period amounted to 2.686 million. In the 1977-78 school year, however, this group consisted of 2.978 million.

Each year, the relative proportion of those completing their intermediate educations and then going on to higher education declines. For example, of 43,784 students completing their intermediate educations in the 1965-66 school year, 28,299 went on to higher education in 1966-67, a rate of 64.9 percent. But, of the 82,192 students completing their intermediate educations in 1970-71, only 31,014 went on to higher education (a level of 37.7 percent).

In 1970, each teacher had 49 students within the middle educational levels. In the 1976-77 school year, however, the student/teacher ratio dropped to 36 to 1.

## Primary Schools

According to the official statistics, there were a total of 42,848 elementary schools in Turkey during the 1976-77 school year, both public and private. These included 38,826 in rural areas and 4,022 in cities. The number of private elementary schools was 117, with 54 of these being devoted to the various minorities. In these private schools, 1,085 teachers taught some 23,470 students.

According to statistics for 1977, there were schools in 33,214 Turkish villages. Of these fortunate villages, 29,618 had permanent schools, 479 had pre-fabricated schools, 256 had schools in huts, and 2,861 had schools located in temporary structures.

In 2,880 of the nation's villages, there are no schools. The eastern provinces predominate in the lists of villages without schools. For instance: according to the 1977 figures, 216 villages in Erzurum, 208 villages in Urfa, 205 villages in Van, 201 villages in Mardin, and 192 villages in Agri lacked school facilities.

There are only three provinces in Turkey where each village has a school: Kırklareli, Tekirdag, and Nevsehir.

## Vocational and Technical Training

In the vocational and technical training section of the 1977 statistics, the greatest numbers of schools and students are observed in the imam-hatip schools [religious secondary schools]. The 143 imam-hatip schools extant in the 1972-73 school year rose to 320 in 1977, while the number of students rose from 36,000 to 111,000 during the same five-year period.

In 1977, the number of agricultural institutes in Turkey — an agricultural nation — was 56, while the number of students was 4,690. As for the area of tourism, which is being relied upon to strengthen the economy, the number of commercial and related vocational schools was 177, while the number of students was 97,000.

Figures for the other vocational and technical schools are as follows:

TYPE OF SCHOOL	SCHOOLS	STUDENTS
male technical schools	260	110,039
female technical schools	399	56,101
health care schools	81	13,857
teacher-training high schools	88	40,775
conservatories	5	642
police college	1	320

## Students Abroad

In recent years, the number of students desirous of studying abroad has increased, despite the shortage of foreign exchange. It is likely that the prevalence of terrorism within Turkey has contributed to this trend. The available figures illustrate the situation until 1975. According to the figures, the number of students pursuing university and graduate education abroad was 5,966 in 1969. This figure was 13,542 in 1972 and 18,225 in 1975.

Of the 18,225 students studying abroad in 1975, 1,250 were studying under the auspices of ministries and other institutions, while the rest were studying on their own. Of those studying on their own, 3,299 were studying with foreign exchange, while 13,676 were studying without having obtained foreign exchange.

While the number of elementary-school, middle-school, and high-school students studying abroad was 420 in 1969, it had risen to 890 by 1972 and to 1,050 by 1975.

## Waiting in Turkey

While some young people hope to find opportunities to study abroad, over a hundred thousand others are preparing constantly in order to be able to enter into a university or higher school in Turkey. From among this number, only 40,449 lucky students will be accepted into university faculties or higher schools this year.

In 1980, 23,227 students will be accepted into universities, 3,206 into the 13 State Architectural Engineering Academies, 5,290 into the 6 Economic and Commercial Science Academies, 2,106 into the 12 assorted higher schools, 4,940 into the 9 four-year education institutes, and 1,680 into the 14 two-year education institutes.

And the remainder — that is, thousands of young people — will be unable to enter into schools. These are the dimensions of Turkey's current educational problems...

[The following are appendices attached to the original article]

## Universities and Students

Today, Turkey has 19 universities, spread through 15 provinces. A total of 125,363 students are currently studying in these universities. In 1980, an additional 23,227 students will be admitted. The names, locations, and enrollments of these universities are included in the following table:

UNIVERSITY	PROVINCE	NUMBER OF STUDENTS	NUMBER TO BE ADMITTED IN 1980
Anadolu	Eskişehir	62	50
Ankara	Ankara	22,797	3,950
Ataturk	Kizilirmak	8,726	1,640
Bogazici	Istanbul	3,850	690
Bursa	Bursa	1,478	490
Cumhuriyet	Sivas	212	50
Cukurova	Adana	1,150	440
Diyarbakir	Diyarbakir	1,129	295
Ege	Ismir	13,550	3,329
Firat	Elazig	794	250
Hacettepe	Ankara	14,078	1,940
Inonu	Malatya	188	120
Istanbul	Istanbul	31,498	4,820
Istanbul Tech.	Istanbul	10,992	1,893
Karadeniz Tech.	Trabzon	2,685	500
Kayseri	Kayseri	266	100
19 Mayıs	Samsun	366	50
Ortadogu Tech.	Ankara	9,494	2,210
Selcuk	Konya	1,240	410
TOTAL		125,363	23,227

#### Social Sciences Predominate in Higher Education

In a listing made by examining the relative numbers of degrees earned from institutions of higher education, the social science field occupies first place. In the 1975-76 academic year, 8,556 students received degrees in social sciences, out of a total of 79,545 students working on degrees in this area. During the same period, the area with the fewest students enrolled and degrees granted was fine arts, with 2,599 students and 247 degrees granted.

The figures for students enrolled and degrees granted for the other higher educational disciplines are as follows:

Humanities	16,452 students	1,458 graduates
Technical fields	86,581 "	7,979 "
Law	12,199 "	1,130 "
Natural Sciences	14,680 "	1,038 "
Engineering	80,353 "	6,735 "
Medical Science	24,541 "	4,148 "
Agriculture	6,035 "	906 "

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## NEGLECT OF THE COMMON MAN'S POSITION CRITICIZED

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 30 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Ali Gevgilili: "The Real Anarchist Among Us"]

[Text] Every day we have a new problem, now the "presidential elections," then "Turkey's political or economic situation." In that context, then, we are probably beginning to ignore the most important matter of all.

Yes, we are somehow forgetting about the "man in the street."

And yet, the "man in the street," whether worker, civil servant, low-income or disadvantaged peasant, is a person who is already just barely managing to make ends meet. The virus called inflation keeps gnawing away at him above all others. You may find in the following brief lines the measure of his deterioration:

In Istanbul, prices rose in February 1980 alone by more than 20 percent.

No joke, Turkey used to consider it bad when prices rose 20 percent in the course of a whole year.

Excepting the unforgettable world crisis of 1929, the Turkish republic is witnessing such a price jump for the first time in its history.

Now we are forced to state the bare facts.

At a time when price increases were able to reach 120 percent in the past 12 months, purchasing power has shrunk by more than half. As for eliminating erosion of this magnitude, no method is yet known in Turkey. Besides, the problem has another dimension. In Turkish society, which is often said to consume more than it needs, "belt tightening" is an important item on the agenda. It may be thought, considering expenditures, that belts could in fact be tightened with great success.

But, you ask, is this true?

A healthy belt-tightening, as it is understood by modern regimes whether capitalist or socialist, includes not just such concepts as "doing without," "unemployment" or "hunger." Real belt-tightening is the elimination of "excessive" or "luxury" consumption after meeting the needs considered vital for human health and productivity. Thus, the savings necessary to the economy for more abundant investment and production would be automatically ensured.

Turkey is today embroiled in consumption anarchy from this aspect. Inflation is making mincemeat of all the working classes whose income remains static, while for certain groups to whom inflation means a multiplication of their advantages, it is business as usual.

So let them come, the strikes, lockouts and social disturbances one after another. Let them come, the frightening plans, raids and terrorism one after another; the dead-end streets of anarchy!

Is it for nothing that it has been said: "Those who sow the wind reap a storm"?

If we want a better society, we must look first to our "man in the street."

The real story lies there.

...and the most frightening of anarchists takes the shape of inflation and walks among us all.

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## FIGURES GIVEN ON NATION'S DEBT REPAYMENT

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 23 Apr 80 p 4

[Text] It appears that only about one-third of foreign debt payments have been clearly reflected on balance of payments sheets. According to the Central Bank, \$2.6 billion were paid in 1979 against the principal and interest on Turkey's long, middle and short-term debt. Despite this, according to balance of payment figures prepared by the Finance Ministry for all of 1979, \$872 million were paid against principal and interest. Since it seems that only 33 percent of real foreign debt payments made were recorded as "foreign debt" in balance of payments statistics, it follows that payments were overlooked by using "elimination procedures" in accounting for various balance of payments entries.

Moreover, according to Central Bank data, 26.2 percent of the \$2.6 billion in foreign debt payments that Turkey made in 1979 were paid as interest on that debt. In 1979, \$1.93 billion in principal and \$683.7 million in interest were paid.

Although within the framework of Turkey's foreign debt--officially announced to have reached \$14.6 billion in 1979--it seems that short-term debt has taken a lesser portion relative to years past. It appears that 75.5 percent of Turkey's debt payments last year were made on short-term debt and interest. Short-term debts constituted 73 percent of debt payment on principal made by Turkey last year and 66.1 percent of all interest payments.

A \$1.52 billion payment was made in 1979 on the Turkish public and private short-term debt [principal] while \$452.2 million were paid as interest. When looking at short-term debt payments, it appears that these alone took a 30.1-percent portion of all payments on principal. A \$590.3 million payment was made last year against bank credit imports; \$118 million were paid in interest on these debts. It also appears that interest paid on "imports in exchange for commodities" debts took a more significant portion and that a total \$280.2-million payment--including \$152.3 million in interest--on these debts was made to foreign countries and institutions.

Turkey, which experienced sounder development in the term structure of its foreign debts in 1979, raised the level of its middle- and long-term debt from 47.2 percent in 1978 to 69.9 percent last year.

Also in 1979, Turkey paid \$639.9 million in principal and interest on middle and long-term debts to various international institutions and governments. Of this, \$408.4 million was principal and \$351.5 million was interest.

In addition, Turkey paid a \$91.8-million debt--including \$3.3 million in interest--to the IMF. Moreover, \$175.7 million against principal and \$169 million as interest were paid on middle- and long-term debts to other international bodies.

As for debts Turkey incurred on European money markets, a total \$173.2 million--including \$119.2 million against principal and \$54 million as interest--were paid back.

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## VARIOUS GROUPS VOICE OPPOSITION TO AUTOMATIC WAGE INDEXING

Ankara YANKI in Turkish 24-30 Mar 80 p 16

[Text] "This law bill is a bill whose purpose is to do away with collective bargaining and the right to strike." When RPP [Republican People's Party] Chairman General Ecevit spoke these words at the Tarsus meeting, debates on the cost-of-living escalator system that the Demirel government had announced on its 100th day in office that it would pass had begun again. The Demirel government had submitted to the assembly a law bill that proposes that wages in the public sector be increased as prices increase.

The escalator system is a system that is applied in countries with high rates of inflation and that automatically increases wages to the same degree as price increases. According to the law bill, wages and other payments that are considered to be wages in the public sector would be raised in February and August to correlate with increases on the wholesale goods price index published by the Ministry of Trade. When giving pay raises, attention would also be given to increases in the national income from the previous period. The law would become effective 1 January 1981 and would be in force for 5 years.

The RPP chairman general has come out against the law bill. According to Ecevit, the purpose of the bill is to set on a shelf democratic workers' rights. "Its aim is to shelve democratic workers' rights, to shelve democracy as well," he said and added, "No one in Turkey has the power to do this."

Social-democrat-leaning unions affiliated with Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor] also oppose the escalator bill. Yol-Is [Turkish State Highway Workers Unions Federation] Secretary General Muzaffer Sarac stated, "The escalator system is a new ploy designed to eliminate the unionist movement and the collective bargaining system. It violates Article 47 of the constitution. Unionist organizations of the working class will come out as a single force against the system that the government hopes to institute. Just as taxation of seniority compensation was not allowed the right to life, the escalator system will not either. Tez Buro-Is [Turkish Office and Clerical Employees Union] Education Secretary Guven Onler said,



"Who will form the committee that decides how and how much wages will be increased? How will the decision be reached? Not finding these details in the law bill increases our concerns over the escalator system." Unions cringe at replacing the system of collective bargaining with that of the escalator system and assert that this violates Article 47 of the constitution. Turk-Is Education Secretary General Kaya Ozdemir stated, "It is natural for us to oppose interference with the collective bargaining system."

Turk-Is Secretary General Sadik Side said, "We believe that workers' rights, which are guaranteed by the constitution, will never be able to be rescinded." Turk-Is has protested strongly against the escalator system. DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions], on the other hand, has not yet given its reaction.

DPT [State Planning Organization] experts feel that it would be difficult to apply the system in Turkey. One DPT specialist said, "Consumer indices are old and should be discarded. They do not reflect the true situation. They do not include important changes such as in rents. Therefore, the escalator system cannot perform its purpose of keeping up with inflation."

Businessmen support the escalator system. They have long defended a wage system that reflects increases in national income and productivity and that will increase as prices increase. This bill meets these requirements. Businessman Ertugrul Soysal said, "It is a topic of curiosity how unions, which first claim that workers' purchasing power is being reduced by inflation and which then reject the system that automatically compensates for this reduction through the escalator system, are protecting workers' interests."

The NSP [National Salvation Party], as well, came out against the system. Sener Battal said, "The goal of the government is to retract workers' rights." YSE-IS [Highways, Water, and Electric Workers Union] Education Secretary Irfan Alpaslan stated, "Even if the system worked well and wages rose through this system, the only thing that would increase, because the tax bite remains fixed, are taxes paid to the state. Taxes would absorb wage increases."

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## 'CUMHURİYET' NOTES FAILURE OF DEMIREL'S ECONOMIC PACKAGE

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 25 Mar 80 p 5

[Commentary by Kenan Mortan]

[Text] The second month since the decisions of 25 January was completed today. A general evaluation of the situation makes it evident that the result of these decisions has been a complete fiasco. Measures which were presented as means to increase production, stimulate exports, combat inflation, and create creditworthiness vis-a-vis foreign loans have done nothing but lead to a veritable explosion in prices; the lines everyone waits in to buy all the basic goods have continued.

The basic pillar of the decisions, and the aspect of the economic package which most directly affects the average citizen, has been the price increases. The official justification was the "dual price system" which had existed. In addition to the extreme price increases applied to liquid fuel, increases have been experienced in iron, cement, paper, coal, and transport fees. Furthermore, in a proclamation released on 1 February, all market prices were de-regulated. This decision not to intervene in the market, inspired by the conceptions of [Milton] Friedman, has turned into a degree of "laissez-faire" such as is not even observed in liberal economies, as Ecevit observed in his budget address. And dual prices have still not been eliminated. Structural iron with an official price of 31 lira is today being sold at 50 lira. Bags of cement officially priced at 240 lira are sold for 270 lira, if they can even be found. And while the price of paper, so high as to endanger freedom of the press, has increased from 9 lira per kilo to 41 lira per kilo, to actually purchase it for 55 lira per kilo is not at all unheard of. This explosion has also been reflected in the price indexes. These record increases, which in all the world have been the lot of only a few nations such as Chile and Israel, are being surpassed within merely two months in our nation. The criterion we have used as the basis for this statement is the index of the Izmir Chamber of Commerce, which is the newest and,

by virtue of the weighting system used, the most reliable index in Turkey. In the first two months of this year, while the general price level showed a 22-percent increase, food prices, which should be least affected by the general increase, rose 21 percent. Perhaps such general price increases are only natural after such a large devaluation and such great increases in officially set prices. However: it is possible that this element, seen after the de-regulation of prices, will continue at the present rate, and that the price increases will amount to 200 percent by the end of the year. Market prices have been released from any sort of control, and there was nothing in the devaluation to prevent this from being reflected throughout the economy, despite the exchange rate for imports having been set at 56 lira. The private sector is operating at a very reduced capacity, and the public sector has consciously been neglected. Demirel must have projected all this, in that he has formed a committee to freeze workers' wages as the only means of combatting rising prices. It is clear that these efforts to freeze wages will continue in the days to come, with a sliding scale and similar measures being implemented. Yet it is also plain that the reaction to this policy comes not merely from the average citizen and the organized sectors of society, but rather extends even as far as JP leaders. For instance, JP Parliamentarian Cemal Tercan, a representative of the class of small businessmen, held a press conference in which he openly criticized the Chambers of Industry on this topic.

#### Devaluation

The lira has been devalued to 70 to the dollar, in a decision that astonished everyone; why was the dollar, which wasn't pegged so high even in the free market, valued so high?.. It's because the JP wants to preclude any more devaluations before the elections... Yet another reason is Turgut Ozal's outlook in this regard. When Ozal was explaining to us the story of the 1970 devaluation, which had been realized through his efforts, he said that "In London, I mentioned such a figure to Mr. Sturc that even he was astonished..." It is hoped that by keeping the exchange rate high (known as "overvaluing" in the West), credit will be attracted to Turkey. It is also believed that exports will be stabilized... In 1970, these results were partially attained... But neither today's world nor the makeup of today's Turkey are comparable to 1970...

What has the concrete effect of these decisions been on exports? What is apparent is that exports have not exhibited the slightest increase. Moreover, since the value of the Turkish currency has been continually falling, inputs of foreign exchange are falling as well. For instance, 20,000 tons of tobacco was exported in the January-February period of last year. This year, approximately the same quantity was exported: 19,000 tons... Yet there was no improvement in foreign exchange earnings. While the income last year was 60 million dollars, this year it was 59 million. The same process is observed in cotton. In the first month of last year (when the exchange rate was 25 lira to the dollar), export earnings from cotton were 965 million lira; this year, this figure dropped to 801 million lira...

There has been no increase in exports of the basic products. But there have been increases in a number of what we might term secondary products. Carpets, licorice extract, tannic acid, and leather garments are included in this group. What is clear is that the devaluation was made for the sake of this type of products, and that the share of total exports accounted for by these products does not even amount to 50 million dollars...

#### Unconstitutional

The latest situation in regard to these recent decisions, which are rapidly drawing Turkey into an economic morass, is as follows: the RPP, aware that the package includes a number of rulings that are contrary to the Constitution, are continuing their preparatory work on the topic. RPP leader Ecevit, in a press conference held 8 March in Izmir, reported that this preparatory work was in its final stage. Thus the economic measures in question, which according to Western circles are the most significant decisions that Turkey has made in the economic area in the past 50 years, have reached the state of being very possibly overturned. Actually, after the Chairman of the Aegean Chamber of Industry, who is known to be closely aligned with the JP, said that "Decisions that would really revive the economy have been shelved," what else is left to be said?..

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## 'YANKI' QUESTIONS OZAL'S ABILITY TO SOLVE ECONOMIC WOES

Ankara YANKI in Turkish 14-20 Apr 80 p 34

[Editorial commentary: "Minister Without Portfolio: Turgut Ozal"]

[Text] The most colorful aspect of the JP [Justice Party] minority government is no doubt Demirel's handing to Turgut Ozal the reins for getting the country out of its economic woes. It is Turgut Ozal's clearly making his weight felt in an interesting way, not just in economic matters but in an area which also involves foreign policy. It is, thus, the emergence of a deputy prime minister without portfolio, who is not a member of the cabinet.

An electrical engineer, there is nothing untoward in Turgut Ozal's applying the experience he gained in the [State] Planning Organization and at the World Bank to the service of the Demirel government, as he did earlier to that of various private sector establishments. To date, we have watched the implementation of not very consistent policies under the name of "mixed economy." Even administrations, like the RPP, which say they give more weight to the state sector, have practiced mixed-up systems in which the state sector has been sacrificed to the private sector and individuals have been allowed to benefit from the taxes paid by millions of citizens. They have managed neither to protect the public nor to satisfy the private sector. As for the present, in Turgut Ozal's hands, a market economy is being applied in Turkey, one such as practiced nowhere else in the world.

Demirel said while in the opposition: "There are 500 billion petrodollars on the European market. Turkey can get some of it at any time. You just have to know how to do it." Now, through Turgut Ozal, he is saying: "Turkey is in the position of being unable to get credit on the free market. It can get credit from states, but this has political conditions." He is stressing acceptance of the IMF's conditions and demonstration of the closest possible ties to the West as the only way to get credit.

Foreign policy is also obviously among the matters turned over to Turgut Ozal. There is in this the implication: "If there were a leftist administration in Turkey, Iraq and Syria would go. Russia would enter the Persian Gulf. Russia would shift to Europe the divisions it keeps on Turkey's borders. The West must do its part to keep Turkey from this pitfall. Of course, Turkey will apply the rules of a market economy."



When Demirel had a parliamentary majority in 1970, Turgut Ozal was one who played an important role in the implementation of stabilization measures supported by new tax levies. It may be that he expects success now from what was successful at that time. But neutral economists agree that there are big and important differences between Turkey's conditions in 1970 and Turkey's conditions in 1980. The difference in the inflation rate, the difference in export potential, the difference in oil prices; these are only a few. Therefore, it is quite doubtful whether Turgut Ozal -- from whom the JP expects miracles -- can achieve 1970 results this time.

Ozal certainly believes that what they are doing is the best way of getting Turkey out of its great economic distress. There is a great deal of truth in this ... but, the underlying mistake, in our opinion, is that by isolating himself from the large industrial sector of which he is a member, he is failing to get inside a broad socioeconomic picture taking in all of Turkey. Otherwise, he clearly knows how destructive inflation is, that getting it under control must be the first step and how important it is for Turkey to use all its resources to obtain foreign credit.

By having the gumption to place very heavy burdens on the shoulders of millions of low-income and fixed-income citizens, Turgut Ozal has taken steps which will only be helpful to those who take a large share from the Turkish national income. As for the advantages he has enumerated that Turkey will gain in seeking aid from the West, these depend on the self-denial and vigilance of millions whom he has not taken into account. Ozal's plan is a single-minded plan bound to eliminate the Turkish middle class and lacking measures to prevent this great hazard. Because of this, the most optimistic guess at its success is about the same as those in certain South American countries. And it depends on the arrival in Turkey, which is offering to the West its services as watchman, of the aid expected from the West. Turgut Ozal is now telling both the West and the Turkish citizenry what amounts to: "This is our last chance. If we do not succeed, the system will collapse." Aside from the truth in this evaluation, it also has a humiliating aspect for the JP minority administration for which it will pay the consequences. These words show that Demirel, by the hand of Turgut Ozal, is laying the nation on the line.

There is none who does not agree on how confused Turkey's problems have become. It is certain that they cannot be unraveled by a single person, however adroit, like Turgut Ozal, who is sincere, hardworking and widely experienced, but all of whose capabilities are well known by those closely associated with him and who is used to looking at events from only one angle.

It is impossible not to hope that Turgut Ozal's measures will bring inflation under control and not lead to explosive social reactions. 1980 will be the year of Turgut Ozal. At the end of it, he will either have made a solid place for himself in this nation or he will be looking for another one to go to.

**'YANKI' CALLS ON LEADERS TO 'OPEN THEIR EYES'**

Ankara YANKI in Turkish 14-20 Apr 80 p 6

[Editorial commentary: "Ecevit and Demirel Must Open Their Eyes"]

[Text] There is a plot afoot in Turkey. There are people trying to do everything possible to remove Demirel from the Head of the JP [Justice Party] and Ecevit from the head of the RPP, replace their views with their own and bring in people who they think will protect their interests. The weak sides of the two leaders are, of course, being used to advantage in this plan. Their mistakes are being exaggerated. And they are helping this plot by failing to rally themselves with sufficient speed.

Let us read together:

"In its entire history, the Republic has not seen this much irresponsibility, this much personal ambition, leaders who, when in the opposition, cruelly denigrate, defame and denounce something they thought 'could be done' when prime minister. It is the effect of these two leaders, who would even make a pact with the devil against each other but who cannot get together to confront the general opinion that politics would be better off without them, that the rights and wrongs in Turkey cannot be debated with common sense. No sooner is there an attempt to show some wrong to be right or some right to be wrong than one of the two takes a firm position at the side of whoever is doing it. The simplest arguments are made into the severest smear campaigns. It is because of this that Turkish public opinion is slipping into ideological warfare, a maelstrom of value judgments.

"Will the broad base work as long as these two shoes remain on the feet? Trouble, it is seen, is crystallizing here. The last chance for democracy can only be lost with these two shoes. However, the parties still have one chance to save their feet from these shoes.

"More and more people believe that one of them could not herd four geese and that the other 'can be neither village nor town.' And perhaps these are the truest descriptions of them. The only true descriptions..."

We have criticized Demirel since the first issue of this magazine. We began to criticize Ecevit, also, after the first year of his administration. We see many mistakes by both leaders which would justify this campaign against them. But at this point, we find it our duty to warn all true believers in democracy, including the two top leaders, of the plan being attempted. In the past 10 years, we have seen domestic and foreign interest circles continuously seeking by undemocratic means and methods to lay hands on the administration of the nation by bringing about a change in the leadership cadres of the large parties. And the present plan is another, giving a new look to old exercises.

Demirel, perhaps, does not know much about it, but we think that Ecevit is aware; resistance is necessary against the methods of any powers to initiate action in less developed nations like Turkey through manipulation of public opinion and to bring in people -- trained as a fifth column and well placed internally -- called "moles" in English spy literature to replace the leaders.

We will be unflagging in our criticism of Demirel and of Ecevit when we find their attitudes erroneous. We will resist their suppression or denial of persons of true worth who rise in their parties. We will work for the sincere conduct within the political parties of true democracy. However, we will not accept actions by domestic and foreign interest circles to pull down the political leaders for their own purposes and replace them with "moles." But the real effort in this regard belongs to the two leaders rather than us. They have to clean up their acts. They must understand that they have to turn away from their stubbornness and errors which are so obvious as to be easily exploited and which it is possible to rectify. Otherwise, the tide which has begun to turn against them will swell.

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## EXPORT REDUCTION NOTED, CONSISTENT ECONOMIC POLICY URGED

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 10 Apr 80 p 9

[Article by Dr Haluk Cillov]

[Text] So we learn that our exports for the first two months of this year were \$587 million. This figure represents \$82 million less than in the same period last year.

The decline in exports occurred mainly in February. The most important goal of the 25 January devaluation was said to be the increase of exports. Yet our exports have gone counter to what was hoped. From this standpoint, we cannot interpret the decline in exports as "a positive development." Granted, we know it is impossible to see the positive effect of devaluation on exports in just one month, but still we believe in the need to understand that it is not easy to manage the economy "by a single hand" and to take measures accordingly.

Actually, exports usually show a decline in the early months of the year in our country, where agricultural produce accounts for 60 percent of exports. Moreover, there are no grain stocks for exporting this year. Nevertheless, even what we did have could not be sold abroad in the measure desired because of the price hike or the excessive fund payments charges. This happened, for example, in mohair. Approximately 2,000 tons of mohair was in stock but could not be sold abroad because of the fund's being kept so high. The same thing is said to have happened in tobacco and hazel nuts. So it seems that simplifying the formalities (it can hardly be said that this was done) or eliminating registration procedures or tossing out a slogan such as "export mobilization" alone is not sufficient to increase exports. It is seen that even the hasty, severe devaluation has been ineffective in increasing exports.

The first condition for successful exportation is to produce the agricultural products demanded on world markets, to be attentive to appropriate pricing and to make the necessary commitments on time. It is necessary in this context to review the "fund" rates now taken from agricultural exports and to discuss whether elimination of registration is beneficial.



Meanwhile, the export of industrial products calls for a totally different skill. Superior quality and price competition play a very important role here. Yet the steady increase in costs of exportable industrial products, which are produced on a limited scale in our country, is causing difficulties in this area. The failure to overcome the foreign exchange squeeze largely hampers the economic development of the nation. Moreover, spreading strikes and the inability to ensure labor peace are pushing production down. One wonders, for instance, whether it would be possible to sell a Renault automobile, which is sold for around 780,000 liras in Turkey today, to foreign countries but at half the price.

It is seen that developing exportation with words and even bringing it up to the \$3 billion level this year is very difficult, indeed quite impossible in the present climate of inflation. Yet it is known that exports must be increased in order to reduce the near \$4 billion gap expected between exports and imports this year. Besides, we do not think that worker remittances of foreign exchange will even reach \$2 billion in the present atmosphere. Monetary operations, necessary in theory but unnecessary from the standpoint of national conditions, have not prevented the flow, in practice, of worker foreign exchange to Tahtakale. Indeed, the continuing failure to get the inflationary pressure under control constitutes the greatest obstacle to development of exportation.

In short, the failure to implement an export-oriented production policy in agriculture and external dependence in the production of industrial goods are preventing growth of export revenues at the level desired.

Years of failing to get exportation encouragement beyond platonic practice as well as enjoying the benefit of foreign aid has pushed Turkey into its present straits.

However, what we must realize is that we have to get out of these straits by our own resources.

Turkey's ability to continue the importation required depends, first of all, on increasing foreign exchange revenues. To do this, we have to evaluate wisely everything from tobacco to carobs, from the sun to the sea, from the needle to the thread. The present administration has taken this knowledge to heart. But still it is our opinion that knowledge alone is not sufficient, that in order to straighten out the economy we need to put illusions aside and conduct a consistent and stable economic policy.

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## REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAX BURDEN OUTLINED

Istanbul IKTISAT GAZETESI in Turkish 13 Mar 80 pp 3, 7

[Article by Ibrahim Goktepe]

[Text] Realization of general budget revenues for 1980 depends, in large part, on the realization of the income tax. For this reason, we will go into the subject in this article and attempt to clarify certain important points.

According to 1976 statistics, there were 4,862,461 taxpayers in our country that year. Of these, 972,664, or 20 percent, filed the annual form; 708,113, or 14.6 percent, were lump-sum taxpayers; 3,181,684, or 65.4 percent, filled in the short form.

Of the lump-sum taxpayers, 13.6 percent are people in business and the trades, .7 percent are in the services and .3 percent are independent professionals.

Of those filing the short form, 65 percent are wage earners, and .3 percent consists of corporation withholding taxes.

Again according to 1976 statistics, which we have used as they are the most complete statistics available, 29.8 percent of the income taxes collected came from those filing annual returns, .4 percent from lump-sum taxpayers, 64.4 percent from wage earners, and 5.4 percent was in the form of corporation withholdings.

The regional distribution of income-tax payers in our country is noteworthy also. Distribution is shown in Table I.

The greater part of income-tax payers in all three categories are in the Marmara area. Next, though quite far behind, from the standpoint of those subject to the annual statement, are Central Anatolia and the Aegean region. Again quite far behind, the Aegean, eastern Anatolia and Black Sea regions follow the Marmara region from the standpoint of lump-sum taxpayers.

The table indicates that income-tax payers, whether filing the annual form, the short form or lump-sum taxpayers, are gradually concentrating in the Marmara area.

Attention is required also to the income groups in our country which include the taxpayers subject to the annual statement. Distribution of these taxpayers by income-range categories, according to 1976 statistics, is shown in Table II.

As seen, taxpayers with annual incomes of more than 1 million liras paid 23.12 percent of income taxes paid in 1976. Next come the 43,925 taxpayers with stated incomes of 115,000 liras to 265,000 liras, with 20.34 percent. The average tax per taxpayer in this first group is 1.345 million liras; in the other, 71,143 liras.

Meanwhile, although 80 percent declared annual incomes of less than 55,000 liras, the income taxes they paid comprise only 15.97 percent of the total. It would seem, then, that a large portion of the income-tax payers are small vendors.

Of those among the income-tax payers subject to the annual statement who declared incomes above 1 million liras, 71 percent are in the provinces of Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. And 62 percent of these are in Istanbul. On the other hand, 34 percent of those declaring less than 55,000 liras' income are in these three provinces.

Moreover, it is seen that in 1976 there were no taxpayers declaring more than 1 million liras' income in 19 [sic] of our provinces. These provinces are Adiyaman, Artvin, Bitlis, Cankiri, Gumushane, Hakkari, Kars, Kirsehir, Kutahya, Malatya, Maras, Mus, Ordu, Rize, Siirt, Tunceli, Usak and Van.

In 12 provinces, only one or two taxpayers declared income in excess of 1 million liras. These provinces are Agri, Bilecik, Burdur, Corum, Erzurum, Giresun, Harkin, Nevsehir, Nigde, Sinop, Urfa and Yozgat.

All of these studies show that the state is getting to the point of collecting its income taxes from specific regions, indeed even specific provinces.

Table I

Region	Annual Form %	Short Form %	Lump-Sum Taxpayers %
Mediterranean	9.8	4.7	7.7
Aegean	16.8	14.7	14.9
Marmara	39.4	39.3	37.5
Black Sea	9.8	16.7	13.7
East - Southeast	6.8	7.8	13.8
Central Anatolia	17.4	16.8	12.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table II

Income liras	Taxpayers number	%	Taxes Paid %
Noncategorized	46,569	4.79	0.03
To 10,000	304,121	31.26	0.90
10,000 - 55,000	474,690	48.80	15.07
55,000 -115,000	83,535	8.59	13.97
115,001-265,000	43,925	4.52	20.34
265,001-490,000	11,832	1.22	13.43
490,001-715,000	3,539	0.36	7.39
715,001-1,000,000	1,812	0.19	5.75
1,000,000+	2,641	0.27	23.12
Total	972,664	100.00	100.00

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## AGRICULTURAL SALES COOPERATIVES CALLED OVERSTAFFED

Istanbul IKTISAT GAZETESI in Turkish 6 Mar 80 pp 2, 8

[Article by Sezgin Taskiran: "Years Lost, Billions Lost"]

[Text] Unbacked currency in excess of 100 billion liras was printed in the 1978-1979 period, causing Turkish currency to lose value by 145 percent, and concrete figures have begun coming out on what this money was spent for, and how and on whom it was spent. Of the 1 billion-plus liras, 24,118,192,630 liras were spent on the excessive operational expenses of unions of the agricultural sales cooperatives, which were established by Law 2834 and which make support purchases. This money was used out of Agricultural Bank of Turkey resources. Moreover, recovery of this money is impossible.

The unions are completely broke owing to their failure to make adequate purchases, despite abnormal hiring in 1978-1979. Not only did operating credits fail to cover the pay roll and running expenses, but a portion of the revenues belonging to the Treasury derived from the sale of state support-purchase products on foreign and domestic markets as produce and processed items were used for the purpose of meeting these expenses. Despite this, agricultural sales cooperatives unions such as TARIS [Agricultural Workers Union], CUKOBIRLIK [Cukurova Cotton and Citrus Fruit Agricultural Sales Cooperatives Union], ANTBIRLIK [Antalya Agricultural Sales Cooperatives Union], FISKOBIRLIK [Hazel Nut Agricultural Sales Cooperatives Union], GUNEYDOGUBIRLIK [Southeastern Grape and Products' Agricultural Sales Cooperatives Union] and TIFTIKBIRLIK [Mohair and Fine Wool Agricultural Sales Cooperatives Union], which are the largest support unions, still have not met their personnel and running expenses, despite its being 6 months since the end of the season.

The important agricultural sales cooperative unions, which make support purchases and give direction to the Turkish Agricultural Policy, employed the following numbers of personnel at the end of 1977 and 1979:

Union Name	1977	Personnel Increase in 1978-1979	1979
TARIS	5,543	1,596	7,139
CUKOBIRLIK	2,895	2,296	5,191
ANTBIRLIK	2,901	616	3,517
FISKOBIRLIK	4,392	478	5,379
GUNEYDOGUBIRLIK	1,328	207	1,535
TRAKYABIRLIK [expansion unknown]	233	509	742
GULBIRLIK [expansion unknown]	50	70	120
TIFTIKBIRLIK	156	338	494
TASKOBIRLIK	102	54	156
[Agricultural Sales Cooperatives Union]			
MARMARAZEYTBIRLIK	138	147	285
[Marmara olive union]			

As will be seen in studying the above table, the agricultural sales cooperatives unions, generally hiring more personnel than needed, have added a 40 percent to 300 percent increase in personnel in the past 2 years as compared to the end of 1977.

The union staffs are approved by the Trade Ministry. In the past 2 years, there have been continuous excesses in the staffs passed by Trade Ministry approval. The size of the staffs of the agricultural sales cooperatives which make support is in proportion to the products they buy on support. The ideal rate here is 15 percent. Let me try to show by an example, however, where these rates stand today. For mohair, the amount of credit allowed to cover processing, storage and sale of one kilo of mohair, on a 10-year basis, does not exceed 15 percent of the purchase price of one kilo of mohair. That is, the Mohair and Fine Wool Agricultural Sales Cooperatives Union spent 15 liras for each 100 liras' worth of mohair purchased on behalf of the state. Yet, for 343 million liras' worth of mohair purchased on behalf of the state in 1979, TEFTIKBIRLIK spent a total of 215 million liras, 72 percent of which went for personnel costs, producing a cost rate equalling 62.7 percent of the price of the mohair purchased. The largest amount of mohair that TIFTIKBIRLIK has purchased since it was founded was in 1975 when it bought 1,531 tons and had 99 employees to perform this task on behalf of the state. In 1979, however, it had 494 personnel for the purchase of 998 tons of mohair.

Something else that has happened in the agricultural sales cooperatives unions is the appending, just shortly before the new government took office, of contracts to the collective agreements and the addition of articles to the collective agreements. With the changes made in the collective agreements, the terms of some 2-year collective agreements were automatically extended. Thousands of persons who were working on temporary worker status were put on the permanent staffs. Among those added to



the permanent staffs are people being sought as militants and anarchists by the martial law administration. With the changes made in the collective agreements, the Constitution, the Loans Law, the Trade Law and provisions of Law 274 were violated, and precedents set by scholarly and juridical opinion were applied in complete reverse. The violated article 31 of the constitution says: "Every person has the right to claim and defense as plaintiff or defendant before the legal authorities, making use of all legal means and methods." With the collective agreement concluded between TIFTIKBIRLIK and the union of state machair workers, it is as though this article did not exist, and the employer's right of recourse to the legal authorities has been restricted.

If we would give a few examples of where this money was spent, that is, on whom the still outstanding 24,118,192,630 liras were spent, it comes to mind to take a look at a report prepared by the last government's administrators of the TARIS Spinning Mill. This report was prepared by TARIS Spinning Mill Assistant Manager Kemal Serim, Operations Director Huseyin Kaban, Personnel Director Selahattin Karakas, Planning Director Kamile Olcer and Marketing Director Acar Apak.

I cite verbatim portions of this report.

"Some workers walk around idle, owing to their being backed by members of the board of directors, and they are destroying the harmony of the factory by stirring up regional feelings.

"These workers, as a bad example to the other workers because they do not work themselves, are causing lowered production and the destruction of worker discipline...

"Although the number of workers at the factory increases every day, production is seen to drop. This drop equals 32 tons per day. The mill's basic production at bare minimum is 45 tons per day, with optimal production 52 tons.

"...As directors of the mill, we act at the direction of the current ruling party principles and the policy of our esteemed director general. But it distresses us to speak of the domination of right-wing people at our mill where 900 fascists were dismissed."

From the place requiring the work of 1,400 persons, 900 experienced workers were taken off the job and the TARIS Spinning Mill labor force was raised by 2,400. Actually, the table above showing the number of workers for 1977 and 1979 does not tell the whole story. The missing element is this: the number of workers did not result from the addition of new workers to the existing number. That is, the number of newly hired workers is actually much higher. For instance, almost 3,000 of the 5,543 personnel in TARIS in 1977 were fired for being fascists and the remaining 2,543 personnel were brought to 7,139 by hiring new people. Such personnel changes TARIS took place in CUKOBIRLIK, ANTBIRLIK and other unions also.

The agricultural sales cooperatives unions shown in the table above have 6,309 more workers than at the end of 1977. The number of excess personnel if we also take into account the unions not included in the table is estimated in round figures at around 9,000 to 10,000.

According to one study, the amount invested to create one job in 1977 was 240,000 liras. If we put this figure at 500,000 liras today on account of price increases, the value of the 24,118,192,630 liras, which it is now impossible for the Agricultural Bank of Turkey and the Treasury to recover, becomes even more obvious from the investment standpoint. If this wasted money had been turned back into investment, there would have been new job opportunities for  $(24,118,192,630 \div 500,000 =)$  48,236 people. We have both deprivation of the possibility to create a large employment potential and loss of time. In short, both years and billions have been lost.

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## ILLEGAL GROUPS' PENETRATION OF PTT REPORTED

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 9 Apr 80 p 4

[Article by Olay Tan]

[Text] Minister of Transport and Communications Huseyin Ozalp has stated that, in the course of an investigation into installations affiliated with the PTT [Post, Telephone, and Telegraph Administration], he had determined that mail has been opened and that telephone calls have been monitored. Minister Ozalp said that "I observed with great sadness that privacy in communication has disappeared. There is no privacy of communications in Turkey."

Minister of Transport and Communications Ozalp spoke as follows in this regard: "I have, regretfully, established that privacy, the most important element of communications, has disappeared in Turkey. I observed this in the course of my investigations within PTT installations in Istanbul. Letters are opened and telephone calls are listened to by certain employees, who are the extensions within PTT of certain illegal political groups. Confidential and private information is provided to these groups concerning individuals of opposite views. Political crimes are committed as a result of this. We have identified most of the public employees who are being used as tools in this manner, and we are going to eliminate them from our organization."

Won't Sign Ideology-Based Contract

Transport and Communications Minister Huseyin Ozalp charged that the strike at THY [Turkish Air Lines] was ideologically based and, maintaining that an ideological contract is an obstacle to tourism, said that he would not be able to sign it. Noting that the Maritime Lines and Railroads are in a period of rapid advancement and that they will be developed in accordance with today's conditions, Ozalp spoke as follows: "We are going to increase our Maritime Bank and Maritime Transport Fleet strength."

We intend to be one not an institution which pays out foreign exchange to other countries, but rather one which earns foreign exchange. By increasing the number of ferryboat runs, we are going to put an end to the practice of transporting both passengers and cargo together. In addition, we have taken it as our goal to spread the Railroads to every portion of Turkey."

Minister Ozalp also stated that telephone service will be improved and expanded.

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## COMMENT ON FISCAL DEMANDS OF URBANIZATION ON CITIES

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 9 Apr 80 pp 1,10

[Commentary by Nazli Ilıcak]

[Text] Rapid urbanization is going on in Turkey. On one hand, the population is growing, while, on the other, each year, thousands of our countrymen, who are unable to make a living in their villages, or who have hopes of earning higher incomes in the cities, migrate to the large urban areas. The population of the cities in 1950 was 5.200 million; in 1975 it was 16.869 million. Actually, if the municipal boundaries are taken as the criterion, the population increase in the cities appears even more rapid. By this criterion the number of people living within the municipal boundaries in 1950 — 3.8 million — climbed to 22 million in 1975, amounting to 50 percent of the total population of the nation. The projections of 26 million made for 1980 show that this total will amount to 55 percent of the entire population.

Rapid urbanization means growing need and an increasingly heavier burden of services to be provided. The state should, every year, devote a greater proportion of the rising national income to the municipalities, so that they can perform their duties successfully. But, with us, it has been exactly the other way around: while the share of total public revenues taken up by the municipalities in 1968 was 14.7 percent, this figure declined to 13.3 percent in 1969, 9.7 percent in 1971, 7.3 percent in 1973, 6.2 percent in 1975, 4.4 percent in 1977, and 3.6 percent in 1980.\*

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\* Source: State Planning Organization, 1980 Program, p. 333.



If the garbage isn't picked up from in front of our house, or if our car crashes into a pothole, we grumble about the municipality. We are very good at finding fault, yet, do we ever stop to think what resources the municipalities have to work with?

In a Seminar on the Administration of Large Cities, arranged by the OECD in 1978, the daily per capita municipal expenditures for a number of cities were established as follows:

CITY	DAILY MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURE PER PERSON
Copenhagen (Denmark)	465 TL
London (England)	350 TL
Paris (France)	400 TL
Berlin (Germany)	405 TL
Tokyo (Japan)	450 TL
Ottawa (Canada)	176 TL
Belgrade (Yugoslavia)	137 TL
Bucharest (Romania)	168 TL
Sofia (Bulgaria)	205 TL
Istanbul (Turkey)	1.5 TL

Thus, before we complain about inadequacies of service, we should certainly take into account the resources available to the municipalities. Our Constitution states that "Sources of revenue should be provided for the municipalities in proportion to the services which they provide." Yet, today, municipal revenues are still determined by law number 5237, which was passed in 1948. In addition to this, there are also other laws which bear upon the municipalities' share of state revenues.\*

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\* Such as: Law for Weekly Leave (1924); Law for Numbering of Buildings and Naming of Streets (1927); Weights and Measures Law (1931); Salt Law (1936); Law on Duty to be Collected by Municipalities on Vehicles and Machines (1938); Expenditure Tax Law (1956); Civil Status Law (1960); Motor Vehicles Law (1963); and Real Property Tax Law (1970).

In large municipalities, particularly, it occurs each month that revenues are insufficient to cover expenditures, especially when the day to make payments comes at the beginning of the month. In order for our mayors to be saved from this "first-of-the-month beggary", it is absolutely essential that the material resources of the municipalities be increased. Various administrations have accepted the necessity of this, and various bills have been submitted to Parliament; yet none of them has yet become law. The bill drawn up by the Ecevit government would have provided between 9 and 11 billion lira to the various municipalities in Turkey. Passed by the legislative assemblies, this bill was vetoed by the President. Thus the matter was put off. The proposal for the Financial Stabilization Law presented to the Chairman of the National Assembly by the minority JP government will, according to Finance Minister Ismet Seagin, secure an additional 5 billion lira in funding for the municipalities. Fine... but if it is not passed into law?.. then our municipalities will continue to become poorer, our mayors will continue to beg at the doors of our state officials, and those of us who live in urban areas will continue to grumble to ourselves as we look at the potholes and uncollected garbage around us.

#### Municipality of Istanbul

Whenever the mayors ask for money, immediately the following charge is heard: "We are not going to spend the state's money merely to fund a lot of leftist militants..."

This charge was valid in the case of a certain former Mayor of Istanbul. At that time, a number of young people among the workers used to come to work only once a month. Ahmet Isvan carried partisanship so far as to say that "Sixty percent of Istanbul are RPP supporters; my supporters are all RPP; it's only natural for me to choose from among these." Aytekin Kotil is from the same party, but he has preferred to serve the people rather than the ideology that says "Get rid of all the other party's people." The most striking example of this is the increase in the number of buses over the past few months. While, at one time, 700 buses used to set out each day, this figure dropped to 400 in 1977. The bus system in Istanbul was initiated in the 1930's, and 1,220 buses have been purchased since that time. The number of buses procured by Aytekin Kotil, of which only a portion have so far begun service, is on the order of 1,500. Thus, within two years, more buses will go into service than the total purchased over the past fifty years. In addition, tasks such as paving, sewer construction, and landscaping have also been stepped up. Meanwhile, 140 garbage trucks, 60 dumptrucks, and a good deal of fire-fighting equipment have been purchased, while a cementware factory, two cement plants, and an asphalt plant have been opened. In spite of the growing burden of services, there has been no great increase in personnel over the past two years: the increase has been 622 among white-collar workers and only 18 among blue-collar workers.

The rapidly growing population, on the one hand (250,000 people are added to Istanbul's population each year), and the increases in the wages of civil servants and workers, on the other, make it necessary for our municipalities to spend more money. In two years (1979 - 1980), an increased burden of 1.536 billion lira (net) has been added to the expenditures of the Municipality of Istanbul due to the rise in municipal workers' salaries. Meanwhile, the competition between DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Unions] and Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor] is stimulating further wage increases, thus exacerbating the difficulties. There are also municipalities which fund militants, just as do the State Economic Enterprises. Evaluations should be made by examining each municipality one by one, without making general accusations, and those who are working should be dealt with differently from those who are not. The Municipality of Istanbul, which is struggling to provide services with only limited resources, deserves support.

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## COOPERATIVE EFFORT LAUNCHED FOR LARGE ANKARA HOUSING COMPLEX

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 18 Mar 80 p 6

[Article by Emin Colasan]

[Text] Work is quietly continuing in Ankara to establish, using a unique method, a new 300,000-person housing complex on 1,000 hectares of land. For the first time in the world, a union of housing cooperatives is opening up a new housing area. The goal is to construct, within the next 8 years, 50,000 residences for low and middle-income citizens in a region called "Batikent," which lies on the western end of Ankara. Work for the legal expropriation of the land has been completed, and, in accordance with the law, the money to pay for the expropriation of the 1,000 hectares has been deposited in the bank.

Batikent will be created by a union of cooperatives called the Kent Koop [City Cooperative], which was formed, under the leadership of the Ankara municipal government, by unions affiliated with DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions] and Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor] and by civil service and trade organizations. Kent Koop is continuing its work on the new city that will be established by a powerful staff consisting of economists, sociologists, city planners, architects, and engineers on the outskirts of Ankara and that will become part of Ankara.

With this goal in mind, construction cooperatives were founded by OLEYIS [Hotel, Restaurant, and Amusement Places Employees Union of Turkey], Genel-Is [Municipal Service Workers Union], Yol-Is [Turkish State Highway Workers Unions Federation], DYF-Is [Federation of Turkish Railway Worker Unions], Harp-Is [Turkish War Industry and Allied Workers Unions Federation], Agac-Is [Turkish Wood Workers Union], Basin-Is [Turkish Journalists and Press Industry Workers Union], and Tez Buro-Is [Turkish Office and Clerical Employees Union], which are affiliated with DISK and Turk-Is and by various civil service and trade associations. Later, these cooperatives were organized as a union under the roof of Kent Koop. The Ankara municipal government also has a place within the organization.

As is known, the housing sector in our country has, in recent years in particular, faced a serious dilemma. While the state has been unable to do what is left to it on this subject, the private sector and single co-operatives have been generally unsuccessful, and the housing supply has gradually decreased because of rising costs and because it is not possible to receive a significant return from rentals. It has become more attractive for persons who could build housing to deal in land speculation. As a result, rents increase a little with every passing day, and the groups of low and middle-income workers are, in particular, faced with grave monetary pressures. The city of Ankara occupies a special place in the environment that exists in Turkey. In an air basin in which it was determined that a maximum of 700,000 persons could live, more than 2 million of our citizens now fight for breath in the polluted air and wage a battle for survival.

It was as a result of these circumstances that the Kent Koop was born and began to be organized in order to undertake a construction project as large as Batikent. If Kent Koop, which expects absolutely no help from outside other than the state's moral support, succeeds, the true victims of the land, housing, and cost-of-living problems will have, by organizing, increased their influence on housing policies.

The work of Kent Koop, which aims to construct 50,000 residences within the next 8 years in a corridor opening to the west of Ankara, will be carried out in accordance with the Ankara development plan that was approved in past years and that will go into effect in 1990. This plan seeks to save the city of Ankara from the enclosed air basin and to open the city out to the west. Kent Koop has now received foreign credits in the amount of \$47 million from the United States and France. With these resources, a great amount of machinery will be brought into the country this year. In addition, the Ankara municipal government has begun work on infrastructural services for the 1,000 hectares of land on which legal expropriation procedures have been completed. Road building is continuing at a fast pace. It is expected that foundations will be laid within the next 1 or 2 months at the latest. Infrastructure projects are being designed by the Middle East Technical University Faculty of Engineering.

The Kent Koop project has also been studied by the European Housing Fund and was found to be "worthy of support." At a meeting to be held 23 March in Strasbourg, this organization will furnish Kent Koop with low-interest, long-term credit in the amount of 2 billion liras.

It is reported that Kent Koop is presently at the stage at which it can assign land to 25,000 persons. Furthermore, approximately 25,000 citizens, other than those in member cooperatives, have applied to Kent Koop for membership. A decision dealing with the method of handling these citizens' membership requests will be forthcoming soon.



## Physical Organization

Batikent, which will be created by Kent Koop, will be organized as follows:

1. Neighborhoods: There will be a "neighborhood" for every 5,000 residents. Thus, it is calculated that there will be a total of 40 neighborhoods in Batikent. Approximately five cooperatives will create a neighborhood. In each neighborhood, there will be a public nursery, playground, park, and market.
2. Wards: For every two neighborhoods, there will be a "ward." Every ward will have a primary and middle-school site, a ward market, and a theater.
3. Quarters: For every five wards or 50,000 residents, a "quarter" will be established. Within the quarter, there will be two mother and child health centers, two infirmaries, two police stations, a PTT [Post, Telephone, and Telegraph Administration] office, and a mosque.
4. All of Batikent will be a "center." In this center, which will be composed of four quarters, construction is planned for sports fields, a central playground and park, a large mosque, a hospital, and three trade schools at the lycee level.

## Community Usage

Housing will occupy 45 percent of the 1,000 hectares of land in Batikent, and 55 percent of the land will be designated for community use. As a general principle, 5 to 12-story apartment buildings will be constructed with SSK [Social Security Organization Directorate General], Bagkur [Social Security Association relating to Tradesmen, Artisans, and Independent Workers], and MEYAK [Government Employees Mutual Aid Society] credit while one or two-story "coordinated residences" will be built with individuals' own resources as an alternative to shack housing. In addition to this, 4 percent of the housing will be set aside for "rentals" to be managed by cooperatives. The one or two-story residences that are termed "coordinated housing" or "the antithesis of shack housing" will be built with personal resources by those who are unable to obtain credit on land given to them by the administration, by persons who are newcomers to the city, and by persons who have built shack housing in the city and who will give those houses to the city.

According to estimates, the total cost of Batikent will reach 63 billion liras by the time the project is completed in 8 years. This money will be obtained from cooperatives that will be formed, membership fees, and other revenues. At this time, Kent Koop's assets have reached 500 million liras. With the money on hand, construction of residences of various sizes will begin in the near future. However, the largest residence will not be able to exceed 100 square meters. Work will be carried out with surveyors at the

first stage. Following this, construction unions will carry out the work planned by Kent Koop.

Kent Koop, which is composed of the largest unions and of civil service and trade associations, could become one of the most powerful organizations in Turkey from the monetary standpoint.

Batikent, the new housing area that will be inaugurated by, for the first time in Turkey and in the world for that matter, a union of housing cooperatives, will be the size of the city of Eskisehir. Kent Koop, which is composed of the Ankara municipal government, member unions of DISK and Turkiye Is, and civil service and trade associations, has completed a large proportion of its work on Batikent. All of the unions and associations belonging to the organization recently held individual general council meetings on the subject of Kent Koop. At Kent Koop's first general council meeting also held recently, members of the administrative council were selected. They are Ali Dincer, Murat Karayalcin, Kadri Atabas, Korel Goymen, Ertan Andac, Muzaffer Sarac, Kenan Durukan, Huseyin Baser, and Erdal Tandiroglu.

If there are no obstacles, Kent Koop will, in the near future, establish a giant city using a completely new housing policy in our country and a unique form of organization. This city will be created through the organizational power of the Ankara municipal government and workers' and tradesmen's associations and through the sweat of laborers.

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